

JPRS 80129

18 February 1982

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2489

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

18 February 1982

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2489

## CONTENTS

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Information Ministers Comment on Baghdad Conference ('Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi; AL-DUSTUR, 16 Nov 81) .....	1
Arab Labor Organization Draws Up Proposals at Baghdad Conference (Wasam 'Ali; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 23-29 Nov 81).	6
Energy Conference To Be Held in Doha (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 22 Jan 82) .....	10

## OPEC AFFAIRS

OPEC Strategy for Coming Year Discussed (8 DAYS, 16 Jan 82) .....	11
--	----

## PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

Bahrain Incident Underscores Gulf Security Concerns (Sulayman Nimr; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 26 Dec 81) .....	13
Gulf Security Examined in Light of Umm Al-'Aysh Bombing (Sulayman al-Farzali; AL-HAWADITH, 9 Oct 81) .....	15
GCC Said To Affect Region's Military Balance (AL-DUSTUR, 5 Oct 81) .....	21
Closer Relations With USSR Cited (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 23 Jan 82) .....	22
GCC Economic, Political Progress Discussed (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 18 Jan 82) .....	26
<b>Briefs</b>	
Saudi-Kuwaiti Cement Project	28

## AFGHANISTAN

Afghan Prince Discusses Resistance Movement  
('Abd al-Mawla Interview; AL-MAJALLAH, 6-12 Feb 82) ..... 29

Ex-Shah Elaborates Position on Present Crisis  
(Zahir Shah Interview; AL-MAJALLAH, 6-12 Feb 82) ..... 32

## ALGERIA

Interview With President Chadli Bendjedid Published  
(Chadli Bendjedid Interview; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 4-10 Dec 81) 37

Dissident Leader Hocine Ait Ahmed Interviewed  
(Hocine Ait Ahmed Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 7 Dec 81) ..... 49

Farming Problems Examined  
(AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 25 Jan 82) ..... 53

## BAHRAIN

Briefs  
Banking Figures ..... 55  
Refinery Production Record ..... 55

## IRAN

Khomeyni Seen Becoming Ill-Tempered With Followers  
(DER SPIEGEL, 11 Jan 82) ..... 56

Steps Taken To Resolve Foreign-Trade Problems  
(AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 11, 18 Jan 82) ..... 59

Restriction of Imports  
Standoff of Petrochemical Complex  
Loans for Raw Materials

Deputy Minister Discusses Domestic Food Production  
(KEYHAN, 17 Jan 82) ..... 62

Briefs  
PM Urges Heavy Industry Be Restarted ..... 64  
Violence in Iran ..... 64  
Meat Shortage Discussed ..... 64  
Military Equipment for Iraq ..... 64  
Friendship Agreement ..... 65  
Striking Workers Killed ..... 65  
Interests Section in Algerian Embassy ..... 65  
Islamic Society Member Dies ..... 65  
Embassy Appointments Announced ..... 65

**IRAQ**

Transfer of Ambassador From France to Tunisia Discussed (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 7 Nov 81) .....	66
Political, Military Strategy Behind Karun River Withdrawal Discussed (AL-HAWADITH, 9 Oct 81) .....	68
Future French Nuclear Cooperation Discussed (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 18 Jan 82) .....	71
Diversification of Exports Sought (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 13 Dec 81) .....	72
Lebanese Problem Affecting Country's Oil Exports (8 DAYS, 16 Jan 82) .....	74
New Accounting System Instituted (AL-THAWRAH, 28 Nov 81) .....	76
Briefs Japanese Truck Order	78

**ISRAEL**

Activity of Marginal Political Groups Analyzed (Ilan Greilsammer; REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, Oct-Dec 81) .....	79
Former West Bank Commander Discusses Arab Viewpoint (Benyamin Ben-Eli'ezer Interview; BAMAHAINE, 4 Nov 81) ....	105
Bedouin Village Experiences Problems (Yoram Hamizrahi; HA'ARETZ, 13 Nov 81) .....	112

**KUWAIT**

Crown Prince Sa'd al-'Abdallah Interviewed (Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim Qadri Qal'aji Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 25 Dec 81) .....	116
Controversy, Passage of Citizenship Law Analyzed (AL-TALI'AH, 16, 30 Dec 81) .....	120
Dispute Over Citizenship Law Citizenship Law Passed by National Assembly	
KPC Plans To Step Up Oil Exploration (Graham Benton, John LeRoux; 8 DAYS, 16 Jan 82) .....	123

Briefs		
Port Traffic		125
Bond Issue Figures		125
LEBANON		
Israel Blamed for Recent Bombings (AL-MAJALLAH, 26 Sep-2 Oct 81) .....	126	
Assistance From France Said To Be Mutually Beneficial ('Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 3 Oct 81) .....	129	
MAURITANIA		
Staying Out of Trouble (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, 20 Jan 82) .....	132	
MOROCCO		
Commodities Price Increase Persists in Morocco (Editorial Report) .....	136	
OMAN		
Five-Year Plan Accomplishments Cited (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 7 Nov 81) .....	137	
QATAR		
Briefs		
Water Injection Project	140	
Foreign Investment	140	
SAUDI ARABIA		
Country's Foreign Policy Examined (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 11 Jan 82) .....	141	
Energy Development Aid Promised to Pakistan (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 18 Jan 82) .....	143	
Briefs		
Loan to Bangladesh	144	
Japanese Desalination Cooperation	144	
European Contracting Advantage	144	
Trade Ties With Taiwan	145	
SYRIA		
Dams To Be Built on al-'Asi, al-Sarut Rivers (AL-BA'TH, 26 Oct 81) .....	146	

New Dam, Irrigation, Drainage Projects Discussed (AL-BA'TH, 27 Oct 81) .....	148
Electricity To Be Generated From Waterfalls (AL-BA'TH, 27 Oct 81) .....	150
Construction of Syrian Section of Hejaz Railroad To Begin Shortly (AL-BA'TH, 23 Oct 81) .....	151
Briefs	
Aleppo Investment Budgets	153
Cotton Seed Production	153
TUNISIA	
Dialogue Interviews Mahmoud Messaadi (Mahmoud Messaadi Interview; DIALOGUE, 16 Nov 81) .....	154
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
Ra's al-Khaymah Ruler Discusses GCC, Border Issues (Saqr Ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 1 Dec 81).....	162
Abu Dhabi Surplus Expected To Fall (Graham Benton; 8 DAYS, 16 Jan 82) .....	164
Briefs	
Dubai Aluminum Projections	166

INFORMATION MINISTERS COMMENT ON BAGHDAD CONFERENCE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 208, 16 Nov 81 pp 14-15

/Article by 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi: "Latif Nasif Jasim, the Iraqi Minister of Culture and Information, Says: 'Our Goal Is To Protect Arab Citizens From the Foreign Cultural Invasion'"/

/Text/ Baghdad--If the Arabs, in their political conferences, have been content to agree to the "minimum"--and this is the formula which Iraq relied on in accomplishing what was necessary from the Arab conferences since politics is subject to individual judgments and interpretations--they are nevertheless unable to be satisfied with anything less than the maximum in their cultural conferences. This apparently is the spirit which prevailed in the third conference of Arab ministers of culture which was recently held in Baghdad and in which all Arab countries except Syria participated.

AL-DUSTUR covered the activities of the conference and held interviews with the Arab ministers of culture, all of whom were in agreement concerning the importance of the conference in highlighting Arab national culture, embodying the authentic nature of the Arabs, and stressing the civilizational role played by the Arabs.

The first interview was with Mr Latif Nasif Jasim, the Iraqi minister of culture and information, who was the chairman of the conference. He said: "The conference is important because it represents the resolve of the Arab nation to raise the level of its culture in order to firmly establish the bases for a new cultural effort to embody the personality of the Arab nation and to achieve cultural and civilizational interaction with the Arab people. The conference represents a qualitative development in joint Arab cultural work and action. The decisions and recommendations made by the conference have been a basic and essential new turn and development which concerns the essence and basic needs of the Arab nation--needs which represent a strategic reality in the nation's modern life rather than transitory circumstantial needs which are based on reactions." Mr Jasim continued talking about strategy which emerged from the conference, saying: "The conference represented an important qualitative change and development in joint Arab cultural work and action. It established the foundations for a cultural strategy for protecting the Arab world from the foreign cultural invasion, which comes in various forms and from various sources, and filling in the obvious gap which has occurred in our Arab systems of thought, values, traditions, and the foundations of our behavior as a result of the process of hasty economic development which the Arab world has witnessed during the last few years."

"The conference stressed a new philosophy for organic coexistence with culture in the achievement of cultural and intellectual security, preparation of the means necessary to convey this intellect and to bring it out from the shadows and spread it throughout the Arab world and the rest of the world, raising the level of cultural cooperation to that of coordination and integration, confirmation of what is proper in the clauses of the charter of Arab cultural unity as a prelude to Arab cultural cooperation agreements, concern with providing support for the efforts to Arab nations to establish direct contacts and to implement the programs of cultural cooperation which they feel to be important, support for Arab writers and intellectuals and furthering Arab literary production by simplifying import and export procedures as well as customs and financial procedures dealing with literary, scientific, intellectual and artistic works, striving to propagate the Arabic language in non-Arab countries in Africa and Asia, and establishment of Arab cultural centers with the help of the Arab League and the Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization."

The Iraqi minister added: "The time has come for the Arabs to rise above their spasms, convulsions and narrow viewpoint which have hampered the work of the Arabs for so long. It is also time for the Arabs, in their thinking, to rise above negativism, narrow horizons, and their own problems. Their goal should be the interest of all of the Arab nations rather than the interest of their own individual Arab nations so that they will be able to raise Arab culture to the level where it should be and raise it above the level of being characterized by a lack of responsibility."

Dr Muhammad 'Abdu Yamani, the Saudi minister of culture and information, said, in response to our question concerning the role of the conference in embodying Arab culture: "For us Iraq, with its interest in vital issues concerning all of the Arabs and since it has held this conference of ministers of culture, has come to be considered a basic indicator of the concern which we are showing for culture in this stage of our /national/ life. I believe that the conference took place at the right time, and I believe that the subjects which were discussed were of great importance. This is especially true since many cultural issues have been ignored for so long, and the time had come for us to give them the attention that they deserved."

When asked about the role of the conference in resisting the Zionist cultural invasion of the Arab world, Dr Yamani said: "The Zionist cultural invasion of the Arab world continues. It is much more dangerous than the military onslaught against the Arab world which has been going on continuously."

"What we need to do is to resist this foreign intellectual invasion in all of its forms, whether it be a Zionist, American or Russian invasion. We must embody the authentic nature of the Arabs, build the distinctive Arab personality, and interact with the cultures of all nations--but at the same time maintain the purity and authentic nature of our own culture."

"There are dangerous dimensions to the Zionist invasion. It is attempting to erase the features of our Arab personality and to discredit and spread slander and defamation about its authentic nature."

Al-Sadiq Dahan, Libya's delegate and secretary of the Cultural Section, had the following remarks to say about this same subject: "The Zionist invasion is

something which is no longer at a standstill. It has changed over into being a vicious attack which is attempting to harm the Arabs in order to consolidate the Camp David conspiracy." "We call for the implementation of the decisions made by our conferences. In my opinion this is the most important thing we can do in order to emerge from the vicious circle which we are living in."

Mr 'Abdallah Hawrani, the director general of the Division of Information and Culture in the PLO, had the following to say about the nature of this Zionist invasion and the present situation: "There exists no Zionist culture which is attempting to stand up in the face of our Arab culture. What does exist is deliberate distortion and mutilation of the features of our Arab culture and /attempts to/ obliterate the features of our Palestinian culture and undermine our Palestinian cultural identity for the purpose of eliminating our Palestinian national personality. What we need to do then is to protect our Arab culture in the occupied Arab lands which is the means by which our people express their distinctive culture. We need to kindle the flame of revolution through our songs, qasidas, stories, novels, poetry and other literature. We also need to support culture by circulating our national writings inside the occupied territories so that they can serve to present, in comprehension form, the evidence /and accomplishments/ of Arab civilization to the inhabitants of the occupied territories."

"What the ministers of culture need to do is to support the holding of weeks of culture dedicated to the works of Palestinian artists and writers in foreign countries. It is also necessary to lend support to the cultural struggle being waged inside the occupied homeland."

Mr Boualem Bessaieh, the Algerian minister of culture and information, had the following to say concerning the path leading toward achieving standardization of foreign terms in the Arabic language in order to keep Arabic pure and free of the blemishes and stains of foreign languages: "The Arab League and the Arab countries are undertaking efforts aimed at standardizing Arabic terms in order to maintain the soundness of the Arabic language. In this regard it is necessary to make a political decision which will guarantee the preservation of the soundness of the Arabic language and the standardization of terms in the language in order to have these standard terms be used in all the countries of the Arab world." "The Zionist cultural invasion, which is attempting to penetrate the Arab world by means of the Camp David breach, is something which we must firmly oppose, and we must resist /and destroy/ the foundations on which this invasion was built."

Mr Bechir Ben Slama, the Tunisian minister of culture, gave the following reply to our question concerning the importance of the conference in developing Arab culture and reaffirming the active role played by our Arab personality: "The conference held in Baghdad has been something of great importance in view of the challenges faced by our Arab nation. The most important thing which came out of the conference was its reaffirmation of the active role played by our Arab personality and the embodiment of its active civilizational role in modern life."

"Perhaps this reaffirmation of our Arab personality is, at the same time, a reaffirmation of the influential role which this personality is able to play in resurrecting our nation's history as well as ratifying and confirming its civilizational existence as a deep-rooted, but active, nation. We should be open to /other/ cultures and not closed to them, but we must preserve the distinctive characteristics of our Arab cultural personality."

Mr Ma'n Abu Nuwwar, the Jordanian minister of culture and youth, had the following to say about his assessment of the conference in light of current circumstances which require that our Arab personality resist the attacks made by ambitious people who talk in high sounding terms about Islam: "The conference represents a new turn and development in the cultural solidarity of the Arab nation which has always preserved its authentic nature even under the darkest of circumstances and during times of tribulation. A nation which does not adhere to its morals and maintain its honor and national identity is a nation which has no history and no existence. This conference did not include in its agenda a discussion of the Khomeyni phenomenon and what it has resulted in in terms of heresies and false claims in the name of Islam which have distorted the reputation of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of the other nations of the world. In addition to this, Khomeyni's tyrannical band is committing crimes against the Muslim people /of Iran/, claiming that they are not loyal Muslims."

"Furthermore, Khomeyni's gang has made war against our fellow-Arab nation of Iraq and has ignored appeals made by the world to have a cease-fire and to stop this aggression against Arab Iraq--a nation which, as the representative of the entire Arab world, has rushed as a unit to resist Khomeyni's attack against the Arabs."

"In its war against Iranian aggression, Iraq represents the most eloquent meanings of altruism and dignity and is plunging into the depth of the Arab personality in order to return to it its glories and in order to extract it from its age of deterioration--and I say 'age of deterioration' because it is an age 'in which people who call themselves Arabs are taking the side of the Persian foreigners who are committing aggression against the Arabs and are attacking the eastern gates of the Arab homeland.'

"The stance which Iraq has taken in defense of the Arab nation is a living embodiment of what this conference was searching for in terms of the confirmation and reaffirmation of the Arab personality which we are engaged in accomplishing."

"When we ponder and reflect about the stance which Iraq has taken, we realize that Iraq is defending not /only/ Baghdad, but is also defending Medina, Mecca, al-Manamah and Muscat, and is protecting the capital city of every Arab country. This conference of ours, in which we were trying to assign a distinctive role to our authentic Arab nature and our Arab personality, failed to mention the crimes of this Persian enemy. Iraq is fighting for, and defending the interests of, our Arab personality and authentic nature, and is fighting alone on behalf of all Arabs. If it were not for Iraq, Khomeyni would have been able to reach any Arab capital city and Persianize it in the name of Islam--and it has nothing to do with Islam."

"The execution in Iran of people who have committed no crimes is something concerning which the conference should have taken a definite stand. Islam is not a religion which leads people to the gallows like sheep. Killing human values means killing their authentic nature and it means killing the people who express the most lofty forms of this authentic nature. We are making the appeal that we intellectually commit ourselves to our Arab heritage and Arab values at a time when we are also ignoring these values when our brothers are fighting foreigners and we are not rushing to help them--but instead are sitting and watching while they are defending our honor and dignity."

Shaykh Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Khalifi, the Qatari deputy minister of information, had the following to say about the results of the conference of ministers of culture in Baghdad: "Some good results came out of the conference. One of them was the decision to compile an Arab encyclopedia. This is something which Kuwait had already suggested. Now Baghdad has become the place where this encyclopedia project will have its headquarters."

Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti deputy minister of information, said the following about the most important decisions of the conference: "The conference was a very successful one. Its decisions were ambitious and they will be presented for ratification to the next Arab summit conference which will be held in Morocco."

"The establishment of a council of ministers of information and culture within the framework of an independent body, represented by an executive bureau, was a step along the road toward unifying Arab culture and information and having Arab culture emerge and come forward."

Dr 'Abd al-Hadi al-Tazi, head of Morocco's delegation, adviser to King Hassan II, and head of the Moroccan Academy of Science, said: "I am very glad that Iraq will be the headquarters for the encyclopedia project. Also, the maintenance and preservation of Arab cities means the preservation of our authentic Arab nature and consequently the preservation of the values of Arab history which are contained in these historic Arab cities."

"The conference, with Iraq's blessing and support, decided to save and preserve Morocco's historic city of Fez and to protect it from deterioration."

This series of interviews was concluded by Shaykh 'Issa ibn Rashid Al Khalifah, deputy minister of information in Bahrain, who had the following to say in the context of his remarks about the conference held in Baghdad: "It was a progressive step for Arab culture which reaffirms our Islamic Arab personality and embodies the efforts of our nation to resist the trends which are attempting to do harm to it and to our authentic nature which, in modern times, has been experiencing a renaissance."

9468  
CSO: 4404/156

ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION DRAWS UP PROPOSALS AT BAGHDAD CONFERENCE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 238, 23-29 Nov 81 pp 43-44

/Article by Wasam 'Ali/

/Text/ Some of those who are working in the Arab Labor Organization compare the situation of the organization to that of a sick person who has begun to recuperate. They explain this by saying that the fact that Mr al-Hashimi Banani has taken over the administration of the Arab Labor Bureau had led to a qualitative development and change in the organization's work which has enabled it to begin to prepare important projects which have the objective of development of employment in the Arab world.

The most recent meeting of the Administrative Board of the organization, which was held in Baghdad between 31 October and 3 November of this year, was the culmination of this new orientation.

The above-mentioned meeting concluded with an agreement to begin work on a number of projects, the most important of which are the following:

1. The project for development of the Arab Labor Bureau apparatus. Two committees have been formed in connection with this project. The function of the first one will be to study the rules and regulations of the bureau on various levels, and the job of the second one will be to study the tasks and the situation of the /bureau's/ employees as well as the concept which the bureau should be based on by the year 2000. The chairman of this committee is the Lebanese government's representative in the organization's board and the head of the Administrative Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Mr Ma'ruf Suwayd.

2. The Arab Fund's Arabization Project.

The Administrative Board had agreed to this project in view of the urgent need on the part of some Arab nations for the Arabization of all of their laws and ordinances concerning labor, workers and social insurance and security, the Arabization of everything having to do with vocational training and education, and training the personnel who will be in charge of training the workers in this field to use Arabic instead of a foreign language /in the training courses/.

The Arabization projects encompass the countries of North Africa as well as Mauritania, Djibouti and Somalia. The initial budget for the project has been set at \$50 million.

The board has set the objectives of the project as follows:

- A. Arabization of labor legislation which is in force as well as Arabization of all of the regulations, decisions, communiquees and other legal documents appended to this legislation.
- B. Arabization of the programs set up to educate those who will be conducting vocational training.
- C. Arabization of vocational training programs.
- D. Organization of training courses to qualify individuals working in the field of labor-related affairs in the use of the Arabic language.
- E. Organization of model courses for vocational training in Arabic.
- F. Organization of Arabic language courses for individuals working in the field of labor-related affairs and affairs concerning workers.
- G. Arabization of the basic international documents utilized in the realm of labor-related affairs--such as international lexicons of terms and classifications dealing with jobs, job descriptions, fields of economic activity and lists of job-related illnesses.
- H. Arabization of international research studies and source materials dealing with the field of labor-related affairs.

### 3. The project for organizing the Arab Employment Agency.

This agency's budget has been estimated at about \$150 million, and it is one of the most important social projects. The /Labor/ Organization's Administrative Board has established the work to be done by the /Employment/ Agency's Administrative Board as well as the system which its work will follow, and has established Tangier as the place where its headquarters will be. The fact was borne in mind that the agency should respond to the needs of the Arab nations for various skills and specializations, to be exercised by Arabs, within the framework of a plan which will gradually phase out the non-Arab workers who are currently working in many of the Arab countries.

It was also borne in mind that the agency's electronic equipment should be advanced equipment so that it will enable /the agency/ to be able to immediately have at hand information concerning the situations of the 50 million Arab workers who are all over the Arab countries and in foreign countries and concerning each Arab country's needs in terms of labor force and categories of jobs needed and each country's /projected/ increase in labor force and job categories for at least 5 years into the future.

The /Labor/ Organization's Administrative Board set the /Employment/ Agency's objectives as follows:

- A. Collection, analysis, publication and propagation of information dealing with the labor force and employment (labor market information) in Arab countries, including the labor force working abroad.

- B. Improvement of the efficiency of the apparatus which plans the labor force and employment in the Arab countries, and organization of profitable exchange among them in these fields.
- C. Furnishing of information which aids in the establishment of employment and training policies, as well as the implementation of such policies, and transfer of the labor force among the Arab countries and implementation of what /the labor force/ has been assigned to do within this framework.
- D. Furnishing of statistical and other data for vocational guidance services, especially in order to aid those who are entering the labor force for the first time.

#### 4. General rules for implementing the technical cooperation agreements.

The Administrative Board has decided to set priorities in the technical cooperation agreements being made with the Arab countries. This has been done in order that the countries which are really in need of these agreements benefit from them. The Arab summit conference, which was held in Baghdad, has already listed which countries these are. They are Sudan, Mauritania, Somalia, Djibouti and Yemen. Then the conference of Arab ministers of labor and social affairs added Lebanon and the PLO to this list since they are considered to be the ones most in need of aid and having the greatest requirements.

#### 5. Cooperation With the International Labor Organization.

The board has decided to coordinate cooperation between the Arab Labor Bureau and the International Labor Organization. This will be done so that there will be no repetition in the services provided by the two organizations in certain countries, so that such services will not be lacking in other countries, and so that there will not be any duplication involved in the projects provided by the Arab organization and those provided by the international organization. The board has requested that the director general concern himself with this matter, determine the most important areas of cooperation, and coordinate services in these areas.

#### 6. With regard to amending the Arab League charter.

The Arab Labor Organization's Administrative Board has carefully studied the matter of the amendment to the charter of the Arab League which stipulates having all of the organizations working within the framework of the league, with all of their projects and budgets, be under the control of the league's Economic and Social Council before they are definitely established and ratified. It has demanded that there be a distinction between the Labor Organization and the other organizations, in view of the fact that the Labor Organization is not an official one. The Labor Organization consists of three groups--government representatives, employers, and laborers. This is something which provides the Labor Organization with a special status which must be considered.

#### 7. The Administrative Board has also made a number of other decisions of a particular nature which do not concern labor force projects or the organization's work plans and situation. The most important of these decisions were the following:

A. Agreement that the Arab League flag should be the flag of all of the organizations belonging to the league, and that the Arab Labor Organization's motto be placed in a corner of this flag. This agreement came as a result of a memorandum received from the Arab League's secretary general which pointed out the necessity of standardizing the flag of all of the organizations belonging to the Arab League.

B. Organization of a day of solidarity with the workers and people of Palestine, in view of the fact that the Arab Labor Bureau usually organizes a day of solidarity with the people of Palestine during the month of June, when the International Labor Conference is held. This conference is usually attended by more than 2,000 participants who are workers, employers and representatives of all of the governments of the world.

In addition to this day of solidarity, the board has decided to "set up a Palestinian heritage exhibit to which all of those who attend the conference will be invited--especially those from friendly countries. The purpose of the exhibit will be to highlight the Palestine cause and reveal Israel's violations of the /rights and/ freedoms of members of labor unions as well as its zealous pursuit of a policy of racial discrimination in the occupied territories." The bureau will write a number of books and pamphlets which, using figures and statistics, will show what Israel is undertaking against the Arab workers who are living under Israeli occupation.

C. The Administrative Board has agreed to the proposal made by the conference of Arab ministers of labor and social affairs which stipulates setting aside 1 day's earnings for the benefit of Palestinian children living in the occupied lands. The board has requested that the director general cooperate with the competent authorities in the league in order to have the setting aside of 1 day's earnings apply to all job categories, whether the people involved be in government service, employers or laborers.

9468  
CSO: 4404/156

ENERGY CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN DOHA

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in Arabic No 652, 22 Jan 82 p 7

[Text] The Director General of Qatar General Petroleum Corporation Ali Al Jeeda said last week that the most Arab petroleum and energy minister would attend the Second Arab Energy Conference scheduled to be held in Doha on March 6-11.

In a statement to the Qatari AL RAYA newspaper, Jeeda disclosed that 18 Arab ministers so far responded positively to the invitation to attend the conference and said that over 400 specialised experts in the field of energy would also attend the conference meetings.

A number of recommendations will be adopted by the conference and are accepted to be centered on finding out clear and specified basis for energy on the local and Arab levels, the Qatari official said. He added that the conference is expected to set up a committee to be entrusted with coordinating and studying all subjects related to energy in the Arab world such as consumption, prices and energy alternatives.

The conference will also discuss subjects like petrol, gas, solar and nuclear energies. Jeeda said that Qatar General Petroleum Corporation has an important role in preparing for the conference with the collaboration of the Arab Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), the Arab League, the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development and the Organisation for Arab Industrial Development.

Meanwhile, the OAPEC Secretary General Dr Ali Atteeqa expressed hope that OAPEC Ministerial Conference which was postponed last month resumes its meetings soon before the second conference of the Arab energy, or at least during the conference sessions.

Dr Atteeqa told AL RAYA that the OAPEC secretariat is ready from now for the resumption of the OAPEC conference.

CSO: 4400/121

OPEC STRATEGY FOR COMING YEAR DISCUSSED

8 DAYS in English No 2, 16 Jan 82 pp 22, 23

[Text]

OPEC'S difficulties of last year may offer the merest foretaste of what it faces in 1982. The next few months will tell whether or not the 13 member states will succeed in recapturing their share of world markets and boost significantly their joint output, which shrank dramatically last September to a new low of 20m barrels a day.

Opec faces three main struggles — to defend its vulnerable price structure, to assist both Iran and Iraq to regain part of their market share whether or not they remain at war, and to put a brake on the pace at which members' balance of payments surpluses are dwindling.

Since autumn, Saudi Arabia's oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, has been wooing oil buyers with especial diligence, apparently seeking to reinforce the growing confidence among importing countries. New exploration areas in Saudi Arabia are to be opened up to newcomers, propane prices have been slashed by up to 12 per cent to improve its competitiveness, and hints have been dropped repeatedly that the country's official proven oil reserves of 173bn barrels is vastly under-estimated — all this is being used by Yamani to lure multinationals to the Gulf.

The kingdom clearly has a vested interest in winning long-term commitments from major buyers, if only to guarantee firm outlets for its finished products, even if there are short-term technical (rather than political) difficulties in the way of achieving Saudi Arabia's target of sustained production capacity of 12m b/d. After all, if buyers are reluctant to lift crude, why should they be willing to buy refined products from the area? That is why Saudi Arabia has decided to offer bargain prices of 50 cents per million British Thermal Units (BTU) of

natural gas used either as fuel or feedstock for refining and petrochemical plants built in the country.

Prices are certain to continue to tumble for both the extra light North African and the heavier Gulf crudes as the market pushes further in a last draw to improve refinery runs and yields. The hoped-for pick-up in world demand hinges on two factors in the short term: a cold season which may force a drawdown on record high inventories much faster than expected and thus trigger an earlier replenishment of stocks ready for the heavy motoring season, and an economic upturn in North America and Western Europe. However, such a demand take-off could be strengthened, but not fuelled, by a finer Opec tuning on spot market quotations, however narrow and erratic the latter may be in New York, Rotterdam or Singapore. That would entail a change in Opec's output configuration, within greater stress on cheap medium-to-heavy crudes, leading to further price trimmings liable to spread to Indonesia and Venezuela, especially as far as the American market is concerned.

The result will be a lower average weighted cost for Opec crude as customers switch from top to second quality grades. Yamani clearly expects further price cuts in 1982 for these grades. But if Algeria and Libya shave their prices by a dollar a barrel to meet competition from Nigeria, it would bring considerable pressure on the Arabian marker crude of \$34 and the only way this floor price could be defended would be through further production cutbacks in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the question looms as to how much lower the kingdom is ready to go.

Much of the answer will depend on what

happens along the Shatt al Arab. Whether or not Iran and Iraq make peace, they need to increase their output into the market if only to shore up their foreign exchange. If the war drags on, both countries could boost foreign sales by well over 1m b/d, just bearable for the export organisation. Tehran has already notified its fellow exporters that it wants to double its production.

Iraq recently concluded a new transit fee agreement with Syria and Lebanon to reactivate the Tripoli line. The move, especially when American buyers are lining up in Baghdad, could boost Iraqi exports by up to 50 per cent. Furthermore in December, Baghdad authorities were seriously contemplating revising their prices downwards on the new Gulf set of differentials.

But if Iran and Iraq end their war, combined exports from the two countries could jump by 3m to 4m b/d, enough to destabilise OPEC seriously. Indeed, there is only a single producer left with spare production to trim: Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi's 1m b/d maximum allowables for 1982 are not significant enough to add greater leeway, and Kuwait is still fighting hard to recapture some of its market.

However, if Saudi Arabia were to pull down its daily output by a million or so barrels a day in reaction to North African price shaving, it would not leave much room to absorb the shock of peace along the Shaat al Arab. At most, the kingdom could lower its production to 6.5m b/d without endangering its development expenditure, but this would still leave a healthy surplus of 1m to 2m b/d on the world markets.

OPEC is likely to cut its average weighted cost of oil. Yamani clearly pointed towards further cuts for specific grades in 1982 to reflect spot market quotations more sharply. If Algeria and Libya meet Nigeria at \$36.50 a barrel, it will bring considerable pressure on the Arabian market crude and this time around, Saudi Arabia will not be ready to bear the full burden of restoring market equilibrium by reducing its production. But nobody else has any spare production to trim.

CSO: 4400/121

BAHRAIN INCIDENT UNDERSCORES GULF SECURITY CONCERNS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 253, 26 Dec 81 p 14

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Saudi Arabia Dispels Gulf Concerns"]

[Text] The great concern for security which the Gulf area has felt the last few days because of Bahrain's discovery of an Iranian terrorist network at the beginning of last week was dispelled by Saudi Arabia the first of this week, last Sunday precisely, when Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz signed a bipartite security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz said that the security of Bahrain and the Gulf area is also the security of Saudi Arabia. Witnesses to Bahraini Amir Shaykh 'Issa Bin Salman al-Khalifa's farewell to the Saudi Minister of Interior at Manama Airport last Sunday after his 24-hour visit (during which he signed the bipartite security agreement and learned about the latest interrogations of the members of the Iranian terrorist network) realized the importance which Bahrain gives to Saudi Arabia's support in security, military and political matters. Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz reiterated in his press statements that the security of Bahrain and that of Saudi Arabia are one and the same. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is willing to give Bahrain unqualified assistance if she requests it.

The Saudi Minister of Interior also said in Manama that Saudi security forces are ready to support the security forces in any Gulf country and to go to that country immediately if asked.

Political observers in Manama explain this message from Saudi Arabia, which Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz wanted to deliver in Bahrain, as a warning to Iran that Saudi Arabia, along with the other Gulf countries, is responsible for quashing any attempt to shake the security and stability of the Arab Gulf Region. This message dispelled the security concerns which have existed in the Gulf area for the last two weeks.

Although Saudi security circles are saying that the security agreement which Riyadh signed with Manama last Sunday was prepared earlier and that a comprehensive security agreement among the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [Gcc] will be signed during the coming meeting of Ministers of Interior on 9 February, Manama diplomatic circles have said that the agreement was signed to stop any attempt by Iran to cause disturbances in Bahrain to try to cover up the operation

of the terrorist network which was discovered and its members arrested. Such an attempt would be stopped by Saudi Arabia's announcing that it is taking responsibility for maintaining the security of Bahrain and all other countries of the region. This rests on the conviction that the combined capabilities of these countries are sufficient to protect the region's security, especially since coordination among the security organizations in the Gulf countries led to discovery of the network.

Nonetheless, security officials in the Arab Gulf countries felt that this cooperation and coordination were not enough and must be crystallized through a joint security plan agreed upon by the six Gulf countries.

It should be noted that Bahraini Minister of Interior Shaykh Muhammad ibn Khalifa sent even farther when he called upon the GCC to create a Gulf force to intervene rapidly in any of the six member countries when needed.

The latest news about the network is that there are 60 members and that three hide-outs containing large amounts of weapons have been uncovered.

It should also be noted that security officials from each of the six Gulf countries are joining Bahraini security officials interrogating the members of the Iranian terrorist network.

9882  
CSO: 4401/221

GULF SECURITY EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF UMM AL-'AYSH BOMBING

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1303, 9 Oct 81 pp 22, 23

[Article by Sulayman al-Farzali: "A Joint Command for Gulf Security, By Decree of the Cooperation Council"]

[Text] Gen Alexander Haig, the American secretary of state, could not control himself when the Department of Defense (the Pentagon) told him that the AWACS aircraft, now on loan to Saudi Arabia, had seen the Iranian aircraft as soon as they took off to bomb the oil storage complex at Umm al-'Aysh in Kuwait. Just as Archimedes shouted 2000 years ago "Eureka, eureka! when he discovered his error, so too did General Haig shout in a loud voice, "God has sent it! God has sent it!" Those who heard Haig were astonished that he repeated it even after the end of his conversation with the Pentagon, and then he went out and repeated it to the newspapermen!

Everyone was asking about this thing that "God has sent." He had bestowed joy to General Haig's heart. The thing that had so gladdened the American secretary of state was the Iranian raid on Kuwait and the AWACS' sighting of the aircraft, because it proved the importance of completing the deal to sell these aircraft to Saudi Arabia, especially when the vital oil installations in the Gulf were exposed to peril!

Some of those who listened to Haig's ecstatic statement commented that "One would almost think that America had carried out the raid on Kuwait, so that General Haig could say what he said!" General Haig was asked: "As long as the AWACS saw the Iranian aircraft from the moment they took off to bomb their targets in Kuwait, why didn't you inform the Kuwaiti government?" The secretary of state's reply to this pointed question was: "This was not our business. Possibly the Saudi defense system could have given early warning, which would have enabled the Saudis to use their fighter aircraft to intercept the attacking planes before they dropped their bombs!"

Haig's reply left observers confused as to whether this statement was made to enhance the discussions underway in Washington about the AWACS deal, or whether it was contrived with respect to the Gulf, especially after the recent developments in the battle of Abadan. This was not the only Iranian raid on Kuwait; on the contrary, it was the third.

The Americans, Kuwaitis and Iraqis have said that Iran was the perpetrator of the raid. Each had their evidence and opinions. The Americans through General Haig said that they, by means of the AWACS, saw them coming from Iran. A development like this is a danger to Gulf oil, which forms the sinew of the West's economy. The Kuwaitis

officially accused Iran; joining in solidarity with them were the GCC states. They are afraid that the war will spread to their country, especially after the violent and explosive events that have recently occurred in Kuwait. The Iraqis also accused Iran, and said that that proved that the aggressive Iranian intentions were not just aimed at Iraq, but rather, were aimed at all Arabs, and especially the Gulf Arabs.

As for the Iranians, they had two contradictory stories. The first story, which no one believed, alleged that the Iraqis had carried out the raid. The Iranians made this allegation without any evidence. The second story was put out by the Iranian ambassador in Kuwait, Dr 'Ali Shams, who visited the scene of the raid, accompanied by a Kuwaiti official, after having received an official protest from the Kuwaiti government. The Iranian ambassador said, commenting on the raid: "It is a trick; perhaps the Israelis carried out the raid!"

'Ali Shams' story might not be true, because it was purely hypothetical and designed to shift the accusation away from Iran. However, it nourishes the Iraqi suspicions that there is American-Iranian-Israeli collusion in the Gulf war. The Iraqis have some evidence of trickery in this regard.

It is no secret to anyone that the Kuwaiti oil refinery was fulfilling a part of Iraq's requirements, especially in the southern areas. There is a belief in Iraqi and non-Iraqi circles, and perhaps in some Kuwaiti circles, that the fire that broke out recently in the al-Shu'aybah refinery (see the previous edition of AL-HAWADITH) was perpetrated either by an Iranian group or by an Arab one loyal to Iran, in order to prevent Kuwaiti fuel reaching southern Iraq.

Those who have been watching the course of the Iraqi-Iranian war since the last part of last September say that the war has reverted to revolving around oil. They also say that the Iranian raid on Kuwait was specifically targetted against an oil installation, in retaliation for the Iraqis' raids on the Iranian oil exporting and distribution network on Kharj Island in the Gulf. The Iraqi bombing of the strategic Iranian oil center caused extensive damage to oil supplies inside Iran and to Iranian oil exports abroad. This is practically the sole resource upon which the Iranians depend for hard currency, in order to buy war materials and ammunition. This gave Iraq a military and strategic advantage, because it does not have a problem like this, especially since its supply shortfalls in some areas are being covered by the neighboring Arab states.

In this situation, many questions were raised about the deaths of three military commanders, Javad Fakuri, minister of defense, former commander of the Air Force and advisor in the office of the chief of staff, Valiollah Fellahi, chief of staff, and Musa Namju, Imam Khomeyni's representative to the Supreme Defense Council, along with the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and about 100 military officers of various lower ranks. They all died in the crash of a military C-130 transport (American-made Hercules) near Teheran. They were coming back from the front-line battle areas. This incident might be normal, except that that does not eliminate other possibilities. In a country in which nearly half its leadership has been assassinated, it is difficult for people to believe that the deaths of these commanders was an ordinary occurrence. The only thing confirmed so far is that these commanders were not going to Teheran, but rather, they had been summoned to Teheran. However, no one knows for certain the reason for the summons. Therefore, the stories have multiplied. One of these stories was circulated by former president Bani-Sadr's group, to the effect that the three generals had resolved to flee Iran, join the

opposition abroad and enter the provisional government in exile, under the leadership of Ma'sud Rajavi, leader of the Mujahedin. This supposes that the incident occurred as a result of sabotage by a government group. As for those who say that Khomeyni summoned the military commanders, for the purpose of agreeing upon an arrangement that would give the army a greater role in controlling affairs inside Iran, following the clashes between the Revolutionary Guard and the Mujahedin, and which nearly caused the reins of power to slip from the hands of the clergy, they assume that the sabotage, if true, was an act of the opposition. There is a third curious story that says that the aircraft was given emergency landing instructions by a "control tower" which claimed to be the control tower in Teheran. That is not all. Those who are circulating this version say that the directing of the aircraft to an emergency landing was done through the AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia!

Whether these stories are true or not, this incident itself sheds new light on the Iranian army and its role. The army in Iran, as diplomatic circles in Europe say, is still an American army, or so the Americans would like it to remain, so that it would be the last reserve in the struggle. It is as if it has become an organization independent of the present regime in Teheran, whether that was by design or by the fact of war. This would explain, possibly to a great extent, its ability to obtain American arms through Holland and Israel!

Therefore, the Americans were delighted with the Iranian raid on Kuwait, which "God sent" as Haig said. It overcame the argument that giving the AWACS to Saudi Arabia would keep the sword of fear poised over the necks of the Gulf people. It made the Gulf area remain in need of the American umbrella. This is the European analysis of the raid. The Iranians are capable of striking an oil or non-oil target in Kuwait that would cause Kuwait more suffering. However, in striking the Umm al-'Aysh storage facilities, they wanted to intimidate, warn and alarm more than they wanted to inflict heavy damages. The bombed storage tanks are not the principal ones in Kuwait; in strategic considerations, they are secondary. They are located in a relatively remote and sparsely populated area. The authors of this analysis go on to say that the raid was "punishment" for Kuwait, after the trip that the Amir made to Eastern Europe, calling on the GCC nations to establish relations with the Socialist camp, and after his representative ('Abd al-Rahman al-'Utayqi) was sent to the GCC states for this purpose.

In the first raid on al-'Abdali, after the Iranian threat to strike at the UAE and the Saudi and Kuwaiti refineries if economic and military assistance was given to Iraq, the Kuwaitis accepted the Iranian explanation that the pilot had strayed off course, because they did not want to become embroiled in the war, despite their support for Iraq from a pan-Arab posture and in compliance with the mutual defense pact. As for the second raid, the AWACS aircraft had begun to orbit over the Gulf, and the GCC had laid down the principles of the security agreement, which stipulates that any attack against any one of these nations would be considered an attack against all. The AWACS command warned about the Iranian aircraft as soon as they took off, and a squadron of Saudi aircraft took to the air. This is the routine whenever the Saudi command receives such a warning. A Saudi official says that the Kuwaiti government was quickly contacted and informed about the suspicious flight. Kuwait was also informed that the Saudi aircraft were prepared to stop the suspicious operation. However, that did not happen that time, because Kuwait did not think that it was the target. There may have also been the previous reason, i.e., that Kuwait does not want to expand the war. Once more the Iranians explained their second raid on al-'Abdali as they had explained the first one, by saying that the pilot had erred during the heat of the battle.

As regards the third and latest raid on Umm al-'Aysh, some Kuwaiti officials say that their government was expecting an Iranian strike. They say that experience has taught them that, when the fighting intensifies on the Iraqi-Iranian front, Iran extends its arm in the midst of the battle and hurls some bombs as a kind of warning!

This third raid posed many questions within the official circles in Kuwait. Kuwaiti sources say that it has become virtually certain that a GCC summit will be held to consider the ramifications of the recent raid. Here we come to an extremely delicate problem. The council's constitution permits each party to undertake its private initiatives in accordance with the dictates of the internal interests of each of the member nations. However, general Gulf security is conditional on the principle of mutual defense and cannot be ignored in this regard!

Thus Iran has put the ball in the GCC court this time. The American media suggests that Iran is punishing Kuwait for its partiality toward the Soviet Union, or more correctly, for its going beyond the bounds of one faction so that it is balanced with all, as a result of the Amir's trip to the Eastern nations and after the arms deal with the Soviets.

There is something in the Western analysis that says that what is wanted is to keep the war burning, and encircle the vital southern area of the Gulf in a belt of fire, so that is constantly lives in danger. A Gulf official told us that, "when you published in AL-HAWADITH the article 'Lebanization of the Gulf', shortly before the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out, we thought that the Lebanese experience was merely a political and military reflection of the Middle East crisis, like the gas that burns in the desert night and day from the weight of underground pressure. We thought it unlikely that war would come to the oil areas and quickly break out. After the Iraqi-Iranian war began over pools of oil ready to ignite, we hoped that the war would remain confined to this area, and not spread to burn all the Gulf."

This Gulf official thinks that Iran intends to expand the area of military operations, and that it might expand it to include Jordan, Abu Dhabi and even Saudi Arabia and all the Arab states that give Iraq military, material, political and moral support. He is also of the opinion that the purpose for striking Kuwait a third time was to transcend military limits in order to get at the Kuwaiti situation in its entirety. In his estimation, the Iranian leadership is betting that one of the results of its threats will be to create a contradictory political climate internally, which will force the Kuwaiti government to adopt a neutral line. It would thus achieve through Kuwait what it wants from the other Arab nations. In his estimation as well, that could not happen, even as a mere possibility, if there were a unified Arab position regarding Iran and the war.

However, the Gulf official thinks it unlikely that what happened in Lebanon will happen in Kuwait, since the Kuwaitis are confident that the contest going on in Lebanon does not apply to them.

If there is a faction supporting Iran, then this inevitably means that the situation will take on the form of a serious or heated dispute, since it would be transferred from parliament and the press to the streets. However, at the same time, he does not consider it unlikely that some incidents will occur, such as the explosions that happened recently.

In the Gulf, there are those who think that the heating up and expansion of the front by the Iranians might not succeed in forcing the Arab states to adopt a neutral

position or to put pressure on Iraq. On the contrary, it would make them more and more active, out of fear of succumbing in the war effort to pressures to stop the war or to settle it!

However, connecting the war with the domestic situation in Iran is still the most likely thing in the minds of observers, with respect to the Gulf analysis, which considers the matter from the aspect of a struggle for the Gulf. Observers of this school feel that the Iranian government expanded the scope of military operations because of suspicions regarding Bani-Sadr's role. In that aspect, they take the Iranian government's view that Bani-Sadr was in collusion with Iraq, and the army was depicted as permanently incapable. Therefore, the attack on Kuwait was tantamount to a message from the new political leadership that the Iranian army is not impotent and can reach out, not only to Iraq, but also to the neighboring Arab nations.

This analysis might be exaggerated, but aside from that, it asserts Iran's intention to abort attempts at a peaceful solution, by means of escalating the war. It is well known that al-Habib al-Chatti, the secretary general of the Islamic Congress, has long since stopped his mediation between Baghdad and Teheran. Al-Chatti had reached an agreement with the Iranian government that the mediation stage would be implemented during a 1-month period from 15 August to 15 September (see his interview in AL-HAWADITH). Accordingly, three committees would be formed. One of them would supervise the cease fire, provided that Iraq announced withdrawal from areas originally Iranian, as an expression of its good faith. The second committee would handle the demarcation process for the land and sea boundaries between the two belligerents. The third committee would limit its concern to the causes which led to the war, as an attempt to eliminate them, as well as studying ways of compensating for damages.

When the Islamic mediation committee was ready to go to Iran in order to implement this agreement, Bani-Sadr was ousted and disappeared. It is said that the clergy's campaigns against the former president, which led to his downfall, were caused by his acceptance of these terms!

The Islamic mediation committee was the only effective one left, since the international mediation effort, which Waldheim began and Olaf Palme continued, has been suspended, as has the non-aligned efforts.

When Raja'i and his prime minister were killed, the new prime minister declared that he was prepared to revive and support the Islamic mediation. There is a view in circles close to the Islamic Congress that differs from the official Iraqi announcement regarding the reasons for the withdrawal. This is what we mentioned at the beginning of this article, to the effect that Iraq withdrew its forces and retreated to the west bank of the Karun as proof of good faith, and so that the Islamic mediation committee would have the opportunity to work freely. Those who hold this opinion say that this military action might help to save face for the regime in Iran.

Surprisingly, the Iranian military leadership took advantage of that and escalated their military operations to include Kuwait. It was said in explanation of that that the Iranian army intends to heat up the front in order to influence the presidential elections, and in order to demonstrate the present regime's survivability, after it has become clear that Bani-Sadr's group in the army has become confused and is searching for a way to either attack the situation or to flee abroad!

Bani-Sadr in his recent interviews, including one on the BBC, has revealed that there is a group of senior officers with whom he is in touch, alluding to the fact that contacts in this manner were underway with the commanders who were killed in the aircraft incident.

Since everyone does his own thing, the economists are also adding their assessment. They interpret matters according to their own logic. A senior economic source in Paris says that recent development in the Gulf war have led to an enormous transfer of funds from Gulf banks to American and European banks abroad. Therefore, he does not think it unlikely that behind this process are economic reasons such as happened in Lebanon.

The economic interpretation is the result and not the cause, since it is well known that the economic and financial situation was generally affected in the Gulf from the start of the war and possibly before. To be more precise, since Lloyds declared the Gulf a war zone, in order to raise shipping insurance rates, in the summer of 1979. Those with funds and interests in the Gulf generally confined their activities to loans available from local banks, and did not risk new investments of their own personal funds. Therefore, the primary dependence now in the Gulf is on governmental expenditures from their budgets.

The belt of fire that has begun to encircle the Gulf, irregardless of the international and local reasons, and irregardless of the regional or non-regional causes for the current developments, might be pleasing to the major powers that are now trying to impose their hegemony and conditions on the region. However, it displeases Europe which constantly fears for its oil supplies, nor does it please the Gulf states themselves, because they cannot live under constant danger, nor under the shadow of constant and continual fear.

Accordingly, Gulf sources confirm that the GCC will study the matter at its next meeting, primarily from the security aspect and not from the political, as was the custom. These sources expect the establishment of a joint command to assume coordination of the member nations' armed forces, and that decisions will be made that these sources describe as "a kind of response to the Iranian operations and provocations, if they are repeated in the future."

Despite that, it is difficult to ignore the major powers' fingers in "Gulf unrest." Perhaps the leaders who heard General Haig's response to the Iranian raid on Kuwait, that "God has sent it, God has sent it," would accept the words, "It was not God that sent it, but rather, America!"

7005

CSO: 4404/75

GCC SAID TO AFFECT REGION'S MILITARY BALANCE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 202, 5 Oct 81 p 26

[Article: "Gulf Military Coordination Changes Strategy After Riyadh Meeting"]

[Text] Western observers described the meeting of the chiefs of staff of the six GCC member nations in Riyadh as a major event and an important step toward efforts of coordination and cooperation among the council states.

The chiefs of staff from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman have concluded their meeting in Riyadh and announced that they had discussed two working papers, submitted by Saudi Arabia and Oman, pertaining to the security situation in the region.

Before the military coordination meetings began, a new report about the armed forces in the Middle East stated that unifying the armed forces of the six GCC member states would result in the formation of a considerable military force.

Studies published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London indicated that the strategic balance in the region has essentially changed by the fact of the establishment of the GCC. The institute, which relied for its studies on public sources and answers to queries that it sent to the region, stated that the council states have approximately 133,000 men under arms, and that they are capable of forming a ground, sea and air strike force.

It is worth noting that Prince Sultan Ibn 'And al-'Aziz, the Saudi defense and aviation minister, made it clear in his statement in Riyadh, a few days ago, that a meeting of the defense ministers of the GCC member nations might be held at the time the next council summit conference is held.

7005

CSO: 4404/75

CLOSER RELATIONS WITH USSR CITED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 652, 23 Jan 82 pp 1-3

[Article: "Rapprochement in Gulf-Soviet Relations"]

[Text]

A high level Kuwaiti political source, who was not identified, was quoted last week as saying that Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam had sounded out Gulf leaders on a possible strategic cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. The proposal of a Gulf-Soviet treaty was made when Mr Khaddam visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, last week.

The Kuwaiti source was not identified by the Kuwaiti papers which quoted him (AL QABAS and AL RAI AL AAM) and they did not say what the reaction of the Gulf leaders was.

The Kuwaiti press reports coincided with two Saudi declarations on the eventuality of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. One declaration was made by Saudi Information Minister Mohammed Abdo Yamani who said that Communism was not an obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union and the second declaration was made by Saudi Journalist Hashem Abdo Hashem in an analysis published by the Saudi daily OQAZ and in which he listed his country's conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, strong criticism of the United States' policy towards the Arabs was apparent in Gulf press comments and editorials which expressed dissatisfaction with the US' handling of the Golan question. One Kuwaiti daily, AL QABAS, warned that by granting unlimited support to Israel, the United States was pushing all the Arab states to align with the Soviet Union. It said that "US policy on the Middle East is pushing the international polarization process to the verge where all Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, will find it inevitable to support Syria in its endeavours to reach a strategic cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union."

Kuwait is the only Arab Gulf state which - besides Marxist-oriented South Yemen - has diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and it has been calling for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and other Gulf states.

Last week, Saudi Journalist Hashem Abdo Hashem - chief editor of the Saudi daily QQAZ and RADIO RIYADH's political commentator - wrote in an editorial that there are three Saudi conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union:

- 1) Soviet withdrawal from the Red Sea, the African Horn and Afghanistan
- 2) Bilateral relations based on mutual respect
- 3) An end to Moscow's "ambitions" in the Arab region .

These conditions are not easy to meet and would probably not be met but the fact is that deep thinking has been taking place in the Gulf region recently over the chances of establishing full diplomatic relations between the conservative Gulf states and the Soviet Union.

One of the earlier calls for the establishment of these relations came from Kuwaiti Ruler Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed last September. He said he would try to convince Saudi Arabia and the other moderate countries of the Gulf region "of the need for establishing diplomatic relations" with the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc countries as part of a policy of balance between the two super powers.

His declaration came at the end of a tour he had conducted to several East European countries, excluding the Soviet Union, and was carried by the Kuwaiti press. He stressed that the Gulf states "need to have friends in all countries of the world and should not be afraid of this." He added that the establishment of such relations would demonstrate to the world that the Gulf Cooperation Council "is a neutral and independent bloc."

Efforts were deployed by Kuwait, Syria and the Palestinian resistance to achieve a rapprochement between the Gulf states and Moscow, sometimes prompting Saudi statements to the effect that when the time came for establishing relations with the Eastern bloc, Saudi Arabia would not need the intervention of "third parties."

When the Fahd peace plan was the main question of the day, after President Sadat's assassination and shortly before Israel announced the annexation of the Golan Heights, Saudi Arabia's real position on the establishment of relations with Moscow was unclear. It was generally thought at the time that Riyadh was not opposed to the principle of restoring relations with Moscow but was adamant not to undertake any move that might be used by the

United States, Israel and Europe as a pretext to undermine the Fahd peace proposals.

Late last November, reports circulated in the press to the effect that, for this reason, the rapprochement between Riyadh and Moscow will start at the level of trade relations between the two countries, and perhaps between the Soviet Union and the GCC member-states as a whole.

What helped ease the atmosphere was the reported fact that Moscow understood and accepted Saudi reservations on the establishment of relations, as well as the fact that similarities could be found in the Brezhnev five-point peace proposals and the Fahd plan, and speculations had it an agreement on the restoration of relations would certainly involve an agreement on a formula for peace in the Middle East.

When Israel stepped up its campaign against the Fahd peace plan, saying it will mean the liquidation of Israel, and when the United States and Europe failed to demonstrate support for the Saudi proposals, Gulf observers began to wonder whether the real danger facing the region came from Soviet influence and presence or from Israel.

Commenting on this, the Saudi daily OQAZ said, early last November that the best way to curb Soviet activities in the Middle East region would be by preventing the Soviet Union from exploiting to its advantage "the legitimate claims of the PLO."

At about the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd declared that both the United States and the Soviet Union are influential powers and both should take part in a settlement of the Middle East conflict. He was also quoted as saying that the fact the US is directly concerned in the political evolution of the Middle East region should not "minimize Soviet responsibility".

The Soviet reply to this was a TASS agency commentary underlining the positive aspects of the Fahd peace plan, prompting speculations that the Soviet rulers would back the Saudi proposals if Arab consensus on these proposals was achieved.

The Golan annexation has stepped up efforts and moves for a rapprochement between the Gulf states and Moscow, moves undertaken mainly by the Syrian leaders and the PLO leaders but it was not yet clear whether Moscow was relying more on Syria or on the PLO for an improvement of its relations with the Gulf states. Certain sources said Moscow favoured the PLO and that this was the reason why it granted the Palestinian organization full diplomatic status, earning praise from Saudi Arabia.

The question now hinges on the outcome of the Golan annexation crisis which Syria is using to promote the conclusion of a strategy cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union and the backing of the Gulf states while more and more Gulf press comments stressed Arab disenchantment with the United States' handling of the question and its unabated support for Israel.

It may be too early to tell which way Gulf-Soviet relations will go, but as Gulf Security Council Secretary General Abdallah Bishara stated last July "it would be foolhardy to say that the relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states will remain as they are now. They may develop, they may differ, but I definitely do not rule out any possibility."

CSO: 4400/122

GCC ECONOMIC, POLITICAL PROGRESS DISCUSSED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 pp 2,3

[Text]

The next Planning Ministers conference of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will take place sometime before March, according to Abdullah al-Qaweez who is the Assistant Secretary-General of the GCC's economic affairs section. Dr Qaweez said in an interview with the Kuwaiti daily *As-Siyassa* that the GCC will take into account the experience of other economic alliances such as the EEC and several in Latin America, while at the same time allowing for the specific realities of the Gulf region.

The six member states of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar, signed an economic unity agreement last November which dissolved existing bilateral agreements and laid down guidelines for coordination in the fields of industry, research and development. The pact called for the coordination of financial transactions, trade exchange, tax levying and the promotion of national industries. GCC members wish to cooperate in planning joint industrial production, especially in refining, marketing, pricing and exploitation of oil and other local resources. They also aim to improve communications and ease travel restrictions within the community.

GCC Finance and Economy Ministers are to meet in Riyadh later this month to discuss how to implement the economic accord. Dr Qaweez told *As-Siyassa* that in practical terms this would mean entering into a Gulf Common Market. First steps in the GCC's economic and monetary programme would include the abolition of customs duties within the GCC and the erection of a taxation "wall" against foreign products, he said. Planners hope eventually to issue a unified currency for Gulf states.

Dr Qaweez revealed that the GCC was aiming not simply at the creation of a Gulf Common Market, but at total "political and economic unity" between its members. After the Economy and Finance Ministers' meeting, there will be a conference of customs and trade

experts to discuss the detailed execution of the GCC conference resolutions.

Turning to industrial production, the GCC official said that policies will be drawn up to ensure the rational distribution of units of production to avoid duplication. The system of production, which is to centre on self-sufficient high-productivity joint ventures, will include an array of incentives, according to Dr Qaweez.

He explained that most Gulf countries market their products overseas, thus eliminating competition between members, all of whose major production units are related to petrochemicals, oil refineries and hydrocarbons. Dr Qaweez said the chances for successful economic integration were enhanced by the fact that levels of economic growth, development and income in the Gulf were relatively homogeneous.

The GCC spokesman focussed attention on the question of food security. All the Gulf states are trying to raise levels of agricultural production to lessen their dependence on food imports. The absence of advanced irrigation and farming techniques coupled with harsh climatic conditions hamper food production in most GCC countries. But Dr Qaweez noted that the natural spacing-out of the date-picking seasons in Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia would facilitate coordination in this area.

The official told *As-Siyassa* that the GCC was developing a coordinated programme for the exploitation of solar energy. He added that information concerning the GCC would be compiled with the help of data centres and computers such as the national research and technology centres in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the Gulf Organisation Centre for Industrial Information in Doha, Qatar.

Concerning the relationship between the public and private sectors in the economies of GCC members, Dr Qaweez pointed out that these economies share a system of free economic enterprise and are eager to offer maxi-

mum opportunities to the private sector to participate in investment. He said the Saudi Ministry of Finance and Economy was preparing a plan for a joint investment company for the GCC. He also stated that bank governors and other representatives of financial institutions were making progress towards the unification of banking systems and currencies.

### Expanded role now envisaged

The ambitious goals of economic integration and political unity embodied in the November 10 accord and recently elaborated by Dr Qaweez show a considerable expansion in the scope of the GCC since it was first mooted in February 1981. At that time, it was envisaged that closer cooperation on security matters by the six Gulf countries could bring greater stability to the region which had been shaken by the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the lurking threat of superpower intervention.

Gulf security is still high on the agenda of GCC members. They are deeply concerned about the alleged coup conspiracy in Bahrain last month. Gulf leaders accused the Islamic regime in Tehran of masterminding the plot whose participants were reported to be extremely well-armed and trained. Bahrain has alleged that the organiser of the conspiracy was an Iranian clergyman named Hadi al-Madrasi, who escaped from Iran under the Shah's régime and took refuge on the Gulf island. Iran, however, had denied any involvement in attempts to overthrow the Bahraini authorities.

Gulf rulers also view with alarm developments in the Gulf war which has seen Iran gaining ground in spite of the country's economic disarray. Arab attempts to mediate between the two sides seem unlikely to succeed where others have failed. The conservative Gulf states have lent a total of at least \$16 billion to Iraq since the war began in September 1980 to help Iraq keep its development programme going and finance its war effort. Recent Iraqi moves to boost oil production have not been helped by sabotage to pipelines carrying Iraqi oil across Syria, Lebanon and Turkey.

The Gulf states are apprehensive that a US failure to penalise Israel for its *de facto* annexation of the Golan heights will result in growing pressure for oil sanctions from radical Arab régimes. Saudi rulers in particular are upset by the fact that the Reagan administration has now improved the terms of the next \$2.2 billion aid package for Israel, thus nullifying the effect of its suspension of a \$300 million order for military equipment.

Most GCC members want to avoid overt reliance on the US Rapid Deployment Force as a military umbrella. Some of them, notably Kuwait, feel that far from guar-

### GCC MEMBERS HAVE ASSETS WORTH \$86 BILLION

GCC member states have total aggregate financial assets amounting to \$86 billion, according to figures released by the Central Bank of Kuwait last week. The estimate was based on statistics published by the banks and monetary authorities in the six GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. It is not clear, however, to what extent the sum represents the true wealth of the Gulf states.

The Kuwaiti Central Bank's bulletin said the total, which was for 1980, equalled 24,714 million Arab Dinar Units of Account (ADUs). It gave the following breakdown: the UAE - ADU 698.2 million (about \$2.43 billion), Saudi Arabia - ADU 22,156 million (about \$77.103 billion), Bahrain - ADU 188.5 million (about \$656 million), Oman - ADU 204 million (about \$710 million), Qatar - ADU 95.3 million (about \$332 million) and Kuwait - ADU 1,372 billion (about \$4.75 billion).

The bulletin mentioned that the UAE's foreign assets, including gold and foreign exchange, amounted to about \$1.797 billion.

Figures for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of member states for the same year (1980) were given as follows: the UAE - about \$27.1 billion, Saudi Arabia - about \$102.9 billion, Oman - about \$4.72 billion, Kuwait - about \$24.85 billion. No figures were given for the GDPs of Qatar or Bahrain.

Total imports by the GCC countries amounted to around \$41.4 billion in 1980. The Kuwaiti Central Bank bulletin gave the following breakdown: the UAE - about \$7.875 billion, Saudi Arabia - about \$26.381 billion, Bahrain - about \$3.232 billion, Oman - about \$1.618 billion, Qatar - about \$1.286 billion and Kuwait - about \$1.660 billion.

Anteening their security the RDF constitutes a potential threat to it. Kuwait is now drawing up a draft plan for the collective defence of the Gulf to be submitted to the GCC. The only dissenting voice may be that of Oman, which has close military ties with the West and participated in last year's "Bright Star" exercises with US forces.

The Secretary General of the GCC, Abdullah Bi-shara, who was formerly Kuwait's ambassador to the UN, recently summed up the *raison d'être* of the GCC by saying: "The people of the Gulf want to maintain the outflow of energy resources to the world and strive for stability in the region through the preservation of their political, cultural, economic and social systems." Given the internal and external challenges facing them, the rulers of the Gulf states are probably correct in thinking that their best hope for survival lies in hanging together.

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SAUDI-KUWAITI CEMENT PROJECT--Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have signed an agreement to set up a large cement project. The scheme falls within the framework of economic cooperation agreed on by members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The plant will have a daily capacity of 7,000 tons of cement and 30 tons of clinker. It is designed to meet the combined cement requirements of the two countries. According to Saudi press reports, contracts worth around SR 1.1 billion (about \$321.2 million) have been signed with international companies to construct the plant off the Dammam-Kuwait road in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. Work is due to start in February 1982 and will take three years to complete. Saudi Arabia will have a 55 percent share in the joint venture, with Kuwait owning the remaining 45 percent. Saudi Arabia has a similar project with Bahrain. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 12]

CSO: 4400/122

AFGHAN PRINCE DISCUSSES RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

PM111551 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 6-12 Feb 82 pp 17, 18

[Interview with Crown Prince ('Abd al-Mawla) of Afghanistan to Muhammad Ma'tuq in Rome--date not given]

[Text] Prince ('Abd al-Mawla), son-in-law and cousin of King Zahir Shah, was a general in the army before the 1973 coup. He was commander of the central military region, which covers most of the country, when the coup d'etat took place. ('Abd al-Mawla) was put in jail and remained there until 1976. When he was released he came to Rome, where the king now resides, and he is still there. But he has always lived in a state of instability and has therefore not learned Italian in all this time.

('Abd al-Mawla) identifies himself as "a soldier placing himself at the service of his country and part of the resistance movement now struggling for Afghanistan's independence against the foreign invaders." We had an exclusive interview with him.

('Abd al-Mawla) is described as the king's official spokesman, but before a recent interview with him by the U.S. NEWSWEEK magazine he was not so well known. ('Abd al-Mawla) says not only that he is the king's spokesman but also that "when the king wants to issue a statement or make a declaration, he does so through me. This is seasonal and happens from time to time. Otherwise, I am what I am. Not all that I say is said as his majesty's spokesman. I speak on his behalf when he orders me to issue a statement."

('Abd al-Mawla) chose Rome as his place of exile because the king is there. As to why the king chose Rome, ('Abd al-Mawla) says that the coup d'etat took place while the king was in Rome receiving medical attention, and he remained in Rome because he happened to be there. ('Abd al-Mawla, denies that there is any other reason.

Neither ('Abd al-Mawla) nor the king seems to plan to leave Rome in the near future and come closer to the battlefield. This could be because the king considers himself part of the Afghan resistance but above all the parties and organizations and parties fighting within the resistance. ('Abd al-Mawla) does not see the need for the king to have an organization or an armed group of his own, "because his majesty is widely popular among the great majority of the Afghan people."

The Afghans call Zahir Shah "Baba," that is "father." ('Abd al-Mawla) says that this is a rare title given only once before to an Afghan king, Ahmad Shah, who lived in the 17th century and was an ancestor of Zahir Shah himself. Ahmad Shah was described as a simple man of the people, and during his rule Afghanistan was an empire fighting on several fronts and King Ahmad Shah was a fighter.

('Abd al-Mawla) said that the king meets and has contacts with all "the fighting elements that form the resistance." There is no distinction whatever between these organizations, and the king does not interfere in their internal affairs and is not interested in the differences that divide them.

('Abd al-Mawla) describes the idea of uniting the resistance organizations in one single organization as "a step in the right direction," but he believes that talk about the lack of unity in the Afghan resistance ranks is exaggerated in the press. Everybody agrees on the objective, which is the independence of Afghanistan, the preservation of its Islamic faith, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and national sovereignty for the Afghan people, so that they can decide what they want and do not want, because the people who are now fighting a great power will be able in the future to determine their destiny. As a soldier ('Abd al-Mawla) sees the absence of a single command for all the organizations as an advantage. He believes that the kind of war the Afghans are fighting--a guerrilla war--calls for a command for every group fighting in its own area.

('Abd al-Mawla) complains of the scarcity of the aid the Afghan fighters are receiving, saying that "we are fighting a very powerful army that has helicopters, tanks and fighter planes, they bomb and strafe. In order to fight these tanks and helicopters we need suitable weapons. Rifles and standard automatic weapons are not enough."

Nevertheless, ('Abd al-Mawla) believes that the Soviet Union needs half a million soldiers to crush the resistance and be fully in control of the situation.

We asked ('Abd al-Mawla) about the rumor in the Western press that the Soviet Union is in contact with King Zahir Shah in order to seek a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan crisis in agreement with him in which he will play a major role, ('Abd al-Mawla), who is reserved about sensitive matters, said that he had no knowledge of this. "I have heard about it as a rumor, but it is groundless," he added.

The discussion then touched on the Soviet proposals to solve the Afghanistan crisis, which are essentially based on recognizing Babrak Karmal's government. He said: "If one makes a proposal, he must be practical, any proposed solution must be acceptable to the Afghan people. And what is acceptable to the Afghan people is the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of national sovereignty to the people. As long as the Afghan people are not given the opportunity to decide for themselves, these proposals will be impractical."

('Abd al-Mawla) added: "But I believe in the need to initiate a dialogue on the UN level. There are proposals by the EC countries which constitute a step in the right direction. I believe that the Soviet Union will understand that it is necessary to find a political solution so that its forces can withdraw from Afghanistan's territories and integrity can be restored to the independent Afghan territories."

He continued: "Afterward Afghanistan can return to the traditional policy of non-alignment which it used to pursue. I believe that this is necessary for the security of the area and for world peace."

As far as ('Abd al-Mawla) is concerned, the policy of nonalignment means peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. He said: "We have a long history of relations with our neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union. I believe that the Soviet Union realizes that a nonaligned Afghanistan is a better security guarantee for it and for the area. We would like to have friendly relations with all our neighbors without exception. This is natural for any country."

('Abd al-Mawla) agrees with the analysis which says that the Soviet Union's entry into Afghanistan was due to concern over the events in the area, especially what was happening in Iran then and is still happening now. He said: "Afghanistan in the general Soviet strategy is not a target in itself. It is a stage toward a final target. To be more precise--toward the south, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. This is what appears to be the real objective of the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan."

Replying to a question, ('Abd al-Mawla) drew a comparison between the Afghan resistance and the Palestinian resistance, saying that both are engaged in the same struggle, the struggle of a people who want to restore their dignity, identity and land. The two resistance movements face invaders, the Afghans facing the Soviet and the Palestinians the Israeli invaders.

He added: The two struggles are far apart from one another because of the distance separating them. It is therefore difficult to coordinate the two struggles. "There is no material link between them, but there is a spiritual link. We feel close to our Palestinian brothers through this link."

('Abd al-Mawla) does not see the Arab interest in the Palestinian struggle as negatively affecting Arab solidarity with the Afghan people's struggle. He says that the Arabs support the Palestinian struggle as a true Muslim should because the Palestinians are a Muslim people fighting for their own land, as is the case with the Afghan people.

CSO: 4604/13

EX-SHAH ELABORATES POSITION ON PRESENT CRISIS

PM111315 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 6-12 Feb 82 pp 15-7

[Interview with former King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan to Muhammad Ma'tuq in Rome--date not specified]

[Text] The king of Afghanistan, who has been in exile since the 1973 coup d'etat, did not wish to make any statements or answer any questions when al-Majallah asked for an interview with him. King Zahir Shah, who ruled Afghanistan for 30 years, has so far stuck to his decision not to meet the press. He charged his son-in-law, Prince ('Abd al-Mawla) with the task of being his official spokesman and reading his few press statements to the press. ('Abd al-Mawla's) condition when we contacted him from London was that al-Majallah should refrain from putting any questions to the king, because he would receive us only as "Muslim friends from a magazine known for its support of Muslim problems and struggles." He had to consult the king regarding our request to take pictures of him during the interview. The answer was in the affirmative. But as a security measure in dealing with the press, the photographer must be a friend whom ('Abd al-Mawla) would personally chose for this task.

This was not out of fear for the king's life, since the king lives in a house north of Rome and is guarded by no one except a gardner and a housekeeper. There is no barrier between you and Zahir Shah. I asked ('Abd al-Mawla) about the reason for ignoring the question of security. He said that Afghans have faith and their Islamic faith is part of their life; it is a way of life as far as they are concerned. They therefore exercise their faith that God's will prevails. As for the king, he is long known to have entrusted himself to God. When he was proclaimed king, before he was 19 years old, the Muslim Ulemas gave him the title of "The One Who Trusts God." Even when he was ruling, his guards were a form of protocol and would not prevent anybody for arms. Zahir Shah escaped to safety, while all those who have ruled after him have been murdered one by one.

On the road to (Casia) Grotta Rossa, where the king resides, ('Abd al-Mawla) was repeating his request that I should not talk to Zahir Shah and reminding me of the capacity in which he was receiving me. Half an hour earlier ('Abd al-Mawla) had answered the questions I put to him about the Afghan people's struggle. He believed that what he had said was enough and that it exactly reflected the king's stand.

The king's residence was quiet and the king was ready for the meeting. He is tall and slim with a serious expression. He wears simple dark clothes with almost an absence of style. As we entered and greeted him ('Abd al-Mawla) bent and kissed his hand, a normal sign of respect among Afghans. ('Abd al-Mawla) told me that obeying the king is stipulated in the Koranic saying: "Obey God, obey the messenger,

and obey those who are your lawful guardians." The king is the "lawful guardian." As far as ('Abd al-Mawla) and millions of Afghan people are concerned, Zahir Shah no longer rules but he is still the "king."

After greeting him, the king invited me to sit down and insisted that I sit on a big settee in the modest reception room. I sat and waited for him to sit down and listen. I thanked him for agreeing to receive me as representative of AL-MAJALLAH magazine and conveyed to him the greetings of the magazine publishers Hisham and Muhammad 'Ali Hafiz. I expressed the wish that the time would come when he would be ready to answer press, questions, in which case we would have the chance of another meeting with him.

('Abd al-Mawla) was translating into Parsi what I said in English, when I had finished, the king began his talk by welcoming me. He explained the reasons why he agreed to receive me despite his decision not to meet journalists. He praised AL-MAJALLAH'S policy and its defense of Muslim causes. He suggested that the Saudi Research and Marketing Company publish a bulletin in French and English containing some of the articles published in AL-MAJALLAH, so that non-Arabic speaking Muslims in Asia and Africa would be able to read them. He said that he could not read what AL-MAJALLAH publishes but could appreciate the variety of subjects and the large space it devotes to Muslim causes.

As Zahir Shah spoke, for the first time to an Arab journalist, his voice was low and hardly audible. His mouth moved slowly as if he had a weakness in the jaws. But his voice was steady and soon became clear and firm.

King Zahir Shah spoke about every aspect of the Afghan crisis, which began with the coup against him about 9 years ago. He spoke about the Soviets' aim of penetrating Afghanistan and its negative effect on world peace. He called the Afghan strugglers against the Soviet military presence to unite further. He warned world countries about the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and called for faster efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Zahir Shah said that Afghanistan's geographical position was the principal cause of its crisis. This was the reason why it was affected by the war between Britain and Napoleon and later the war between Germany and the allies in World War II. Afghanistan has no natural resources which the invaders would covet. Its great wealth lies in the fact that it stands at an international crossroads. World reaction to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was therefore stronger than the reaction to its intervention in other countries such as Cambodia, Angola and others.

In his interview with AL-MAJALLAH King Zahir Shah added that the Russians had no reason to enter Afghanistan. Its history for almost a whole century had been one of nonalignment. The situation in the country was normal and there was a democratic atmosphere that ensured freedom for all parties.

Zahir Shah had adopted the system of constitutional monarchy in the seventies, leaving the prime minister great freedom of action. This became evident in the freedom of political action which permitted activities by political parties in Afghanistan. Behind this step was Sadar Mohammad Daud, King Zahir Shah's brother-in-law, during whose premiership Soviet-Afghan relations flourished remarkably.

He was the Afghan prime minister who received Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the mid-50's, during his historic visit to Kabul.

Mohammad Daud led the first military coup in Afghanistan's history. He toppled the monarchy and set up an Afghan republic, of which he was president for 5 years. Relations between him and the Soviets then began to deteriorate, and this was reflected in his relations with the Communist Party. This was followed by the arrest of the party leaders. The reaction was a military movement led by partisans in the army who toppled Daud and brought in Mohammad Taraki, an Afghan poet and leading party member, and appointed him president. Afghanistan became a democratic republic under open Marxist rule.

Since April 1978 the confrontation between the Marxist regime and the Afghan religious opposition has been and is still raging. Many have fallen victim, most prominent among them President Taraki himself and then President Hafizollah Amin, who killed him and took power before his own regime was crushed when the Soviet tanks entered Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal as president.

Until 1 December 1979 the confrontation was confined to government and opposition, but the Soviet intervention shifted the crisis to the world stage, and it is still there.

Zahir Shah told us that he could not understand the Soviet Union's stepping into Afghanistan except within the framework of the Russians' historical ambition to reach warm waters. He was thus referring to the documents that exposed Czarist Russia's plans to expand toward the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf, which is a historical fact that still causes embarrassment to the Russians when mentioned--hence their claim that the documents are faked.

Zahir Shah said that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is part of a general Soviet policy whose effects we see in Asia and Africa. He says that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan met with stronger resistance than in any other country where it intervened, including Yugoslavia [as published] and Hungary. The king attributes this to the difference in ideology and faith between the Afghans and the Soviet Russians.

Zahir Shah blessed the Afghan armed resistance to the Soviet military presence and calls on the fighters to achieve unity. "But," he added, "the world must realize that the strugglers are united in their objectives and aims more than they are thought to be. All Afghans want the Soviet soldiers to leave their country and to be given the right to self-determination."

Speaking in a pessimistic tone, Zahir Shah said: "Continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan will increase world tension and affect world security. This can be dealt with only by finding a peaceful solution to the Afghan crisis that will restore to Afghanistan its freedom and independence and the sovereignty of its people."

The king of Afghanistan added that the world countries must seek to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, so as to avoid its dangers to world peace.

Zahir Shah expressed his thanks through AL-MAJALLAH to the world countries that support Afghanistan, particularly the Arab countries. He also pointed out the moral support the cause is being given by the press and praised the aid the neighboring countries are giving to the Afghan refugees.

Zahir Shah did not mention the name of any country in particular, but he obviously meant Pakistan and Iran. It could be that Pakistani President Ziaul Haq was visiting Rome when we interviewed the Afghan king. The main topic of his visit, which was part of a tour also taking in Yugoslavia, Romania and France, was the question of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

We asked the king through prince ('Abd al-Mawla) [note: NEWSWEEK 18 Jan spells this name "Abdu Wali"] whether there were plans for a meeting between him and President Ziaul Haq or whether such a meeting took place, but we got no answer. I had put two questions on this subject to the king's spokesman, but the king did not reply to the question about the meeting. The question was still on my mind when I said goodbye to the king, and so on the way back I asked ('Abd al-Mawla) whether he had conveyed my question to the king. He said that he had not. I asked him whether he had any knowledge of plans for such meeting, but he ignored the question. I said to him: apparently you have reservations regarding this subject, to which he replied: "We have reservations about many subjects." He then laughed. I asked him: Did you meet the Pakistani president? He replied jokingly: "I meet many people, but my memory does not help me to remember the names." ('Abd al-Mawla) then went on to sing the praises of the Pakistani president, whom he describes as "a 'true Muslim' and 'an honest man.'" He then changed the subject and asked me about the developments I expected after Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. The subject was then closed. But I came away with the impression that the meeting I asked about did actually take place.

Going back to Zahir Shah at his residence: The last of the Afghan kings said that it is not true that the Afghan rebels receive U.S. aid of that they are fighting for the sake of America. He said that the evidence of this is their lack of arms and the unavailability of sophisticated weapons necessary to face the tremendous Soviet military machine.

Before we discussed the details of the simple daily life of the king of Afghanistan, Prince ('Abd al-Mawla) mentioned that I am Lebanese. Noting this, Zahir Shah said that "Lebanon has a special place" in his heart. It used to be his stopover on every trip he took abroad, and the best time on the trip was the time he spent in Lebanon. ('Abd al-Mawla) said that he too visited Lebanon in the sixties when he was on his way on an official mission abroad. When the late Lebanese President Fuad Shihab learned that there was an Afghan delegation in the country, he invited them to lunch.

Zahir Shah said that Lebanon's situation is similar to that of Afghanistan; its only fault is that it occupies an important strategic location on an international crossroads, but has no natural wealth except that location.

How does Zahir Shah spend his day?

Could we take pictures of him engaged in his hobbies, so that we could give an idea about his daily life?

Zahir Shah is 60 years old and has four sons and two daughters. The eldest daughter is Princess Balqis, the wife of Prince ('Abd al-Mawla). She is followed by Ahmad Shah, then Princess Mariam, then Prince Nadir, then Shah Mahmud, and finally Mohammad Daud, who was killed in a car accident 18 months ago.

Zahir Shah spends his day with his children and grandchildren. He says he prefers the company of children. He spends some time receiving Afghan citizens who come to him to discuss the situation in the country, the resistance, and the developments in the situation.

Zahir Shah has few hobbies. At his age he only takes walking exercise in his garden and spends some time playing chess with his son-in-law.

Between sentences he keeps repeating that he does not want his private life to be in the limelight, but then again reveals new details of his daily life on which ('Abd al-Mawla) reminds him and about which they both laugh--the king's laugh being very brief.

Could we take some pictures of him reading or walking or engaged in other activities? Zahir Shah first declined, since he saw no point in this, but soon agreed after exchanging a few words with his son-in-law. But he insisted that we take the camera out to the garden, so that he could tend the trees in front of the camera.

CSO: 4604/12

INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID PUBLISHED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 928, 4-10 Dec 81 pp 11-18

[Interview with President Chadli Bendjedid by Charles Saint-Prot--date and place not given]

[Text] The president of the republic granted an interview to Mr Charles Saint-Prot, head of the committee for peace in the Middle East, manager of the review LES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES.

Here is the complete text of the interview, which was published by the French weekly PARIS MATCH.

Saint-Prot: I last saw you in El Asnam, which is now Chlef. That was last May. Fourteen months have passed since the catastrophe. Are you satisfied with the results obtained?

President Chadli: I cannot say that I am 100 percent satisfied. The blow was very hard, the losses of human life and property were considerable.

In regard to the first relief, rescue and temporary shelter operation, I think that everything took place under the best possible conditions, thanks to an unprecedented national unity, but also thanks to international solidarity.

Of course, the needs were enormous, but the international support was morally and materially of great assistance.

The reconstruction of Chlef is basically the work of the Algerian people, but you know very well that the Algerians are not an ungrateful people.

Furthermore, I am taking advantage of this occasion to address my sincere thanks to the French people and their government for all the assistance which was given to us at this difficult time.

The results obtained are the work of all the nation's forces and particularly of the ANP (People's National Army).

It must also be noted that the people who were victims of the disaster demonstrated endurance and maturity during those painful times. After the catastrophe, the workers went back to their land, their factories and their jobs before the tremors had stopped.

Saint-Prot: So why are you not 100 percent satisfied?

President Chadli: Of course, a large part of the program has been completed, particularly in the areas of housing, building the nation, and resuming activity.

However, efforts must be maintained at the same pace to respond to all the needs to be able to return to normal life in the area.

Saint-Prot: That brings us, Mr President, to the subject of Algeria. It is almost 3 years that President Boumedienne has been gone. What changes have taken place since then?

President Chadli: We must first agree on definitions.

In fact, we are experiencing a new stage of our revolution. To be more specific, I would say that the dynamics of a nation are made up of a series of stages.

Important events mark both the end of one stage and the beginning of another.

The precipitation of the revolution (1 November 1954) was an event. It constituted the end of one stage and the beginning of another. The revolution was the result of all the forms of struggle and the experiences lived through before 1 November.

The recovery of independence in 1962 was an event. It marked the end of the armed struggle and the beginning of the struggle to build the nation.

The popular debate centering on the constitution and its adoption were an event. For the first time in a developing country, the country's ideological option was discussed and voted on by the citizens through universal suffrage.

It is from this event that a new process was initiated; the passing of the constitution, and presidential and parliamentary elections.

Thus the fourth party congress (1979) can be considered an event in the life of the nation. It was the beginning of a stage, that of institutional legitimacy in the widest sense, both for the party and the state. It was the congress which gave the country an elected political leadership.

Saint-Prot: There is therefore not a Boumedienne's Algeria and a Chadli's Algeria?

President Chadli: There is just Algeria. Today's Algeria which is the work of everyone, of Algeria's martyrs, of its soldiers during the armed struggle, and of its activists and its citizens who gave their best to liberate and to build the country.

This is, moreover, the major lesson to be drawn from the difficult period experienced by our people at the end of 1978 when President Houari Boumedienne was brutally lost.

Our people and our institutions have come through the ordeal. They have shown that we have actually built "a nation which survives events and men."

For all of the true activists, this principle has been a hope and then a conviction before becoming a reality.

Saint-Prot: But the life of a nation is still always marked by the men or the man who leads it?

President Chadli: Yes, but the essential thing is to take care that the men do not try to substitute themselves for institutions.

Saint-Prot: But just the same, there is the Algeria of today which is undergoing an obvious change?

President Chadli: This is the Algeria of constitutional legitimacy. All the institutions of the party and of the state are in place. The special congress (June 1980) summarized all that had been achieved since 1965 and traced the major lines of development for the years 1980-1984.

This is the 5-Year Plan.

You have spoken of change. But of course, there are changes. To each period of the life of a nation correspond specific imperatives which are inscribed within the logical framework of continuity.

The Algeria of revolutionary legitimacy, born of 19 June 1965, cannot be the Algeria of constitutional legitimacy in 1981.

The Algeria of 9 million inhabitants is not the Algeria of 20 million inhabitants.

The Algeria of 300,000 or 400,000 students before independence is not the Algeria of 5 million pupils and students today.

Saint-Prot: Within the framework of this development, however, certain facts will be questioned?

President Chadli: The reference is and will always be the national constitution.

Saint-Prot: And the single party, some say that it is a "single evil?"

President Chadli: Everyone is free to have his convictions. The essential thing is to believe in them, to believe in them deeply.

I believe that for a Third World country, underdevelopment is the number one problem. For us, the struggle against underdevelopment is our principal concern.

This struggle requires an overall strategy, a clear political line, a program of action which conforms to the people's aspirations. This unity of thought and of action is the single party.

Saint-Prot: That you lead.

President Chadli: The FLN [National Liberation Front] Party is not the Chadli party. It is the vanguard that the people have selected to lead their struggle against underdevelopment.

Before 1976, some could say that the single party was an expression of revolutionary legitimacy. The discussions centering on the national constitution and its adoption by referendum were eloquent.

Our people did not just opt for the single party. They dictated continuity, even in the party's name. Thus the FLN Party is a choice of the people.

The following must be taken into consideration: Under the aegis of the FLN, Algeria survived an armed revolution which was lengthy and costly.

This experience has marked us, we have comprehended that to achieve a common goal, unity of action must first be achieved.

We activists know that political independence is only a step toward the achievement of independence in the widest sense, in other words the political, economic and cultural sense.

It is for this reason that from the beginning, all of us, as the leadership of the revolution, opted for the single party.

We struggled against colonialism in the name of the FLN and we have decided to struggle against underdevelopment in the name of the FLN Party.

It is a party in power, not a party of power.

Saint-Prot: But the results obtained in the Third World under the single party system are not always encouraging?

President Chadli: I would like someone to cite me a single Third World country which, having survived an exhausting war, has achieved economic and social development superior to ours with a different political system.

Saint-Prot: But how, under a one-party system, can one speak of democracy?

President Chadli: At the beginning I told you that we must agree on definitions. It is difficult to analyze the situation in underdeveloped countries using the characteristics of developed countries.

The basis of democracy is freedom.

The essential thing is that the citizen be able to have his say on all issues which involve his future and his development, in complete freedom, free of any material or moral pressure, and within the appropriate organizational body. This is the case in the people's assemblies elected in the communes and wilayas, and the workers' assemblies elected in the factories or agricultural cooperatives. This is the case in the National People's Assembly, and of course in the party's institutions at the national and the regional level.

Furthermore, all issues which involve the Arab nation are discussed by the union before being discussed by the party Central Committee which constitutes the political leadership of the country. The government is responsible for executing the decisions, which then take the form of laws after discussion and approval by the National Assembly.

You can therefore see that our one-party concept encourages the exercise of a responsible democracy which takes the available options, needs and methods into consideration simultaneously.

Saint-Prot: The recent purge campaign is considered by some to be a settling of political accounts?

President Chadli: The purge is not a campaign. It is a continuous operation demanded by all the activists and required by all the citizens. It is a continuous struggle against social ills and plagues which could threaten our society.

Personally, I have no accounts to settle with anyone. Quite to the contrary, I have already said that we risk indicting former companions in arms whose behavior would be considered against the law.

I have not hesitated to take the necessary measures according to my solemn commitments before the people.

What matters is respect for the law.

What I can guarantee is that the law is the same for everyone, that no one is above the law.

Saint-Prot: One of the problems which has also been mentioned in Algeria is that of the "people's cultures?"

President Chadli: As you know, certain elements, here and in France, have tried to exploit this problem for political purposes.

We have opted for public discussion in a calm environment.

In speaking of culture there are, of course, the academic aspects and the aspects which involve the daily life of each citizen.

I do not intend to go into all the details. I will content myself with mentioning several points.

On the one hand, one cannot speak of people's cultures, since this expression would signify that there is an official culture.

Now, there is a single culture in which the whole nation sees itself, and which is its identity. There are people's arts, various people's expressions which represent a part of the national heritage, a part of the national culture.

On the other hand, Algeria is a nation and a people. The in-depth study of its history confirms that there are no ethnic problems nor any minority problem in Algeria. I understand that in France you are experiencing the problems of minorities, but I can assure you that this is not the case in Algeria.

Saint-Prot: But there are Berbers and there are Arabs?

President Chadli: Can you scientifically prove who is a Berber and who is an Arab?

You would be obliged to use linguistic criteria only, but is this enough?

History tells us that this entire region was called Barbary, that was the expression used by the Romans to designate non-Romans and furthermore, in a pejorative sense.

I don't want to go into the academic or historic details; you know that some say that the origin of the "Berbers" was Yemen, based on the fact that more than two-thirds of the words used in the Berber dialects (there are dialects, not just one dialect) are Arab words or are derived from Arab words.

I do not want to belabor a very simple point. The number of "Arabs" who came to North Africa after Islam was not sufficient to create an ethnic majority. I am drawing an obvious conclusion.

There is one nation which was formed over the centuries, which reached its maturity in the melting pot of Arab-Islamic civilization and which shared in the glories of this civilization.

There is one national language which is the language of our civilization and which is our cultural identification card.

There is one people's heritage which belongs to all Algerians whatever their geographic region. No one has the right to monopolize his heritage.

Besides, the people's arts and dialects cannot be understood and analyzed without using the Arab language.

The Algerian is proud of his nation which has given the world Emir Abdelkader as well as Tarek Ibn Ziad, Youghourta, Siphax and Massinissa.

Saint-Prot: Algeria is both a Moslem and a socialist country. Isn't that a contradiction?

President Chadli: Algeria is a Moslem country which is working to build a socialist society.

Islam is the religion of social justice, of equality of rights and duties. That is also the Algerian concept of socialism.

Another characteristic of Islam is that there is no intermediary between God and his creatures. No one has the right to dominate Islamic thought or the interpretation of the divine will.

Islam is a religion which condemns the exploitation of man by man.

You see why Algeria, a country with deep Islamic convictions, has opted for socialism; for us it is the only way to assure a prosperous future for our country.

Saint-Prot: But there is the phenomenon of integrism?

President Chadli: I wonder whether this word can be used in Islam. Islam condemns any form of fanaticism, maraboutism or extremism.

As far as we are concerned, any form of extremism, whether rightwing or leftwing, is to be rejected. The common denominator for Moslem and socialist Algeria is the national constitution.

Certain writings you have published and which relate to Islam seem to contain political motives. They give Islam a sympathetic or nonsympathetic slant depending on political relations, indeed even political interests.

Saint-Prot: There is, nevertheless, an awakening of Islam which is sometimes violent?

President Chadli: The religious awakening in many developing countries is due to a recognition of the importance of spiritual factors in the building of a nation.

The exaggerated forms of this awakening are in part the repercussions of a certain deterioration of values due to the unprepared contact of two types of societies at different levels of development.

Personally, I am convinced that our people are very aware of it. They will watch over the application of the true concept of Islam. They will unmask those who are brandishing the standard of Islam for personal ends.

Everyone is free to express his opinion, as long as it is not translated into acts which threaten society.

The Islam which advises cooperation also requires the safeguarding of society against any excesses.

Saint-Prot: The court decisions taken recently seemed rather severe to some?

President Chadli: According to the constitution, the judge only obeys the law.

Once can be tolerant except in regard to problems which affect national unity, the dignity of the state, the safety of citizens and the options of the revolution.

I am personally in favor of dialogue, but no one may impose his will by agitation and vandalism.

Saint-Prot: Is this why there are political prisoners or arrested persons being held for reasons of cultural or religious fanaticism?

President Chadli: We do not have political prisoners or "cultural" prisoners. Those who break school windoes or hit their fellow citizens with iron bars or burn citizens' cars, and are judged under the law with all the necessary guarantees, cannot be considered political prisoners. They are common law prisoners.

Saint-Prot: Can you give me an idea of Mr Ben Bella's current situation?

President Chadli: The former president of the republic is currently a free Algerian citizen. As such, he has rights, but he also has duties like everyone else. He receives his monthly salary, which is the salary of a head of state.

All these officials belong to the nation. They are available to the president of the republic. You can refer to the Official Journal.

Saint-Prot: Algeria plays an important role on an international level. Is this due to its geopolitical position?

President Chadli: Geopolitics has its significance for our country. It is one of the factors which gives Algeria its weight on the international scene. But it is not the only factor.

Algeria's reputation is due to its struggle for national liberation, its tremendous effort for development, its political stability, and its devotion to principles related to its presence among the Arab, Moslem, Mediterranean, African, nonaligned nations.

Saint-Prot: North-South relations seem to be particularly close to your heart?

President Chadli: It is Algeria which stressed the urgency of the new international economic order at the summit of nonaligned nations in Algiers in 1973 and in Havanna in 1979. Our program was selected and it resulted in the Cancun meeting.

Saint-Prot: How do you see relations with socialist France?

President Chadli: Relations between the National Liberation Front Party and the French Socialist Party are excellent. We also have a good rapport with the Communist Party, as well as with a significant number of French individuals of all tendencies.

Regarding relations between France and Algeria, they have had their highs and lows. Unfortunately, we have had several unsuccessful meetings.

Today, the current situation in the world, particularly in the Mediterranean, obliges us to play an important role together. Besides, there are many points of agreement, especially within the context of the North-South dialogue which is a basic problem of our age.

Saint-Prot: However, differences currently exist between our two countries?

President Chadli: In truth, there are no insurmountable problems when there is a sincere political desire on each side. Under these conditions, problems settle themselves naturally.

Saint-Prot: Do you believe that the conditions have been met?

President Chadli: Yes, I believe that the two parties have arrived at a simple conclusion: They are condemned to cooperate.

Saint-Prot: What are the possible areas for this cooperation?

President Chadli: They are numerous. The complementary nature of our needs can be applied to many areas. As an example, we can mention: Housing, construction and certain sectors of industry.

In any case, the visit which the president of the French Republic will make to our country will be an opportunity for fruitful cooperation for the benefit of both our peoples and for peace in our region and in the Mediterranean.

Saint-Prot: Aside from these points of agreement, there are points for discussion, particularly immigrants?

President Chadli: In order to understand this problem, it must be placed in its historical context.

During the colonial period, our country was considered as an avenue for the occupying power's industry and as a reservoir of manpower.

The current emigration is an aftereffect of this policy.

Since independence, Algeria has undertaken an ambitious development program which should result especially, in the first stage, in halting the emigration phenomenon, and, in the second stage, in bringing back our citizens who are living abroad. As of 1973, Algeria decided to halt emigration to France.

I am convinced that the two governments will be able to find solutions to this difficult problem, taking into consideration the well-understood interests of the two parties as well as respecting the safety and the dignity of our citizens in the host country.

Saint-Prot: And the question of gas?

President Chadli: This is an important point in the relations between our two countries. I have high hopes of seeing this problem settled during the visit of your president to our country.

Saint-Prot: Finally, I would like to mention the problem of the Algerian-born Frenchmen and the Harkis.

President Chadli: It must be admitted that the Algerian French, or the "pieds noirs" as you call them, have been subject to the effects of the injustices of which our people were victims during the colonial period, the war of liberation and particularly after the ceasefire.

Many "pieds noirs" currently live here: For all of them, peace and safety are assured. Among those who live in France, some of them visit Algeria from time to time. They are always welcome. But some Algerian Frenchmen have done harm to our people. They participated in torture. They cannot be admitted to Algeria. The wounds have not completely healed. It would be difficult to assure their safety.

Saint-Prot: And the Harkis?

President Chadli: I would say the same thing. They have chosen their side. It is history's verdict. Besides, as a Frenchman, what would your reaction be in regard to persons who collaborated with the occupier?

Saint-Prot: There is a problem: Their children.

President Chadli: I am aware of this human problem. I have given the necessary instructions for the free movement of these children, so that they will not be victims of their parents' choices.

Saint-Prot: Can the recent visit of Morocco's minister of foreign affairs to Algiers be considered as a prelude to normalization of relations between the two countries?

President Chadli: The minister of foreign affairs of Morocco came to Algiers to invite me to the Arab summit at Fez. Normalization of relations between the two countries depends on Morocco. I have continuously repeated that we do not nurture any hatred or animosity with regard to our Moroccan brothers.

Saint-Prot: Did you say Moroccan "brothers?"

President Chadli: But of course they are our brothers, and we want to be good neighbors.

Saint-Prot: You are, however, in conflict with your Moroccan neighbor?

President Chadli: We disagree on the problem of Western Sahara, but it is the Saharan people who are in conflict with Morocco.

Saint-Prot: Do you support the Saharans?

President Chadli: Yes, we support the legitimate demand of the Saharan people, which is in harmony with what we had requested ourselves during our struggle for liberation: The self-determination of the people, since there is a people called the Saharans. No one can deny this fact. There is a clear and specific resolution of the OAU's 18th summit meeting which grants the Saharan people their right to self-determination, which is only just.

Saint-Prot: Is the conflict destabilizing the region?

President Chadli: It is, in fact, necessary that the hostilities cease, that the two parties in conflict, i.e., Morocco and the Polisario Front, come to agreement for the application of the will, not only of Africa, but of the whole world.

As far as we are concerned, we are ready to make any contribution possible to support the peace initiative launched in Nairobi--in other words, the Saharans' right to self-determination.

Saint-Prot: But what if the Saharan people vote to join Morocco?

President Chadli: We will support any choice that the Saharan people make in a free, general and overall referendum under the auspices of the OAU in cooperation with the United Nations.

What interests us primarily is the establishment of peace in the area, since we all need peace in order to devote ourselves to national construction.

Saint-Prot: Algeria is one of the members of the Steadfastness Front. How do you envisage the solution to the problem in the Middle East?

President Chadli: Just calling it "the problem in the Middle East" reflects its complexity. In fact, the basic problem in the Middle East is the problem of Palestine being usurped, its people chased from their land. The name Palestine can be crossed off the maps, but it will remain in the hearts, and the coals will always remain

under the ashes. This is why Algeria continues to say that lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian people.

Saint-Prot: But how?

President Chadli: The question must first be posed to the Palestinians, since they are the principal ones involved.

Saint-Prot: Can the creation of a Palestinian state be the solution?

President Chadli: The ideal solution--and I am saying ideal--resides in the creation of a lay state on the land of Palestine, the historic land of Palestine, which includes Moslems as well as Christians and Jews. A neutral state which can be a true oasis of peace for the world.

This solution may appear utopian, but I continue to say that it is the ideal solution because there are repercussions from the past. There is the balance of power in the world, the conflicts of powers involved in the region. In short, there are several obstacles which will not facilitate the achievement of anything less than this goal in the immediate future.

Saint-Prot: What are the perspectives?

President-Chadli: We will commit ourselves to any choice which expresses the will of the Palestinian people. A just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without taking into consideration the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians under the aegis of their single and legitimate representative, the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Saint-Prot: Can the Arab nation impose a solution which conforms to its convictions?

President Chadli: The Arab nation has considerable advantages, and I am thinking more of men than of resources. Of course, too many political differences weaken it, most of them fed from the outside to impede the Arab revival.

Saint-Prot: There is another conflict in the Middle East, the Iraq-Iranian war. What is the Algerian position?

President Chadli: This war is a drain on both the Arab nation and the Moslem world.

Saint-Prot: How can this conflict be settled?

President Chadli: Terminating a conflict requires a negotiated solution. This is what we have said and repeated right from the time the hostilities were initiated.

From the beginning, I have contacted the presidents of the two countries to try to put an end to this regrettable war and especially to prevent this conflict from becoming a conflict between two adjacent nationalisms.

The Moslem world is a strategic extension of the Arab world. Both are linked by the Arab-Islamic civilization and are part of the Third World.

Saint-Prot: What are the guarantees for success of negotiations between the two countries?

President Chadli: The negotiated solution must have a political point of departure agreed on by both partners.

For our part, we had thought that the Algiers agreements of 1975 could constitute the point of departure for this negotiated solution.

Saint-Prot: Does Algeria, which was the architect of the Algiers agreements, intend to play a role in the peace?

President Chadli: I can assure you that Algeria is not standing with its arms crossed in the face of this painful situation. But everything depends on the will of the two antagonists.

Saint-Prot: This would be a new diplomatic victory which--should your legendary modesty allow it--would further confirm your image as the "sage" of the Arab-African world.

President Chadli: Whether I am a "sage" or not is not for me to judge. I simply act according to my convictions and my commitments to the Algerian people.

Algeria will fulfill its duty completely with regard to the Arab nation and all of the Third World.

9693

CSO: 4519/68

DISSIDENT LEADER HOCINE AIT AHMED INTERVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 211, 7 Dec 81 pp 26-27

[Interview with Socialist Forces Front leader Hocine Ait Ahmed, conducted by al-Salimi al-Husni: "Hocine Ait Ahmed to AL-DUSTUR: 'The Demand of the Tribes in Algeria Is Democracy, Not Secession;'" date and place not given]

[Text] Socialist Forces Front

Hocine Ait Ahmed, one of the historical leaders of the Algerian revolution, has lived in exile since his escape from Algeria in 1967 after he was given a life prison sentence during the term of former President Ahmed Ben Bella. From abroad, he leads the Socialist Forces Front in Algeria, an organization he founded in 1962 shortly after Algeria became independent. However, what Ait Ahmed will acknowledge is that he leads the Kabyle Movement, and whenever the issue of the Berbers has been raised in Algeria, his name has been mentioned. At first he was considered a separatist calling for the independence of the Kabyle area. At other times he was characterized as an advocate of sectarianism, tribal chauvinism, and provincialism. When the Kabyle issue became one of the foremost issues in Algeria and all the internal problems began to center around it, many circles began to use this issue either for personal aims or with the aim of divesting what is taking place in Algeria of reality. In order to unearth the reality of what is taking place and what the leader of the Socialist Forces Front in Algeria is thinking about, AL-DUSTUR met with Hocine Ait Ahmed in Paris to ask him the unanswered questions about the issue of the Berbers in Algeria.

AL-DUSTUR: Since you left Algeria, conditions have changed considerably and the leadership in the country has changed. It has now become possible for the government to accept a certain degree of opposition. Thus, why haven't you returned to Algeria as all the other leaders of the Algerian revolution have done?

Hocine Ait Ahmed: The answer is very simple. I have not been granted a pardon and I am always subject to the sentence issued during the term of Ben Bella. It was not revoked by either Houari Boumedienne or Chadli Bendjedid. I am now the only one of the leaders of the Algerian revolution sentenced after independence who has

not been granted a pardon. Fathi Tahir Zubayri, the chief of the general staff who attempted a military coup--or in other words, used the institutions of the state to overthrow the regime--has been granted a pardon. I do not pass judgment on his attempt. Rather, as I have said before, I am glad for him because he was given the opportunity to return to Algeria. The sole explanation for the fact that I have not been granted a pardon is that there is a wing of the regime that is against justice for all. Moreover, I am part of a political movement, and thus the offense they accuse me of is that I lead a political movement. This is a serious point which proves that it is incorrect that conditions have changed in Algeria. What we have demanded for all Algerians--and not in their name--in political, economic, and cultural democracy. I don't believe that we have ever conspired and we will never use the method of conspiracy. We are against violence because we are in favor of dialogue and the competition of ideas. As far as we are concerned, you will not find socialism without democracy and respect for the rights of man. Unfortunately, it appears that in the majority of Third World countries, they consider this struggle of ideas and democracy a waste of time and a threat to security and peace. In reality, democracy threatens the opinions about themselves that the rulers wish to establish.

AL-DUSTUR: You and the movement you lead are charged with working for secession of the tribes and against Arabization. These charges do not come only from sources within Algeria but are made by a number of circles abroad, as well.

Hocine Ait Ahmed: The Algerian people have become ignorant of their history because since independence, they have suppressed all the media of information and expression that could have presented this history instead of the counterfeit information the media present today. Consequently, how can the Arabs know the history of the Algerian people and the true positions of the Algerian political forces on the political and cultural planes? Is there freedom of the press that can present to the people any facts other than those the rulers wish to impose? This is where the falsification comes in. And let me stress that in our positions, programs, and literature, we never speak of demands pertaining to an isolated portion of the Algerians or a specific district. We have always fought for democracy in Algerian society.

I fought for democracy and socialism through legitimate means in the first constituent assembly. I believe that ideas and positions--especially regarding the issue of democracy--are not the possession of the state and the ruling class nor do they require specialists on the subject. Rather, they are the possession and heritage of the Algerian people.

AL-DUSTUR: What is your relationship with Ahmed Ben Bella. Has there really been a reconciliation between you? And if Ben Bella were thinking of establishing a political movement, would you support him and work with him?

Hocine Ait Ahmed: I met with Ahmed Ben Bella at the Islamic conference on the rights of man. We didn't have time to talk about the problems of Algeria and he didn't talk to me about his projects. This is the first time I have heard that he intends to establish a political movement. Our movement has been in existence for some time. It does not claim to have great popularity because that is evident from the free elections we are calling for. We have our plan and program which

are based on a multi-party system and democracy. Therefore, if Ahmed Ben Bella were to take any initiative we would then look at the content of that initiative and decide on it. It is not a question of support or lack of support, but rather of tolerating differences and disagreement with others. This is what will guarantee democracy in the future because the Algerian people are in need of freedom of expression. This people cannot be united around individuals but must be united around ideas and institutions that will inevitably ensure political, unionist, and cultural freedoms in the country.

In our platform, we have emphasized the right of women and men to develop themselves and their country, unlike the position contained in the personal statute submitted to the National Assembly, which at the very least is reactionary and out of touch with the course of history. All that I want for contemporary Algeria is the achievement of peaceful solutions to all our internal problems through dialogue.

AL-DUSTUR: How can this be achieved in your opinion?

Hocine Ait Ahmed: Through the creation of supportive public opinion that will fight for democracy and the right of everyone to progress and freedom. I believe that without this right, it is impossible to talk about independence in the working forces, the farmers, and all the sectors of the people can exercise their right to organization, expression, and free activity. I would like to point out here that all questions surrounding the problem of democracy revolve around the issue of the "Berber language." I would like to stress diversity of national culture and emphasize that recognition of this diversity only enriches the national culture of the Algerian people. I would also like to record that the positions of many Algerian personalities such as Mohamed Harbi and Ahmed Ben Bella are in agreement with this perspective. The issue of freedom of culture and the right to cultural diversity fall within the democratic struggle. I believe it is absolutely necessary that we discuss the Berber issue despite the fact that the regime in Algeria has closed all doors to dialogue. I must stress here that discussion is fruitless if it focuses on the differences in racial character between the Berbers and the Arabs. The emphasis must be on the cultural diversity of the Algerian people. The issue is not a racial one as some would like to interpret it. Rather it is a cultural question. It is risky to talk about racial character because this involves us in mazes which extend even to geographical and regional questions. I believe that these mazes are exploited by the state bureaucracy, world capitalism, and those who want to create an artificial struggle between the Arabs and the Berbers. This is very similar to what we are hearing today in Algeria between the population of the east and the population of the west and south or some other region. This has turned Algeria into a group of struggling regions. They say to us: 'You tribes, how many ministries do you want?' and so on. All of this is an erroneous way to frame the issue. As far as we are concerned, there are those who are on top of the pyramid and those who are at the bottom, and among these there are individuals from every district and area. Ultimately, the goal is to give the people their right to self-government and free expression of their aspirations, especially in the cultural field.

AL-DUSTUR: In light of these problems and aspirations, how do you perceive Algeria's role today in the Arab sphere?

Hocine Ait Ahmed: I know Arab public opinion in the East because I have lived there. The Arabs attached great hopes to the Algerian revolution and wanted it to be a model of the freedom and democracy they aspired to. However, over the years their hopes were gradually dashed and the regime in Algeria became no different from some of the other dictatorial and bureaucratic Arab regimes. The Algerian revolution is no longer the desired model and it has not provided the Arabs and the Third World with a democratic experience they can use to open up the way forward. What circumstances have demonstrated is the vast distance between slogans and talk on the one hand and practices and fact on the other. We all hoped that Algeria would play a role in supporting the liberation movements in the Third World, and especially the struggle of the Palestinian people. However, none of this has been realized.

What we see today is that there is an official silence in Algeria on many liberation causes such as that in Afghanistan. That is because of the subservience to the superpowers that became established during the years following independence.

8591  
CSO: 4504/132

## FARMING PROBLEMS EXAMINED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 4, 25 Jan 82 pp 2,3

[Text]

Farming has been a persistent headache for Algerian leaders ever since independence. In a recent speech to delegates at the Third Congress of the Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens (UNPA), President Chadli Benjedid stressed the urgent need to raise the level of agricultural production. This was vital, he said, in order to preserve the country's independence against the great powers who sought to use food as a weapon to influence the choices open to developing countries.

Algeria's vulnerability to this kind of pressure has undoubtedly increased in recent years. Last year, for example, despite relatively good weather conditions, production of cereals stood at only 2.375 million tons. The country had to import some 3.125 million tons in order to meet its food requirements at a cost of nearly AD 2 billion (\$459.2 million). This represented about 18 per cent of Algeria's earnings from oil and gas exports. This year's production is likely to suffer from the continuation of a six-month drought which has forced the authorities to take measures to safeguard livestock.

The government's recognition of the necessity to revive agriculture stems in part from the fact that the country's population, currently estimated at around 20 million, has doubled in the last 20 years and could double again by the end of the century. The birthrate stands at 3.2 per cent a year, one of the highest in the world. Demand for food has increased not only because there are more mouths to feed, but also as a result of rising living standards.

The reason for Algeria's growing dependence on food imports goes back to the economic strategy laid down by the country's economic planners in the wake of the liberation struggle against the French. The strategy was based on massive investment in heavy industry and an emphasis on public ownership. But in the effort to win economic independence for France and the other indus-

trial nations, agriculture and other important areas such as housing were badly neglected.

The structure of Algerian agriculture prior to independence handicapped official efforts to develop this sector right from the start. For 130 years, agriculture had been split into a modern sector, oriented towards exports and in the hands of the French *colons*, and a traditional sector to supply local needs. The modern sector concentrated on cash crops, mainly grapes for wine production, which were sold in France. After 1961, when Algeria ceased to be an integral part of France, privileged trade relations were also cancelled, and the French cultivators abandoned their farms.

Thus, the fledgling state was faced with the problem of turning thousands of hectares of vineyards over to the production of more basic foodstuffs since there was no longer a ready market for Algerian grapes. Much of the land, however, proved unsuitable for cereals. The state collectivised the approximately 2.5 million hectares of land which the *colons* had occupied, but the publicly-owned self-managed farms which the authorities established have suffered chronic deficits. In 1981, the government had to disburse a total of AD 1.5 billion (\$344.4 million) to cover the debts that self-managed farms and cooperatives incurred during the 1978-79 season. The self-managed enterprises, like the state-owned industrial corporations, are now being restructured.

The government's reform programme includes the nationalisation of 1.5 million hectares of land to be distributed to farmers and the establishment of food cooperatives throughout the country. Mohamed Abdelaziz, President of the Commission for Agriculture and Agrarian Reform said recently that 100,000 farmers and their families in 6,000 cooperatives had received free parcels of land heavily subsidised by the government. The Commission has also launched a project to construct 1,000 new towns to replace the 8,000 farming villages destroyed

during the independence struggle.

Private farmers still account for two-thirds of agricultural production, but they consume most of what they produce themselves and their means are strictly limited. The government is hoping to assist them by means of the Banque Agricole pour le Développement de la Campagne, which has its headquarters at Blida in the Mitidja region.

The agricultural sector already enjoys a measure of state backing. The government supports cereal prices, while peasants are exempted from taxation and benefit from subsidies on fuel and low interest rates on all credits. But Algerian agriculture suffers from deep-seated ills. Two-thirds of the peasants who are still active are on the verge of retirement. In the southern region of Biskra, for example, 30 per cent of them are over 69 years old. This factor helps to explain declining levels of productivity. Furthermore, the flow of young men to the cities may mean that precious farming skills are not passed on to the next generation. Meanwhile, rural undermanning is in contrast to rising unemployment in the cities.

It is generally acknowledged that a wasteful state distribution system and incompetent management throughout the bureaucracy have contributed to the decline in agricultural production. The authorities now seem determined to try to eliminate some of that bureaucratic inefficiency. President Benjedid told the UNPA that "no measure incompatible with the will of the *fellah* will be taken." He also promised more consultation with those most closely concerned with the problems of production.

Many of the actions now being undertaken by the government will require several years to make their effects felt. The 1980-85 development plan allotted AD 23 billion (\$5.2 billion) for the development of water resources. Other priorities include reafforestation and efforts to improve rural standards of living, particularly housing.

It should not be assumed that inefficiency and poor planning account for all the woes of Algerian agriculture, which has had to cope with a difficult historical legacy. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the new approach to agricultural development will enable Algeria to realise its goal of self-sufficiency in cereals by 1990. But the fact that President Benjedid's government is according increased priority to food production is a step in the right direction.

## BRIEFS

BANKING FIGURES--Bahrain's importance as a channel for Arab has grown over the past year, according to a statement made by Abdulla Saif, Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA). At the end of September, Bahrain offshore banking units (OBUs) were borrowing \$8.1 billion from Arab countries, compared with \$4.6 billion a year earlier. Of this total, the OBUs lent \$5.2 million to Asia and Latin America compared to the previous year's figure of \$3.4 billion; \$2.6 billion was lent to Western Europe compared to the 1980 figure of \$1.4 billion. In Mr Saif's view, the increased outward flows reflected the activity of major Arab banks in the market. Total assets and liabilities of the 64 OBUs reporting to the BMA at the end of September were \$46.4 billion, which represented a 12-month rise of 38 per cent. The fastest-growing elements of the market had been the major European currencies, while the dollar retained its 67 per cent share. The BMA Governor said the European currencies had bolstered the market at a time when the Kuwaiti dinar and the UAE dirham had become relatively less important for the OBUs. BMA figures also indicated a considerable increase in turnover both in deposit-taking and foreign exchange. The transfer of some of the National Bank of Bahrain's business to its newly opened OBU had significantly affected the overall figures in the domestic market, Mr Saif added. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 11]

REFINERY PRODUCTION RECORD--Bahrain's oil refinery averaged output of 259,000 b/d during 1981, the highest in its 45 years of operations, Bahrain's Minister for Development and Industry Yusuf Ahmed al-Shirawi announced last week. The refinery's normal production capacity is 250,000 b/d. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 2, 11 Jan 82 p 11]

CSO: 4400/121

KHOMEINI SEEN BECOMING ILL-TEMPERED WITH FOLLOWERS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 11 Jan 82 pp 108, 110

[Article: "To Go to Paris"]

[Text] The ayatollah feels secure, what with thousands of active resisters having been executed and the masses having been intimidated. The only danger which continues to threaten the regime is dissension among the mullahs.

He makes a tired and nervous impression. It is now rare for Ayatollah Khomeyni to raise his hand for the lordly gesture--both benedictory and gripping--which arouses his supporters to ecstatic enthusiasm.

He seems to be tired of his listeners' applause. With increasing frequency, the 82-year-old rails at them, saying "Be still at last!" It is as if, since he suffers from serious heart disease, he is afraid of not being able to finish his speech.

Speeches are what the somber old man with his black turban has been increasingly intent on making in the past few weeks. What he says in these, disgruntled as ever, only rarely is the kind of interpretations of Islam that befit the self-appointed latest imam of Shiism. Nor does he, as often and as vociferously he used to, utter curses against the great Satan, the United States.

Rather, the ayatollah deals with political routine, descending to the lowlands of his supporters' disputes and meting out advice and orders, like a party leader, in the confusion of everyday life in Teheran--apparently oblivious to the risk of thus losing the aura of clerical grandeur.

"Ever since this Islamic Republic was established," he complained recently, "it has not found a single day's peace but has been attacked from all sides, from without and within."

The domestic enemies he now considers to be the worst, noting amazingly enough that there are unjust judges in the country. Thus, in a country where it has long since become customary no longer even to try for a semblance of legality, he objects to a judge in Ahwas having written "something wrong" in a judgment.

Or, as if he had heard about it only recently, he opposes too frequent death sentences and forbids torture.

He also furiously attacks his loyal followers--for instance, the fantastic Pasdaran, the guardians of the revolution, saying that they had better refrain from arbitrary actions and obediently submit to the orders of the clergy.

But the mullahs too get to feel the ire of the old man. Appalled, he exhorts disputatious priests to agree and condemn deviationists--particularly "certain clerics, including Parliament member Ayatollah Goladeh Ghafuri"--for supporting the resistance organization of the Mujahedeen-i-Khalk who for months have been pursuing VIPs of the ayatollah state.

The openness with which Iran's taskmaster castigates untoward states of affairs which most other dictatorships generally keep quiet about is a sign of how securely anchored his regime considers itself to be. Not quite 3 years after the establishment of his Islamic Republic, the ayatollah has reason to fear dissension among the mullahs more than any other danger.

The opposition in the country, subjected to bloody pursuit, seems to be unable to bring about a change in the near future. Since last summer, when mujahedeen leader Rajawi and former President Bani-Sadr fled into exile in France, Khomeini's bloodhounds have arrested thousands of underground fighters, with almost 4,000 of them falling victim to the bullets of the execution commandos.

Contrary to what the mojahedin had hoped, the mass executions did not cause the kind of indignation either abroad or at home that could have been compared to the outcries against the shah's regime.

While European and American students, normally ready and willing to pillory right wing dictatorships anywhere in the world, were making virtually no effort to protest the mullahs' bloody justice, a silence of horror spread over the cities of Iran.

The strategists of resistance against the mullahs had miscalculated. The appeals for resistance by mojahedin leader Rajawi, taped on cassettes and distributed in the towns and broadcast over rebel radios, had no effect. The people stayed at home, with no one running the risk of exposure.

True, there were still some isolated attacks by the resisters, but they occurred almost by accident--a few shots fired from ambushes, some Molotov cocktails, assassinations and bomb attacks--and there was nothing that might have dealt the regime a crucial blow.

Thus, parliamentary spokesman Hashemi Rafsanjani was in a position to announce, confident of victory, as early as late in October that "more than 90 percent of the enemies of the regime (had been) annihilated." The remainder, he said in wrestler's jargon, had been "drawn off balance."

This remainder includes the communist Tudeh Party and leftist splinter groups with whom the ayatollah's Islamic bloodhounds are now dealing on a priority

basis. Iran's leftists now are active only underground, bent more on surviving than on inflicting any harm on the regime.

Having gained assurance again, the mullahs are now also interested in events outside Iran. Since the end of the hostage haggle with the United States, Iran, fully occupied at home, had virtually forgone any foreign policy of its own. This has now changed.

In early November, immediately after his election, the new prime minister, Hossein Muzawi, for example, proposed an Iranian plan for solving the Afghanistan crisis. A 40-year-old architect by profession and later editor-in-chief of the JOMHURIYE ESLAMI, the organ of the ayatollah's IRP, Muzawi had already served as foreign minister under his predecessors Rajai and Bahonar.

The key of his Afghanistan plan is the formation of an Islamic peace-keeping force. Muzawi also demonstrated with his economic policy that he wants to lead Iran back into international affairs again. He concluded trade agreements with Yugoslavia, India, the Soviet Union, Syria, and Libya.

Altogether, economic questions enjoy top priority in Muzawi's government program. This is where the country faces the greatest danger over the long term. Enterprises are operating only at a fraction of their capacities, and the number of unemployed is running into millions.

Nevertheless, the supply of the population with basic goods appears assured. In the otherwise so impoverished country, there have been three successive record rice harvests. (It is, however, almost beyond anyone's reach to buy a little meat to go along with the rice, because, as during the time of the shah, the needs for meat must be covered by expensive foreign currency from Australia and New Zealand.)

In order to prevent possibly dissatisfied citizens from giving vent to their indignation in demonstrations, the poor districts of the towns--the south of Teheran, for instance--are being supplied on a priority basis. In the districts of the rich, who do not want to come out into the open anyway and are not potential resistance fighters, the shops remain empty.

Nor have the mullahs been able to see to it so far that the Teheran bazaar merchants, the true masters of the country's economy, do not hoard their goods. Prime Minister Muzawi has issued a stern warning to the "materialists and people greedy for riches" lest the masses, "God forbid, regard the private sector as a colonialist sector."

8790  
CSO: 4620/21

## STEPS TAKEN TO RESOLVE FOREIGN-TRADE PROBLEMS

### Restriction of Imports

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 11 Jan 82 p 6

[Text]

The government of Iran announced last week that it would stop importing everything but food, medicines and farming and industrial materials in an effort to save dwindling hard currency reserves. Iranian Labour Minister Ahmed Tavakoli said in a Radio Tehran broadcast: "We have banned the import of luxury items and will from now on spend our money on necessary goods."

Iran's trade with the West has decreased by 18 per cent since the 1979 revolution, according to Mr Tavakoli. Official estimates place Iran's oil exports at about 1 million b/d, down from 6 million b/d under the deposed Shah's reign. The country's hard currency reserves have dwindled accordingly. According to statements made by Iran's former Central Bank Governor Ali Reza Nobari at the end of 1981, Central Bank reserves were down to \$2 billion (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, November 2 and 23, 1981).

The recent decision to ban imports comes after a series of efforts to "eliminate the problem of foreign imports," in the words of President Ali Khamenei. If complaints by foreign suppliers and contractors of unpaid Iranian bills continue to mount as they have in recent weeks, the problem of non-essential imports may well take care of itself.

Meanwhile, the US Federal Agriculture Department has indicated that it expects Iran's total food imports to rise to about \$5 billion in 1982, from \$3.5 billion last year and \$2.8 billion in 1980. Notwithstanding the exhortations of President Khamenei on the Iranian people to achieve self-sufficiency in food production, this goal is not likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future and there seems to be an unwritten Iranian policy to import food to avert destabilising food shortages. Food sales to Iran have increased dramatically in the past year, especially from the EEC, Australia, Brazil and Thailand. Europe is the biggest supplier, shipping

sugar, dairy produce and other foodstuffs valued at \$1 billion. While the US has increased exports of wheat, corn, corn oil and other farm products to Iran to \$300 million in 1981 from practically nothing in 1980, the US lags behind other countries in sales to the Iranian market. Brazil supplies Iran with poultry and soybean meal and cooking oil, Thailand supplies rice, and Turkey and Eastern Europe sell tobacco. Yet despite the widespread imports, Iran still has shortages of meat, eggs and livestock products.

#### Standoff on Petrochemical Complex

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 11 Jan 82 p 6

[Text]

The fate of the \$3.6 billion Japanese-Iranian petrochemical project at Bandar Khomeini remained undecided after a series of exchanges last week between the Mitsui Industrial Group of Japan and Iran's National Petrochemical Company. After the ultimatum delivered last month to Iran by Mitsui to the effect that the company would withdraw from completion of the contract if Iran did not finance the remaining work, Iran rejected a Mitsui proposal to terminate the project. Iran instead called for a new conference to be held in Tehran to discuss ways to continue work on the petrochemical complex within the framework of the present joint venture agreement.

Mitsui reiterated its demand that Iran bear all additional costs incurred at the complex since the outbreak of the Gulf war, which disrupted construction work as a result of Iraqi air strikes. The cost of the project was originally estimated at \$500 million, but the figure has been revised to the current \$3.6 billion. According to Mitsui, the NPC reply to its demand was "unsatisfactory."

Later, Iranian President Ali Khamenei said on Radio Iran that his country would resume work "as soon as possible" on the project, which is 85 per cent complete. "We are determined to get the petrochemical project going but we are waiting for our Japanese partner to declare its readiness in this respect," he declared. This may be enough for local consumption, but it is hardly likely to provide enlightenment in Tokyo.

### Loans for Raw Materials

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 18 Jan 82 p 11

[Text]

Banking sources in Tokyo reported last week that Iran is seeking urgent short term loans from Japanese and Western banks. Requests for loans of \$100 million per bank to purchase vitally needed raw materials are reported to be involved.

The need for funds has arisen as currency reserves have been depleted by decreased oil revenues and Iran's continuing war with Iraq. But Iran's central bank has denied the reports of requests for loans, asserting that its foreign currency reserves are "as good as can be expected and improving." Central Bank Deputy Governor Hassan Azamahd dismissed the reports as "baseless lies." The central bank has not given any figures on its reserves since last spring, but in November exiled former Central Bank Governor Ali Reza Nobari estimated reserves at \$2 billion (*AN-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, November 2 and 23, 1981).

During last summer, Iraq's oil exports dropped to 500,000 b/d, while imports of food, oil products, armaments and raw materials were running at over \$1 billion a month. Since that time the government has made repeated efforts at controlling imports, and last week it announced that it would ban importing everything but food, medicines and farming and industrial materials (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, January 11, 1982).

According to the Japanese reports, the loans are to finance chemicals-for-oil deals with major trading companies, but neither the banks nor the companies are expressing much interest in the Iranian proposals. The difficulties foreign companies have had in dealing with the Iranian authorities and Iran's difficulties in paying its bills may be causing them to wonder if getting involved in Iran is really worth their while.

CSO: 4600/244

## DEPUTY MINISTER DISCUSSES DOMESTIC FOOD PRODUCTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Jan 82 p 3

[Text] It is expected that within the next 3 years, through reliance on the agricultural and industrial units in Moghan, there will be no need for grain importation from outside the country.

In a radio-television interview yesterday, Reza 'Asgariyeh, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development for matters related to cultivation and industry, described various types of agricultural and industrial activity in large and small units. According to the report on this session by KEYHAN's economics correspondent, Engineer 'Asgariyeh opened by pointing to the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development regarding the establishment and expansion of the nation's cold storage facilities. He said: "During the current year approximately 5 cold storage facilities with a capacity of 15 thousand tons have been prepared for operation and construction work has started for a cold storage facility with a 20 thousand-ton capacity to be completed next year. This cold storage facility alone constitutes 15 percent of the capacity of all currently operative cold storage facilities in the country."

On the matter of recommissioning those units that have been at a standstill since the revolution, the Deputy Minister said: "Between 1971 and 1973, sixteen projects for the establishment of agricultural and industrial units were set in motion and by 1978, which was the year of the revolution, only 40 percent of the construction work on these projects had been completed. On the whole, most of these units are presently in operation and management of a number of them that are quite large is beyond the ability of one or several individuals. Our view in this regard is that these units should be under the control of the government just as are the primary industries; but concurrent with the management of units by the government, there is an effort to place the smaller units, through joint ownership, under the control of landless farmers and those with meager holdings. But the plan of the Ministry of Agriculture is that large units earmarked for the production of strategic crops would remain under government control."

Touching on the agricultural and industrial units of Moghan, he said: "Activities carried out during the current year in these units briefly consist of cultivating more than 20 thousand hectares of land in the region and some 400 thousand tons (as read) of primary seed and 60 tons of alfalfa seed have been produced. Conse-

quently, we hope that by relying on these units, the need to import grain will be eliminated within the next 3 years."

He added: "Next year a unit comprising 1000 head of hybrid cattle will be ready for operation in Moghan agricultural and industry."

The Deputy Minister of Agriculture then said: "In the large agricultural and industrial unit of Sefid Rud, during the past year, 17 tons of poultry, 20 tons of milk and 1700 tons of fish raised in a 700-hectare artificial lake were produced, and these products were made available to the public at fair prices by the Headquarters for Economic Mobilization."

He continued: "Another unit is currently in the process of being rebuilt. This unit raises the hope for self-sufficiency in the area of raising silkworms." With respect to the yield of poultry belonging to agricultural and industrial, 'Asgariyeh said:

"Considering the fact that during the current year some 800 million tumans in foreign exchange had been taken out of this country in a single day for chicken importation, it is very important for us to breed chickens domestically. Thank God that during the years since the revolution we have succeeded within this country in selecting 4 strong breeds of chicken. In this connection, the Supreme Council on Economics has allocated more than 850 million rials for the establishment of a research unit at Babol to conduct studies in this field. We hope that by the end of next year we will be self-sufficient within the country with respect to the daily output of chicken."

CSO: 4640/151

## BRIEFS

PM URGES HEAVY INDUSTRY BE RESTARTED--Prime Minister Mir Hossain Mussavi told a special session of the Economic Council in Tehran that ministers must do everything in their power to ensure that heavy industry is restarted. He promised that the government would ensure the cash and credit were provided. Subjects under discussion included the Isfahan steel mill and the Moharakeh steel project. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 11]

VIOLENCE IN IRAN--Violence continued in Iran unabated in the past week. The mullahs and alleged leftists were on the receiving end, though some of the people executed in recent weeks are reported to have had no contacts with leftist groups whatsoever. Deputy Minister of Industries and Mines Hojatoleslam Hasan Monfared and Majlis deputy and brother of the President Mohammad Khamenei, also a mullah, were wounded in attacks by motorcycle gunmen. Khamenei's two guards died in the attack on him. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 11]

MEAT SHORTAGE DISCUSSED--Eat less meat was the message put out by Minister of Agriculture Salamati in a meeting with his officials. Buying more meat was not to the advantage of the revolution and since the people could put up with other shortages they should now make do with less meat, he said. Not buying has caused exporting countries to reduce their prices, he claimed. New Zealand recently halted shipments until the Iranian government paid off \$42 million owed on a current contract. Deliveries have begun again and officials are said to be hoped to negotiate a new contract. The minister also revealed that Iran has been exporting onions to obtain hard currency, but he still contended that the "leech-like" dealers were responsible for the present shortage. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 11]

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQ--Questioned about France's joining Saudi Arabia and other countries in supplying the Iraqi regime with military equipment French Foreign Minister Cheysson told a press conference that his country was not "betting on one horse in the region" or taking sides. "We are sorry the war continues," he said. "We are equally sorry about the violence and other happenings inside Iran." He said these events could lead to the disintegration of the country, with far-reaching consequences well outside the country's borders. Current help for Iraq was part of agreements made before the present government came to power and which it had promised to honour when taking over. The question of Iran came at the end of a 75-minute programme and the chairman had to cut off the minister before he could elaborate on the subject. Diplomats in Paris commented later that since Iran was in no position to buy anything from France it was obvious that Iraq, backed financially by other Arab states, was a better customer for French goods and technology. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 12]

FRIENDSHIP AGREEMENT--Iranian sources say the Tehran Government has rejected a request from the Soviet Union that it should sign an extension of the 15-year co-operation and friendship agreement with its northern neighbour. The Soviets were said to have offered extensive new cooperation and help in return for the signing. The mullahs are said to have told the Russians they cannot sign, but will be happy to have closer cooperation with Moscow. Visits by the Soviet ambassador to the Foreign Ministry are thought to have set off reports in Tehran that he has protested against a purge of suspected Tudeh elements in Iran. Tudeh leader Kia-Nouri is said to have gone underground. No solid confirmation of the purge has yet been received in Europe. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 12]

STRIKING WORKERS KILLED--Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani categorically denied reports from Mojahedin-e-Khalq sources that security forces had killed a number of striking workers at the Iran National car-building factory. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 12]

INTERESTS SECTION IN ALGERIAN EMBASSY--A senior U.S. legal official is reported to have called for the closing of the Iranian interests section at the Algerian Embassy in its present form, saying it has become a nest of terrorism. He proposed the work of the section should be taken over by Algerian diplomats. A number of the Iranians working in the section are now known to U.S. officials, he said, and there was evidence that some staff at the section had been involved in terrorist attacks like the killing of former opposition leader Tabatabai in Washington. Three people in the section, which presumably is covered by diplomatic immunity, are wanted by U.S. courts, he added. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 12]

ISLAMIC SOCIETY MEMBER DIES--Mansur Nazari, an active member of the Islamic Society in Spain, has died in a mysterious manner. His body was transported to Tehran where he was buried, the daily ISLAMIC REPUBLIC reported. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 12]

EMBASSY APPOINTMENTS ANNOUNCED--The Ministry of Islamic Guidance has announced the appointment of 12 cultural attaches to Iran embassies in Pakistan (3), India (2), Sudan, the Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Turkey, Lebanon, Algeria and Belgium. No explanation was given as to why Belgium was the only country chosen which has no big Muslim community, though sources conjectured that the EEC might be considered, in view of its priority to economic interests, as a sufficiently receptive target to better understand the policies and problems of the Khomeini regime compared with other parts of the non-Muslim world. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54 14 Jan 82 p 12]

CSO: 4600/239

TRANSFER OF AMBASSADOR FROM FRANCE TO TUNISIA DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 246, 7 Nov 81 p 27

[Article: "Ambassador and Relations"]

[Text] In a few days, Nuri Isma'il al-Ways will be behind his desk at the Iraqi Embassy in Tunisia because his government has chosen him as Iraq's ambassador to Tunisia and its delegate to the Arab League.

Instantly, the question arises: Is this the time to transfer an ambassador like Nuri al-Ways from Paris to Tunis?

The question is relevant due to several considerations, including the consideration that the Iraqi-French relations are of an extremely delicate and important nature. Such relations require a person who has gained experience with people and with their method of transaction and who has become familiar with the weak and strong points in the policies they manage and with the policy and the policy makers in the State of France.

As there are considerations dictating that Nuri al-Ways continue his work as Iraq's ambassador to France, there is also a fact that must be taken into consideration, namely that a new regime has begun in France and that it is normal for another Iraqi ambassador to be working with this regime. This doesn't mean that Nuri al-Ways was a "Giscardist," if we may use the expression, and that it is necessary to select a "Mitterrandist" ambassador, again if we may use the expression.

Nuri al-Ways has lived during the most important period in the history of the relations between France and an Arab country. He has experienced the phase of development and initiative in Iraqi-French relations and the phase of the dangers and fears of decline in these relations. He has also experienced the delicate period of nuclear cooperation between Iraq and France and the consequences of the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

This experience which Nuri al-Ways gained during his position in France will provide a solid foundation for his work in Tunisia which is experiencing domestic political vitality that reminds one of the vitality Lebanon experienced when Nuri al-Ways was Iraq's ambassador in Beirut. Tunisia is also experiencing the beginnings of political vitality on the Arab level, as a result of the provisional presence of the Arab League in Tunis. This reminds one of the vitality Nuri

al-Ways would have enjoyed in Cairo had not the conditions under which he was chosen to be his country's ambassador in Cairo faltered from the start. This is why his mission in Cairo ended (as soon as he arrived there), if we may say so.

While wishing Nuri al-Ways success in his new position, we hope that Iraqi-French relations will regain some of their vitality because these relations overcame the period of troubling instability in the wake of the visit made last August by Tariq 'Aziz, the deputy prime minister and member of the Revolutionary Command Council. But this doesn't mean that it is permissible to assume that overcoming the instability means the restoration of vitality.

It is most likely that this vitality will not be regained until a French official with the same weight in President Mitterrand's regime as the weight which Tariq 'Aziz has in the Iraqi leadership repays the visit.

8494  
CSO: 4404/149

## POLITICAL, MILITARY STRATEGY BEHIND KARUN RIVER WITHDRAWAL DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1301, 9 Oct 81 p 19

[Article by "H. H.": "Why Did the Iraqis Cross the Qarun River from the Rear to the Front?"]

[Text] In October 1980, the Iraqi army completed its occupation of "al-Muhammarah," [al-Khoramshahr]. Before it lay either al-Ahvaz, capital of Arabestan province, or Abadan, from which all of Iran's vital arteries extend. The Iraqi army crossed the Karun River. All Iraqis, as a people, regardless of whether the Iraqi political leadership wanted to not occupy Abadan, whether announced or unannounced, wanted the Iraqi army to go into Abadan. But this did not happen. It was said at the time that not entering Abadan was a political decision. It has now become clear that it was a political decision. It has now become clear that it was a political decision which was not rejected by the military. Occupying Abadan would have meant the shedding of more blood. After the fall of al-Muhammarah, and despite the fleeing of civilians from Abadan, it was changed into a city of trenches and military fortifications. The fact is that it was in a state of psychological defeat, but the city was capable of resistance and of forcing the Iraqis to pay dearly in blood before it fell. Moreover, the Iranian navy was still in the Gulf and could direct its fire on the Iraqis, if they entered Abadan. As for the political decision, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has alluded to it, and others have made it clear, that the occupation of Abadan was not ordered because he did not want to close the door on negotiations, and because "entry into Abadan was much easier than getting out of it in the future." Accordingly, during the year it became clear that the Iraqis did not want to occupy Abadan, nor the city of Ahvaz, but that they were aiming at putting the two cities under Iraqi fire. Daily they fought along the entire length of the confrontation lines around Abadan from east and south, until the battles of last week occurred. The Iranians brought up the 77th Division from Khorasan, of which it was said that Khomeyni was suspicious of its loyalty, after some of his confidants told him that its leaders were planning a military coup. Accordingly, the division along with thousands of revolutionary guards and most of an armored brigade plunged into a savage attack against the Iraqi forces. The Iraqis were in defensive positions and did not retreat under the pressure of the Iranian attack. On the contrary, before midnight they began a counterattack, which unofficial Iranian sources said caused Iranian losses to exceed 2000 dead (news agencies' report of 28 September). After the Iraqis completed their attack, they had reached the point where they were able to restore the "complete blockade" of Abadan. The military command issued an order to move the forces from east of the Karun to its west bank. It was stated in the communique that this decision was taken because the military value of the area occupied by them east of the Karun was not worth the losses being taken every day.

I asked one Arab military official for an explanation of this communique. He said, "If the purpose was only defensive, then this was quite right, because then between you and the enemy, there would be a water barrier to prevent daily infiltration into the defensive lines. But if the Iraqis are preparing to attack in the future, then the Iraqi forces are in a bad position as compared with the enemy position against whom the attack was intended."

Accordingly, during my visit in the Abadan area last February, the Iraqi troops on the front lines were constantly moving their positions from one place to another. Some officers told me about an Iraqi order postponing the move of Iraqi forces from east of the Karun to the west. Therefore, we know that the order had been previously made and that the withdrawal plan had been drawn up militarily during the third month of the war, when they became convinced that they did not want to occupy Abadan.

The question now is, which of the two positions is militarily best for the Iraqis, should their forces be east of the Karun or west of it?

Military analysts say: "If the Iraqis were in an offensive condition, and they are within Iranian territory, it would be better for their forces to remain in the east, in order to open the way to advance. However, they are in a preventive posture, and on level ground, such as al-Kuf, where armor and tanks can be used. Whoever stops behind the river prevents the movement of the general facing him."

Now there are no bridges connecting the two banks of the Karun. The Iraqi army has taken up positions behind a natural, water barrier, which prevents tank movements. This is after they learned the secrets of the area east of the Karun, and the comparative positions have become well known to Iraqi artillery. Therefore, it has become easy for them to direct their fire without incurring any casualties worth mentioning.

The Arab military official was asked, "Why didn't the Iraqi army make a stand east of the Karun?" He answered: "In the military, there is something called a 'bridgehead', so that forces holding out against any attack by the enemy must have a bridgehead depth of from 15 to 25 kilometers from the water barrier. Then, if the enemy divisions attack, they should be able to cross an area of 12 kilometers easily, after which they would be destroyed. The Egyptians in the 1973 war penetrated 15 kilometers from the Suez Canal. When General al-Shazali wanted to go 25 kilometers to reach the passes, Sadat issued a political order stopping him."

"The Iraqis did not advance more than 3 kilometers east of the Karun, since they had stated from the beginning that they did not want to occupy Abadan, nor to conquer the Iranian people or army. The forces' move west of the river was done for strategic reasons as determined by the Iraqi military command. However, this decision would be erroneous, if the political leadership, in the future, wants to advance. If they remain as they now are, content with their present gains, then this is good. The Iraqis must remain in their positions now."

The military official added: "The decisive factor in the situation is the Iraqi soldier. So long as the soldier is steadfast, Iraq is in good shape. Iraq's Arab and international position is excellent, because it has achieved certain victory, militarily. A year has past, and Iran is trying to regain its territory and cannot. Therefore, the Iraqis are victorious, so long as they occupy a piece of Iranian territory and fight over it."

I asked: "Don't you call the recent battle a victory for Iran?" The Arab military official replied: "Never. When a state regains a piece of its occupied territory, this is not considered a victory until it has regained every inch of its territory, even if only 200 meters remain. The battle of Abadan is considered simply a tactical move. So long as the enemy is on your soil, he is the victor."

On the other hand, it is curious that most of the news agencies in the world, that did not consider the battle an Iranian victory, reported the Iranian exaggerations, which referred to this battle as "the most important Iranian victory since World War II."

Moreover, Westerners understood the decision to move the Iraqi forces to be a political step, taken by the Iraqi president and supported by the military command, in order to achieve a relaxation which might bring the Iranians to negotiations. Those who know Iranian thinking totally disagree with this interpretation. One of them says: "Khomeyni will not enter into negotiations even if he occupied Basrah. When that happened, he would demand Baghdad, and if he got that, he would demand all of Iraq. He would then move his revolution and demand the Gulf, and so on."

I asked an informed Iraqi source whether the Iraqi command would move its forces again?

He replied: "The matter that has not been announced is that the Iraqi forces have changed the arrangement of their positions in many of the locations. They have gone forward in some and have retreated in others, without changing the major and principal targets along the battlefield. The cities of Qasr Sharin, Maharan, and al-Muhammarah are still in Iraqi hands. The forces are still in their strategic positions in Sar-e Pol-e Zahab. The cities of Ahvaz, Dexful and Susangerd are still under Iraqi forces' fire, as well as the city of Abadan."

While observers are interpreting and analyzing the battles and the move of the Iraqi forces, one of the Western broadcasts raised this question. So long as Iran is a disordered country, with a civil war going on, losing 70 of its leaders in one instance, lacking an organized military leadership, how can it carry out such attacks as this? The commentator went on to ask, "Does this mean new international support for Iran?"

In any event, this has not been a shock or blow to the Iraqi army which has undertaken one of the most important military operations during the year, aimed at paralyzing the exportation of Iranian oil to the world, since the "Ghaurah" station (located in the northern Arab Gulf) has been destroyed, which was responsible for exporting the oil from the Iranian island of al-Kharj to the world.

One western diplomat says: "The war has reached a very sensitive juncture: since it is between two oil-producing nations, it might turn into an oil war, especially since Iran did not hesitate to bomb the Kuwaiti refinery."

The Western diplomat referred to the Bahmashir River, which extends from al-Muhammarah to the Gulf, and said: "This river might be the equivalent of the Shatt al-'Arab and might be used as the entranceway into East Iran. If many improvements were made in it, it could become a canal similar to the Shatt al-'Arab. Is it possible to renew this idea?"

The oil war might, in its course, burn up all ideas.

7005  
CSO: 4404/75

FUTURE FRENCH NUCLEAR COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 5

[Text]

The French government has hinted strongly that it will insist on increased safeguards for any nuclear reactor it builds in Iraq to replace the one destroyed by Israeli bombers last June. A statement by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson implied that only special low-grade fuel, nicknamed caramel, would be offered to the Iraqis.

Use of the fuel could keep the enrichment level for the uranium in the Iraqi reactor to as low as 7 per cent, which is well below what is believed necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. It is adequate, however, to allow the reactor to function as a research and training centre, its ostensible purpose.

Iraq and France have consistently denied that the destroyed Tammouz reactor was being used for any other than peaceful purposes. They were supported in this contention in a subsequent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which monitors the nuclear facilities in countries bound by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of which both Iraq and France are signatories (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, November 23, 1981).

Israel, which has not signed the treaty and has refused to allow IEA inspectors anywhere near its Dimona nuclear facility, has threatened to use military means to prevent any attempt by Iraq to rebuild its reactor, citing its fear that the Iraqis were intending to make nuclear weapons to destroy Israel.

Although President François Mitterrand's ministers have repeated France's willingness to continue nuclear cooperation with Iraq, it is not clear whether Iraq will agree to accept the proposed limitations on the type of fuel to be supplied. Iraqi officials have let it be known that they may turn elsewhere, perhaps to Italy, in an attempt to secure their requirements. Another possible French restriction is said to be an extension of the period during which French technicians would be present at any new reactor. The Iraqi response to this idea is not known.

Much secrecy has surrounded the discussions between the Mitterrand administration and the Iraqi government, and no final decisions have yet been taken, press reports say.

## DIVERSIFICATION OF EXPORTS SOUGHT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 251, 13 Dec 81 p 63

[Article: "Iraq Making Progress in Diversification of Exports"]

[Text] Statistics of the Import-Export Organization in Iraq indicate that development of diversity of Iraqi exports is represented by the following indicators:

1. Iraq's exports through the organization (except oil and sulphur) increased in 1979 to 59 percent of Iraqi exports, thereby achieving a total growth rate of 384 percent over 1972, i.e., a compound growth rate of 55 percent.
2. The percentage of manufactured goods and materials exported for final consumption reached 75 percent of the total Iraqi exports through the organization, compared to only 33.9 percent in 1972. That reflects the growth obtained in Iraqi industrial production and the diversification in this production.
3. Iraqi exports of agricultural goods declined from 37.4 percent of total exports in 1971 to just 20.6 percent of the total in 1979.
4. The share of agricultural exports held by dates declined from 98.9 percent in 1972 to 87.4 percent in 1979, reflecting the diversification and wealth achieved in Iraqi agricultural production.

The organization's reports indicate that fertilizer, dry batteries, oils and oil products, and home electrical appliances made up the largest percentage of Iraqi manufactured goods exported in recent years, which was accompanied by a decline in exports of building and construction materials, due to the requirement for them by Iraqi projects, and a rise in Iraqi imports of them because of social and construction growth needs.

Moreover, there was a growth in import markets for Iraqi exports, since the Asian countries' share rose from 15.8 percent in 1972 to 45 percent in 1980. The Socialist nations were second on the import list, followed by the Arab countries, which previously ranked first with 46.6 percent.

This movement is attributable to the fact that the growth of Iraqi exports to Asian countries, during this period, was 1092.4 percent, compared to 611.2 percent to the Socialist bloc, and 107.6 percent to the Arab nations, whereas exports to the group of American nations declined by 95.9 percent. The decline of exports to American nations is attributable to various reasons, including political. The rise in exports to Asian nations is due to the need of these countries for fertilizers which Iraq produces from its abundant sulphur.

7005

CSO: 4404/189

## LEBANESE PROBLEM AFFECTING COUNTRY'S OIL EXPORTS

London 8 DAYS in English No 2, 16 Jan 8, pp 18, 19

[Text]

THE proxy war in Lebanon between Iran and Iraq is starting to take after events at the top of the Gulf, where Iraq is also taking some heavy blows.

The new year began badly for Baghdad in Lebanon. On 4 January, only three weeks after the devastating attack on its Beirut embassy that killed at least 36, the pipeline which carries Iraqi oil to Tripoli, Lebanon, was blown up. Two days earlier, an oil tanker due to transport some of the Iraqi oil from the terminal to Lebanon's second refinery, at Sidon, was rocketed and had to sail to Greece for repairs.

The pipeline blown up was a branch of the 1.4m b/d capacity Iraqi-Syrian line, which runs through to Banias. It had only been open for ten days, having lain idle since the Lebanese civil war more than five years ago.

The Iraqis, had set great store by the branch, lobbying for its reopening with both Damascus and Beirut throughout much of last year. Baghdad is eager to increase its oil exports (currently just under 1m b/d) to around 1.3m b/d, and talks are going on with several oil companies about future sales.

The problem, of course, is outlets. With the sea route through the Gulf closed by the war, Iraq has to rely on its two pipelines, the Syrian one and the line to Doryol in Turkey. But technical problems have limited their use, and only 300,000 b/d is going through to Banias (compared to the 1m b/d the terminal can handle). Tripoli, therefore, gives another outlet. Under the agreement to reopen the line that was reached last November, the pipe was initially to handle 200,000 b/d, half its capacity, with 35,000 b/d going to the Tripoli refinery.

The damage to the pipeline will probably be easily repaired, although some 30 metres of it were dynamited near Tel Al Ghazbi, just inside the border with Syria. The Doryol line was also blown up, by Kurds inside Turkey, at the start of the Gulf war, but it was quickly put right — Lebanese technicians at first said it would take only a day to fix.

On the other hand, there can be no guarantee that it will not happen again. Already fears that there might be another rocket attack on an oil tanker in Tripoli port have made some vessels reportedly unwilling to pick up oil there.

However, it would hardly crush either the Lebanese or the Iraqis if the line is not reopened. Both have managed without it for more than five years. Warnings of gloom and doom by some Lebanese MPs, who were sounding off about how a shutdown of the Tripoli refinery would kill local industry, can be dismissed. So far, the refinery has shown it can survive perfectly well without the Iraqi input.

Pro-Iranian elements in Lebanon appear to be behind the explosion. Attempts to link it to the Syrians are probably motivated largely by malice. Though relations between the two Baathist capitals have cooled in recent weeks, after a period of marked improvement, the line crosses Syria and was only opened with the Syrians' permission. They would hardly have needed to be so dramatic if they had really wanted it shut down.

In fact, responsibility was claimed in a Beirut telephone call by a group calling itself the 'Iraq Mujaheddin'. Such a name implies some affinity with the small but fanatical Shiite opposition group in Iraq,

the Dawa, which supports Iran and wants an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Iraq. However, there is no way of confirming whether the call was genuine or — as so often in Beirut — was just another publicity-seeking crank on the line.

Meanwhile, back where the real war is going on, Iraq last week announced it had launched a new offensive in Iran's Kermanshah province, in which 1,800 Iranians had been killed or wounded. The Iranians were equally confident, with their premier, Mir Hussein Mousavi, predicting that Iranian troops would be moving across the border into Iraqi territory shortly. Like the Beirut phone call, there is no way of confirming either claim, though there is little doubt that the war in the region is hotting up.

CSO: 4400/122

NEW ACCOUNTING SYSTEM INSTITUTED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Nov 81 p 5

[Article: "Unified Accounting System To Be Applied From the First Day of the New Year"]

[Text] It has been decided to apply the unified accounting system beginning the first day of the new year. The financial budgets are to be changed to conform to the new system for purposes of keeping track of appropriations.

The system, and preparation of requirements to apply it, were discussed in a vast meeting held yesterday by the presidential ministries, for 650 officials responsible for applying it in the organizations and institutions.

Discussions dealt with the most important features characterizing the new system, and full explanations pertaining to investment expenditures regardless of funding source.

The methods of reclassifying accounts to serve the traditional financial accounting requirements, the requirements of cost and price accounting, national accounting, etc., were discussed, as well as the statements required for control and planning purposes.

The discussions clarified the control and flexibility in applying the unified accounting system, which has been aimed at reducing the accounting burden on the units using the system, along with retaining the possibilities of providing all the statements required for purposes of national accounting, control and planning, in terms of employing other sources of information outside of the system, to provide certain statistical statements required by various authorities, most especially the statements pertaining to custom duties paid.

Furthermore, the preparation of supplemental statistical lists to cover national accounting requirements, control and planning, and to make decisions regarding the, were discussed, along with the use of the method of flexibly determining payability in all fiscal transactions, most especially at the end of the year, along with stressing the importance of the ratio of amounts of transactions which the unit makes, and also employs the method of determining payability for the purpose of providing statements to be studied by the national comptroller, for purposes of control and establishing regulations for this use, in order to spare the unit's accountant any unjustified additional effort.

Comparable accounting is employed within budget accounts to show financial concentration and, clearly, the unit's responsibilities, through applying the principle of obligation and providing the elements of internation control.

It also employs the classification of uses in accordance with additional value requirements, and classifies resources to show the allocation of economic activities, and discriminates between current and investment activity, and credit and contingency activities. It highlights the construction and building sector with respect to accounting evidence.

The new accounting system was founded on the bases that distinguish between public property, which is social capital, and the unit's property, in terms of accountability and classification for purposes of fixed capital. Cost accounting is separated from fiscal accounting. It eliminates accounts that do not reflect their true reality, and generally classifies the fixed elements in accordance with their nature and use in the activity. Finally it employs decimalization and logical serialized classification for confirmational accounting.

7005  
CSO: 4404/189

IRAQ

BRIEFS

JAPANESE TRUCK ORDER--Iraq has awarded a contract worth Y 5 billion (about \$22.6 million) to the Japanese Sumitomo Company for the supply of 218 large fire-fighting trucks, including 155 foam vehicles. The Sumitomo Co said that Hino Motors would build the trucks for the directorate of civil defence. Morita Pump of Osaka will produce the fire-fighting equipment. Sumitomo won a similar order for 208 fire-fighting trucks worth Y 3.5 billion from Iraq last August. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 12]

CSO: 4400/122

## ACTIVITY OF MARGINAL POLITICAL GROUPS ANALYZED

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French No 5-6, Oct-Dec 81 pp 890-921

[Article by Ilan Greilsammer]

[Text] This study is a comparative analysis of the main characteristics and functions of marginal political groups in Israel.

Why do we use the term "marginal" to designate non-consensus groups. The terminology applied to this phenomenon by researchers is very rich. Political scientists from the other side of the Atlantic have the habit of contrasting "radical" forces with liberal and conservative parties. E. Shils has familiarized us with the concepts of center and periphery. We also frequently find the words "extremist," "antidemocratic," "revolutionary," and so forth.

If the term "marginal" has recently been in vogue--especially since 1968, although the meaning of the word has evolved since then--it is most likely because it is a neutral expression, without any ideological connotation, that "covers the multifarious aspects of a rejection of the dominant values."<sup>1</sup> This term thus covers not only rightwing and leftwing extremism, but also religious, antireligious and antimodern extremism and, in general, all social and political nonconformist groups.

In recent years, the use of the concept of marginality has proven particularly fruitful regarding medieval history. In studying individuals and groups which were excluded or which excluded themselves from society (heretics, Jews, the insane, foreigners, students, etc), and how the medieval society regarded them, one becomes aware of the fact that the marginals surprisingly reveal the consensus and myths of their environment.<sup>2</sup>

Moving from a study of marginal individuals to an analysis of marginal political forces within a given system poses problems, but the objective is still to regard the non-consensus group as a mirror or something that reveals the society as a whole. In the case of Israel, a comparative study of the characteristics and functions of the political marginals will shed light on the values of the main majority parties, and primarily on the Labor Alignment and the Likud. Israeli society readily lends itself to a study of marginal groups in that it is a pluralist society,<sup>3</sup> based on a very powerful political consensus, and it has a large number of extremist forces located along extremely varied ideological axes.<sup>4</sup>

After analyzing the historical process of the marginalization of these forces, we will raise two questions: What do they have in common? What is their impact on the Israeli political system?

### The Marginalization Process

#### Political Diversity in the Yishuv

During the first 30 years of this century, the Jewish community of Palestine (the Yishuv) was marked by extreme political diversity, a real plethora of parties.<sup>5</sup> On the left, we find the gamut of the most varied socialisms, from the most orthodox communism to the most reformist socialism, including anarchist, labor unionist, Tolstoyan and populist currents. Immigrants from the second and third waves of immigration (aliyah) were imbued with the radical and socialist ideas widespread in Russia. On the right, developing a little later, the currents which are generally grouped together under the term "civil camp" and which could be called anti-socialist movements: the liberal movements of various hues and the ultranationalist groups, going all the way to the extremist Revisionist Party. The fourth aliyah, which began in 1924 and was comprised mainly of Jews from Poland ruined by that country's anti-Semitic policy, was at the origin of the development of these right-wing currents.

On a religious plane, the Yishuv society embodied a large number of beliefs, from the most secular to the most fanatically orthodox. Among the orthodox Jews, a fundamental cleavage occurred between the national religious groups in favor of creating a modern, sovereign state, and the anti-Zionist religious groups, which came mainly from the "old Yishuv" and were settled in the "holy cities" of Palestine. The latter formed a political group around the Agudat Israel (Union of Israel) Party and its workers' wing, the Poalei Agudat Israel.

In view of the characteristics of this small community, so diversified from an ideological standpoint, it would seem impossible to use the term marginality or to talk about marginal groups during that period.

In fact, in mandated Palestine, there was no overall sovereign political grouping with its own laws and procedures for ostracism and exclusion.

There was no generally accepted consensus (not even with regard to Zionism). Once this community received "self-government" from the British authorities, all groups without exception could be represented in the elected assembly (even the Communist Party, which was banned by the British, submitted lists under various names and had several assembly members). Finally, even though the Mapai (the Workers Union, and later the Erets-Israel Workers Party), a strongly dominant party, did appear early on, it was, however, not in a position to prevent a myriad of other small parties and movements from developing and consolidating.

### The Three Main Currents

Despite this plethora of parties and absence of exclusivity, three currents--or rather three groups of forces--broke away rather quickly and became consistently stronger. The first two were the social-democrat current (a relatively cohesive

group) and the antisocialist current without cohesion, as it was formed by several small groups of moderates, liberals, nationalists, etc). This cleavage ran along a socioeconomic axis and responded to the question: What should the production relations be in the new Jewish society of Palestine?

For part of the Yishuv, the objective was to build a socialist and democratic society of workers based on the labor union organization. For a minority, in contrast, the goal was to establish a liberal society, allowing the private sector to flourish and giving the Hisadrut only a purely secondary role. It was a left-right cleavage,<sup>6</sup> which was reflected at all levels of the social fiber: kibbutzim and cooperatives versus the urban middle classes; farm workers versus proprietors and small businessmen.... However, there is a controversy among specialists in the political history of the Yishuv as to the degree of ideological intensify of these various groups. With respect to the origins of the Mapai (founded in 1930), Yonathan Shapira regards the Workers Union (1919-1930) as a powerful bureaucratic machine, with oligarchic and slightly doctrinaire tendencies, whereas Yosef Gorni, for instance, stresses the ideological components of the first Israeli socialism.<sup>7</sup> The "religious" axis divided the various parties around the question of what type of relations should be established between the political sphere and religion, within both the autonomous Yishuv and the future Jewish state. This is how the third important political current developed, the national-religious movement, which wanted close ties between religion on the one hand (practice of the "Shabbat," holidays, food laws, marriage laws, etc), and public life, on the other.

In the beginning, these three main movements--socialist, antisocialist and religious Zionist--seem to have taken fairly firm ideological stands. Then they filled out and expanded, and gradually lost their doctrinal content to become "catchall parties." Otto Kirchheimer described this process whereby a party gradually gives up any ambition of being the intellectual and moral leader of the masses and turns into a catchall party. The model of the catchall party has been greatly criticized, but it relates quite well to the development of the three main Israeli political movements: the Socialist Alignment (Maarakh), the Coalition of the Right (Likud), and the National Religious Party (Mafdal).

However, it is important to bear the following in mind:

--The Alignment development as a "catchall party" much earlier than the other two movements.

--The right was not always united. For a long time the Liberal Party (or the "general Zionists") rejected the ultranationalist options of Begin's right and at times even joined with Labor. The rightist movements have been united for the past 15 or so years.

--Finally, the Religious Party was never as important as the other two movements, and was never able to take power. It has merely tried to have a part of the power, by heading certain key sectors (today the interior, the police, discussions on territories, education, etc).

## Moving Toward "Catchall Parties"

By expanding, the three dominant movements tried to absorb all the political forces close to them.<sup>8</sup> Of course, there were mergers or coalitions of organizations, and the militants or "social-democrat" voters, for example, did not always follow. Some former members of the Labor List are now part of the Likud, and some Mapam sympathizers departed for the extreme left. It is still true that the Socialist Alignment is an extremely broad political group, an enormous electoral machine located at the center of the Israeli political checkerboard. According to Alan Arian, the Alignment is indeed the party of the entire middle class, a centrist party. In his book, "Ideological Change in Israel," the author noted that less than half of the voters for the Alignment described themselves as being leftist.<sup>9</sup>

The same is true of the antisocialist forces. The liberals and the ultranationalists have of course been separated for a long time by foreign policy. But the majority current of the General Zionist Party very soon showed its hostility toward the Mapai and the "improper role" granted to the single trade union group. In 1965, liberals and Herut Beginists formed the Gahal, a sort of common front for the elections to the sixth Knesset. In 1973, this rightist coalition became the Likud, bringing together some former friends of David Ben-Gurion with socialist tendencies, on the one hand, and the extremists of the Erets-Israel on the other. And, in 1977, the Likud came to power, further expanding its electorate among the lower classes.

Finally, the national religious wing regrouped and expanded, although not as much. It gained very little ground among the most orthodox groups, although it could have attracted young people from the Agudat Israel, as they were frequently more a part of the modern state than their elders, who were former anti-Zionists. It was mostly in the sectors of the population which had slightly or recently moved away from their religious attachment that the Mafdal expanded its base, i.e., among immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East,<sup>10</sup> less educated and cultured lower-income groups, and "traditional" circles fearing an attack on their moral values and frightened by certain modern phenomena (drugs in the high schools, pornography, loose morals).<sup>11</sup> It is worth noting that one-third of Israeli children (or much more than the percentage of practicing families) are sent by their parents to religious schools. We should, however, point out that in recent years--and even in recent months--the National Religious Party has experienced certain difficulties: its Sephardic following, who are in the poorest classes, seems to be attracted by the Likud, on the one hand, and by the "ethnic" political movements on the other (the Tami, Traditional Israeli Movement, which obtained 2.3 percent of the vote in 1981).

The Mafdal also recruits among laymen attracted by its extremism in foreign policy. Among these nonreligious groups, the Mafdal hopes to play the role played by the Christian Democrats in the countries of the West. As Daniel Elazar observes, it aspires to be a major centrist force, drawing its members by a broad base of spirituality and moral values.<sup>12</sup>

The lines separating these three primary "catchall parties," which received 78 percent of the vote in 1973, 67 percent in 1977, and 80 percent in 1981, are rather vague. To a very great extent, these movements are appealing to the same public, and "transfers" of voters and followers are a constant occurrence. The dividing

lines are no longer sociological, since each of these parties is based on a largely similar following, with a few exceptions.<sup>13</sup> The divisions are both ideological and historical. The Alignment's emphasis on the central (and not just "unionist") role of the Histadrut in the state, its preference for the public and cooperative sectors, and its rejection of any compulsory arbitration procedures prevent it from attracting truly "liberal" elements on a socioeconomic level. Conversely, the pure, primitive liberalism, inspired by Milton Friedman and adopted by the Likud, reduces its possibilities for drawing more social-democratic voters, in spite of everything. Likewise, the religious foundation of the Mafdal makes it hard for it to appeal to truly secular (a fortiori anticlerical) elements of the population, and its nationalism continues to separate it from ultrafundamentalist groups.<sup>14</sup>

With regard to historical dividing lines, you will recall that the nucleus of the Alignment is related to the former movements of the Haganah and the Palmah, whereas Mr Begin's Herut, the pivot of the Likud, was formed by the Irgun and the Stern Group. It seems as though in 1981 it is still difficult to reconcile the parties stemming from these resistance groups.

Since each of these three "blocks" overlaps considerably with the others, we can illustrate the "center" of Israeli politics with the following diagram:

Key:

1. Alignment between Labor and the Mapam (Maarakh)
2. Coalition of the Right (Likud)
3. National Religious Group (Mafdal-Tami)



This diagram shows that small "centrist parties" are virtually nonexistent in Israel. The only exception of this sort that almost succeeded, the Democratic Movement for Change (Dash) (obtaining 11.6 percent of the vote in 1977), quickly disappeared from the political scene. Other moderate or independent parties, which did not fit in with one of the major blocs, played a minor role. In 1981, all the small specifically centrist parties taken together (Telem, Chinou, the Citizen's Rights and Peace Movement and the Liberal Independent Party) won little more than 3 percent of the vote.

#### A Basis for Consensus

The three main political forces in Israel represent a broad bipliugital consensus, accepted without dispute by three-quarters of the population. If the centrist and moderate groups are added to these three movements, nearly 45 percent of the vote is for the "mainstream parties." It would be safe to say that all these political forces today agree on the main issues.

For the purposes of this study, we will define marginal groups as political groups which are critical of or hostile to one or several components of this consensus. In gradually spreading to cover new sectors of the population, the consensus parties stopped at different points beyond which they could not venture without losing a considerable part of their constituents. It is beyond these outer points that we find the marginal groups.

We must first, then, define the beliefs and values that form the political consensus in Israel, or in other words, what Alan Arian calls "a base of widely shared attitudes that predispose their holders to support the system."<sup>15</sup>

In our view the Israeli consensus is based on four factors.

The first is national in nature and rests on two assumptions: "the State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people"; and "the State of Israel is based on Zionism." Each is a specific assumption. First of all there is a link with the Jewish people. Acceptance of the fact that the Jews form a people, a nation, is one of the foundations of Israeli political culture. Likewise, the Zionist ideology, that is, the doctrine that preaches that Jewish exiles must return to the land of Israel to rebuild their sovereign state, is a feature of all the consensus parties.

The second factor is socioeconomic: denial--at least on a practical level--of the class struggle and a belief in the welfare state. The very concept of the class struggle, in its Marxist sense, is no longer under by the workers. It is evoked as a "stylistic clause" by the Mapam. The Mapam, however, is only a small minority group in the Alignment, and it is itself based on a network of Kibbutzim that practice a cooperative, self-contained socialism alien to urban struggles. Finally, ever since the beginning of the sixties, the Mapam has been associated with labor management of the country's semicapitalist economy.

Adherence to the principles of traditional democracy, at the level of the party organization (the party's internal democracy), the government (parliamentary democracy), and of society in general (respect for citizens' freedom and equal rights)<sup>16</sup> is the third factor. Of course, these are only principles, and experience shows that Israeli parties have not always respected them. The parties' organizational rules have not always worked very well, with internal elections at irregular intervals, conventions too few and far between, "arranged" elections, and so forth. As for respect for the equal rights of Arab citizens, it has suffered largely from "emergency legislation" and the "military administration" dating from the time of the British and preserved by the Israeli Labor Party. These deviations from democratic principles have been explained by the system as "temporary," "exceptional," or "imposed by outside circumstance." The growing tendency of Israelis to favor "strongmen"--a trend demonstrated by most surveys--does not affect their official adherence to democratic processes.

Finally, all the consensus parties and the overwhelming majority of the population accept the modernization process, which has inculcated a Western lifestyle in very traditional peoples and has introduced all the advances of science and technology into Israeli society.<sup>17</sup> Even the National Religious Party, which represents the most traditional groups from Africa and Asia at the bottom of the social and cultural scale, has gone along with the modernization process (to the extent, naturally,

that it does not interfere with religious practice. For instance, the Mafdal has always been against "daylight savings time," despite the energy saving it entails, because it is afraid of "desacralizing the 'shabbat'").

These are the four basic components of the consensus and political culture in Israel. These four pillars are closely interrelated: Zionism, as the emancipation from tradition and the pivot of modernization; the essential unity of the Jewish people and the rejection of the class struggle; democratic procedures as the foundation of a "modern" state (for people coming from traditional, authoritarian regimes), etc.

The marginals, including borderline groups and antisystem forces, are the political movements located at the fringe, outside the consensus.

### The Marginals: Borderline Groups and Antisystem Forces<sup>18</sup>

#### The Periphery of the System

Some political forces, which we will call "borderline groups," are located at the periphery of the system. They have reservations with regard to one or several components of the consensus. It is not a total, categorical rejection, but rather a critical attitude is involved. This attitude separates the borderline groups from the majority parties which form the basis and strength of the system.

In the case of Israel, it is necessary to make the following distinctions:

i. A collection of groups, parties, associations and circles can be grouped together under the general name of liberal "Extreme Left."<sup>19</sup> This heterogeneous, amorphous grouping is located between the Mapam on one side and the Communist Party on the other. Some of its groups are critical of the absence of an active, violent class struggle in the country and of the restricting presence of the Histadrut. This is the case of the Black Panthers.<sup>20</sup> Others are not interested in this component of the consensus, but criticize the aggravating nationalist component: ethnocentrism and the ultranationalist interpretation of Zionism (and consequently the "severity" of the majority parties' foreign policy). An example of this is the newspaper *DE MONTE*, managed by Uri Avnery.<sup>21</sup> Most of the groups in this constellation, however, are instead in pursuing an active struggle against the Israeli bourgeoisie and bourgeois society on "moderating" the political consequences of the "extreme" component of the consensus. Parties such as the Moked or the Shelli combine these two types of criticism.

2. Some groups are critical of the modernization process.<sup>22</sup> They do not totally reject it and are even prepared to use it (hospitals, transportation, new technology, etc.). They cooperate with the government and its public services, but they have a restrictive interpretation of modernization. This political (and intellectual) camp, called "orthodox," is comprised of two parties: the Agudat Israel and the Golani Agudat Israel. They reflect the lifestyle suggested by the modern state in areas as varied as the emancipation of women, mixed communities of religious and nonreligious people, dress, and secular education. However, these formerly anti-Zionist parties retain their restrictive interpretation of the "central nature of the state" and of "government ideology." The Agudat Israel, in contrast to the Peulot Agudat Israel, even has reservations with regard to Zionism. Finally,

their internal organization shows that they do not really observe the democratic processes. These parties accept the absolute supremacy of a Council of Wise Men of the Torah (whose members are obviously not elected), which means that democracy does not go beyond the facade.

3. Criticism of the democratic processes and egalitarian principles: the camp of the whole Erets-Israel. These groups theoretically acknowledge the need for democracy and equality among all citizens, Jews and non-Jews. But they clearly place the integrity of the land of Israel above any principle of government. Moreover, their attitude in the event of a conflict between democracy and equality on the one hand, and the integrity of the land on the other, seems problematical. What would they do and how would they react if the majority of the Israeli people--either through their representatives in the Knesset or by referendum--decided democratically to restore all or part of the territories belonging to the historic Erets-Israel? The policy these groups would follow in such a case is not clear. In the same manner, how would they reconcile in practice, as part of "the whole Israel," the egalitarian principles referred to in the consensus with the impossibility of giving the same sovereign rights to Jews and non-Jews? The three political groups that make up this "camp" today, the Movement for the Whole Erets-Israel, the Bloc of Believers and the Renaissance Party,<sup>24</sup> as different as they may be, have a common denominator: their ambiguous reply to these two questions.

#### Rejection of the Consensus

We will use the term antisystem forces to refer to the political groups which have explicitly rejected one or several components of the consensus. The distinction between criticism (or implicit rejection) and explicit rejection is essential.

Some political forces refute the very idea of a people when referring to the Jews. On this basis, they then tend to reject Zionism.

We must draw a line between two very different movements, of unequal importance. The first combines this dual rejection, of a "people" and of the ideology, with the call for a class struggle. This applies primarily to the Communist Party (now the Rakah, the New Communist List), founded in 1922.<sup>25</sup> This group accepts the historical process that led to the existence of a Jewish ethnic group throughout almost the entire country, and it recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist as a refuge for the victims of anti-Semitism. However, the Israeli communists have always insisted on their rejection of the idea of a "people," of a united and unique nation. They believe that the "original ethnic Jews" in every state should become assimilated into it once anti-Semitism is wiped out. Furthermore, they insist on the class struggle that radically divides the Jewish ethnic group (as all other classes of the population). Finally, for the Israeli CP, Zionism is a reactionary ideology that diverts Jewish workers from the struggle and should be combatted.

The CP virtually stands alone in this rejection of the national components of the consensus. Nevertheless, various small groups of the anti-Zionist extreme left have cropped up sporadically (ever since Israel was under mandate, but with a slight increase in number since 1962). These have mainly been of Trotskyite inspiration, and the best known among them is the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matspen, la Boussole [the Compass]).<sup>26</sup>

Another movement, basically an intellectual one, rejects the national components of the consensus but is not interested in the socioeconomic aspect of Israeli society. This is a movement, active in the forties and fifties, which advocated a complete break between the Israeli entity (the Yishuv prior to 1948) and the rest of the Jewish diaspora. This group, the Canaanites,<sup>27</sup> founded by the great poet Yonathan Ratosh, wanted the new "people" born in Palestine to be incorporated into the Middle East. The Israeli people, like their immediate Arab and Druze neighbors, would thus restore the old "Hebrew" nation. To the extent that the Canaanite movement rejected the unity of the Jewish people, the Jewish tradition and Zionism, it ran directly counter to the national "credo" of the Israeli political system.

Some ultra-orthodox groups categorically reject all the elements of the consensus, except the concept of the Jewish people, naturally. Their acceptance of the concept of the Jewish people should be contested as well, since they see themselves as a "small remaining trace" of the elected and the pure, separate from a people which has seriously erred. This movement includes the Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City) and groups that are more or less allied with them (Hassidim de Satmar, Hassidim de Reb Arel, etc).<sup>28</sup> These groups reject right away the State of Israel and Zionist ideology. They consider this ideology to be a heresy and the state itself to be the work of the devil--for only Satan could have allowed the reconstruction of a sovereign Jewish entity before the Messianic era. The Neturei Karta want an Islamic state to be re-established in the place of Israel, and for the Jews to be in the minority. These groups, however, also categorically reject any modernization and are not interested in democratic or any other principles of government.


Finally, some political circles explicitly reject any application of egalitarian democratic principles to the Arab people (in Israel or its territories). This is the case with the small Kach Party of Meir Kahana, which is found at the extreme right of the Israeli political spectrum and is known for its racist options.<sup>29</sup> Kach is the continuation of the Jewish Defense League, created in New York to "defend" the Jewish quarters. Kach stands quite clearly apart from the borderline groups (the Whole Erets-Israel camp) in that its platform states explicitly what is only implied by some other groups, i.e., the need to expel the Arabs. It considers these groups to be too moderate.

The following table sums up the position of all the marginal groups.

	The four bases for consensus			
	National Elements	Absence of an Active Class Struggle	Democracy & Equality	Modernization
Preservation or criticism of the dominant interpretation	Rightist Extreme Left Left Relativist	Feminist Extreme Left	Zionist-Israel Arabs-Liberals	Agonist-Israel Arabs-Liberals
Categorial rejection	Postmodern Relativist Ecological Religious Second Culture	Anti-Traditional Extreme Left	Secular-Judaic Neturei Karta	

In terms of the center and periphery, we can present this table in the form of a diagram.

- (1) Consensus Parties
- (2) Borderline Groups
- (3) Antisystem Forces



#### Common Characteristics of the Marginal Groups

Ideologically Intensive

In a society which began with strong ideological cleavages and have evolved toward a disideologization and a broad consensus, marginal groups still represent nuclei with strong ideological intensity. They always involve a doctrine, a philosophy

and master thinkers, and claim to base their political activities on these thoughts. They do, however, have varying degrees of ideological intensity.

In the case of Israel, we can distinguish three different degrees.

Some of these groups are really coherent in their political objectives, but are not unified from a doctrinal standpoint. For instance, what we have called the Zionist extreme Left is united only by its common position on the political checkerboard. In this grouping of former Maki communists (the Israeli Communist Party turned Zionist), former members of the Labor Party (such as Arieh Eliav, who was secretary general of this party), some Black Panther groups which are polarized only on the issue of the poor Sephardi, antiannexation students, etc. The rather vague objectives of a group such as Peace Now (antiannexationist, but not in agreement as to socialism and the Palestinian problem) are a good illustration of the weak ideological intensity of this camp.

Other groups are united not by a coherent global doctrine or a vision of the world, but by a single idee-force. This is the case with the three movements of the whole Eretz-Israel camp which focus on the refusal to abandon any of the territories, or the Kadish Party which is polarized on the subject of the departure of the Arabs.

Finally, three movements have an overall view of the world, and their political action is presented as a mere appendix to this vision. The first two are the Agudat Israel and the Neturei Karta. Their vision of the world (supremacy of the practice of the divine commandments) is accompanied by a unique style of living, down to dress and the spoken language. The third movement (CP and the anti-Zionist extreme leftwing groups) shares a common view of the world but includes, in contrast to the others, elements from widely differing backgrounds and with radically divergent life-styles--Diaspora (Sephardi and Ashkenazi), Arabs (Christians and Muslims) and Druzes.

#### Ancient Political Currents

Despite their strong ideological intensity, these marginal groups are marked by a second characteristic, and that is that under different names they represent ancient political currents that have existed continuously, at least since the modern-day return of the Jews to Palestine. These currents were already stabilized in the 1910's and 1920's.

The reason for this continued existence is twofold:

--First, these movements have their own specific political behavior within the Jewish World which has gone hand in hand with the processes of emigration and immigrating ever since the 18th century.<sup>11</sup> The extremist religious reaction, opposed to any innovation, is associated to the Agudat Israel (founded in 1920). This party represents the continuation of a type of religious defense common to the Jewish Society of the last century: antimodernism, antisecularism. The Neturei Karta was split off from the Agudat Israel in 1935, as it considered their main party had taken a dangerous turn toward the Zionists. Likewise, anti-Zionist socialist movements developed in East Europe, in Poland and in Russia (particularly the Bund). As for the Zionist parties, a split between the extreme left and the

extreme right became apparent very early, from the time of the first "Zionist congresses." Within the Jewish community of the Yishuv, the place occupied today by the Zionist extreme left (roughly, the Shelli Party), was in the 1920's occupied by the Hashomer Hatsair, the Poalei Tsion of the left, and pacifist circles such as Brit Shalom (the Peace Alliance) or the League for a Jewish-Arab Rapprochement. The Revisionist Party founded by W. Z. Jabotinsky occupied practically the same ground as the whole Erets-Israel camp today.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, note how similar the platforms and attitudes are between the Brit Habirionim (Alliance of the Brigands) of Abba Ahimeir and the current Kach.

--Furthermore, these marginal groups appeared very early, and the same international events or the same general factors caused groups of this sort to crop up in a number of other countries. The Communist Party got started in Palestine at about the same time as it did in the rest of the world. A Trotskyite movement existed in Palestine beginning in the early 1930's, and leagues inspired by fascist methods (if not by fascism itself) took shape with and alongside the Revisionist Party. In the same way, the sectarian, integrist reaction exemplified by the Agudat Israel and especially by the Neturei Karta should be compared with similar reactions such as those of the Christian societies confronted with modernism (the sects in the Netherlands, for instance). We might add that the presence of racist groups, even though this is surprising in a society which has suffered from racism, can probably be attributed to permanent psychological factors found in any heterogeneous society.

#### A Restricted Sociological Base

The third common characteristic of marginal groups in Israel is their narrow socio-logical base. They all have a well-defined and distinct sociology. As we emphasized earlier, the consensus parties, because of their desire to be "catchall parties," tend to bring together widely varying social classes and extremely diverse ethnic groups (edot in Hebrew, from the groups of original settlers). Israel is an extreme case, in that the Labor Party, formerly composed essentially of workers, became a force identified with the establishment and recruiting largely from the middle classes. Conversely, the Coalition of the Right began recruiting increasingly from the poorer classes, and especially from the original settlers from the Arab countries and the inhabitants of the development cities (they assured the Likud's victory in 1981 as they did in 1977).

In contrast to these parties, the marginal groups have a well-defined social base.

As the marginal groups have the broadest boundation, without at the same time being the most numerous, they are based on quite precise circles. By circle we mean a setting, surrounding, or an environment. We are referring primarily to the Zionist extreme left, the Bloc of Believers, the Kach, the Matspen, and the Agudat Israel. For instance, the Zionist extreme left, whether talking about Shelli or the Peace Now movement, recruits primarily from university circles--teachers and students--and from kibbutzim. The racist group Kach finds its audience among new immigrants from the Soviet Union or the United States, who are poorly integrated. The Bloc of Believers, which is the spearhead of the "wilderness settlements" in the territories, recruits from among the youth coming out of the Talmudic schools of the "religious-Zionist" movement.<sup>33</sup> The members of the Matspen and other small

groups of the anti-Zionist extreme left are almost entirely students. Finally, Agudat Israel, the largest of these movements, finds its base in the various Hassidic communities scattered throughout the country, the large Talmudic schools due to the Lithuanian immigration, the orthodox immigrants from Germany (the Frankfurt School), and finally the former Yishuv located in the holy cities of Palestine (above all Jerusalem).


A second category is comprised of the Communist Party of parties. The Maki Communist Party (1948-1965), which coexisted with the Rakah Party after 1965, disappeared in 1975. These CP always developed on a very restricted social base. As for the Jews recruited earlier by the CP, Czudnowsky's studies have shown that they were either poorly adapted new immigrants with no steady jobs or housing,<sup>34</sup> or immigrants of Bulgarian or Iraqi origin who were already members of the Communist Party in their countries. In the Jewish sector, the CP acted as a sifter: most of its members left as soon as they got a satisfactory job or housing. The Maki and then the Rakah, on the other hand, recruited in the Arab sector without distinction as to class and presented themselves as defenders of the rights of non-Jewish minorities. As a result, the communist movement was only able to develop in Israel on the basis of (socioeconomic) class in the Jewish sector, and on ethnic basis in the Arab sector.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, the group with the narrowest base, because it is a sect, is formed by the Neturei Karta. This group of several hundred members (but which on specific issues --such as prohibiting autopsies, for instance--can attract several thousand) has all the characteristics of a sect. Although it enjoys considerable support outside the country--especially in New York among circles linked to the Satmar Hassidism--this group is very restricted in Israel. It is restricted numerically, geographically (the Mea Shearim section of Jerusalem), socially (poor families living on foreign subsidies), professionally (the men have no profession and are constantly studying in their Talmudic schools), and especially ideologically (the idea of the "small remainder" which is separated from the "worshippers of Baal," as in the time of Elijah).

Thus, while the consensus groups tend to be unrelated to any specific social base and to recruit from all different circles without distinction, the marginal groups all preserve a well-defined base. Their possibilities for expansion are rather limited. This sociological aspect is summarized in the following table. [See next page.]

#### Functions of the Marginal Groups

A functional analysis of the marginal groups can be very helpful. As Georges Lavau wrote, it can make it possible not only to ascertain the functional requirements of a political system, but also to understand how a system succeeds in imposing the constraints of its norms on forces hostile to it.<sup>36</sup> With this type of analysis, we can therefore try to explain how certain movements, which should theoretically hamper the system--for the consensus parties--not only do not harm it but even indirectly help keep it in place. Here we will follow Robert K. Merton, in giving a heuristic value to the concept of function and in associating this concept with specific questions: What are the objective consequences of the activities of marginal political groups for the Israeli system as a whole? Are these consequences dysfunctional (i.e., weaken the system), or functional (strengthen the system)?



## Dysfunctional consequences

Do marginal groups hamper the system and help weaken it? A priori, the reply should be positive. Since the consensus parties want to become broad-based, catch-all parties, they naturally have hegemonic designs. In the case of Israel, it is clear that, from the standpoint of these parties, the ideal regime would be a tripartite regime reduced to a leftwing bloc, a rightwing bloc and a religious-democratic type of party. This aspiration is reflected in these parties' constant efforts to eliminate the marginal groups. Extremely varied means have been used since 1948: attempts to change the electoral system; a plan to raise the representation threshold in parliament; the Zader-Ofer law to divide up the remainder; proposals make these groups to be "incorporated" into the large parties as "factions"; proposals to make them illegal; arrest of their leaders or restrictions on their freedom of movement; police intervention; administrative obstacles; slander, etc. It would thus seem that the marginal groups do actually hamper two basic functions of the system.

## The Legitimacy Function

This function is necessary for any system, but it is particularly important for the Israeli system, because of the sharp disputes, both inside and outside, that accompanied the formation of the state, the heterogeneity of the people, and the diversity of their beliefs. Now five marginal groups interfere with the system's attempt to assert its legitimacy.<sup>57</sup> This interference varies in degree according to the nature of the system under dispute. The least "dysfunctional" are of course the borderline groups, since they dispute only the regime's validity, either on economic and social or religious matters, or on the Palestine issue and the problem of the territories; at times their critique does not go so far as to touch on the principles of power.

The antisemitic groups are a more serious obstacle. Following the distinction suggested by G. Bataille, we can pinoint different degrees of a denial of legitimacy:

--The racist groups such as Hashomer Hachadash do not contest the legitimacy of the Israeli community, because it is homogenous, mono-National. This refusal to accept this mixed nature is clearly apparent in Ze'ev Jabotinsky's criticism of the Declaration of Independence. It brings out the "inherent contradiction" of this declaration (Jewish State, equal rights!). Contesting the Israeli community, this extremist group has gone so far as to put itself in the place of the legal authorities in sending an invitation to the Arabs of Galilee to "feel free to emigrate."

--The Communist Party does not contest the community (Jewish majority, Arab minority), but it denies the legitimacy of the regime, which it regards as "nonrepresentative, undemocratic, and oppressive of minorities." In fact, its main dispute is centered on what it calls "the lack of representation of the Arab people." Its activities have therefore aimed to replace the state leaders of this minority by any means in developing alternative social, political and cultural structures at all levels.

--Finally, the small groups of the anti-Zionist extreme left, such as Matzpen and the ultraorthodox groups gravitating around the Neturei Karta, share the fact that they contest the total system, albeit by different ways. They contest the

regime (democratic, parliamentary) and refuse to participate in the elections. They contest the authorities (the basis of which they do not recognize). They oppose the dominant ideology (Zionism). And, in strangely similar terms, they reject the community structure. For the extreme left, the only acceptable community is a Palestine with an Arab majority and a Jewish minority. The Neturei Karta want a state under non-Jewish domination (British, Turks, Palestinians, Jordanians or the United Nations), and minority status for the Jews. The practical results of this radical dispute have been almost the same: the extreme left, like the Neturei Karta, has made contacts with Palestinian organizations. The Neturei Karta has gone to the extreme in their dysfunctional activities. In the early years of the state, they refused to use the currency of the country, the national identity cards, and the mail. Some use no gas or electricity because they are supplied by the government. Naturally they do not vote, and they have tried to have the Mea Sherim quarter proclaimed "a separate political entity."

#### The Conciliation Function

The consensus parties want the "rules of the game" to be observed. Samuel H. Beer's motto on British politics could be adopted by them: "Happy is the country where consensus and conflicts are dealt with in a dialectic that makes the political arena both a market for the different interests and a forum where the basic moral options are discussed."<sup>38</sup> They would like to use conciliation procedures and settle disputes in a practical and nonviolent manner.

Recourse to a certain form of violence, however, characterizes marginal groups. The Israeli system itself makes violent antagonism possible, but within well-defined limits. For example, while labor disputes are corporatist in nature, they frequently adopt a "hard line"; constant threats of strikes, wildcat strikes, are one of the permanent characteristics of social life. But in the end the Histadrut roughly establishes the rules of the game and handles [workers'] demands. In specific cases, the parties of the system have resorted to violent demonstrations, such as the famous "march on the Knesset" organized by the right against acceptance of the German reparations, and the acts of violence of the Likud youth during the 1981 campaign. We should also mention the frequent brutality of the clashes between members of the Knesset. The altogether exceptional use of violence by the system, however, only makes more evident its daily use by marginal groups.

Verbal violence is primarily involved. Unfortunately, there is no lexicological analysis of the leaflets, articles, pamphlets and speeches of the marginal groups. An analysis of this sort would bring out the use of terms foreign to the vocabulary of the system.<sup>39</sup> Aside from a lexicon common to all the marginal groups, including such terms as oyevim (enemies), bilti-legitimi (illegitimate), poch'im (crooks), and knoufia (band of gangsters), each camp has its own vocabulary:

--The extreme left (Zionist and communist), for instance, uses terms such as class enemy, fascism, racists.

--The fanatically religious groups speak of infection, impurity, heresy, renegades, and decadence (the Neturei Karta accuse Israel of being a nazi state every day and they go into mourning on Independence Day).

--The annexationist groups talk about betrayal, Bolshevism, sacrifice, recourse to the army and corruption of the regime, and accuse the left of defeatism, of being a cancer in the body of the nation, and of ruining the youth.

There is also violence in the political style and methods for being heard. In this area there are very few differences between the consensus parties and the Zionist extreme left, except that the latter group holds more street demonstrations (although the demonstrations are generally authorized). We should also mention the "shock activities" of the Black Panthers (stealing milk bottles from residential neighborhoods), or the tendency of Agudat Israel members to put chains around their neighborhoods so that no one can come into them by car on "shabbat" (this recently caused the death of a man when secular youths tried to force these chains).

The Communist Party goes even further. Although it has been careful to practice an essentially legalist policy since 1948, it has nevertheless indirectly incited its people to violent action, the most famous event being the Day of the Land on 30 March 1977. On that day, actual riots took place in the Arab zones. Annexationist groups practice a "fait accompli" policy, whereby they set up colonies along the border in Jordan without government authorization, and then resist, either passively or actively, when the army comes to evacuate them. In the case of the Bloc of Believers, the use of force has sometimes gone as far as the use of weapons. The Kach group, too weak to take action of that sort, has specialized in individual surprise tactics such as actions of intimidation and threatening letters. Its leader was arrested for an affair involving arms traffic to the United States, for use in activities against the Soviet legations, it seems. Finally, the Neturei Karta have probably engaged the most in violent activities: throwing rocks at cars circulating on the "shabbat," stealing bodies "scheduled for autopsy," burning Christian missions, attempts of using force to prevent archeological digs or roads from being built too close to a cemetery, etc.

The reasons for practicing this violence against the system differ widely. In the case of the Neturei Karta, for instance, there are three precise reasons: the practice of a constant one-upmanship among their various members; the loss of ground to the Agudat Israel which threatens them with extinction; and attempt to obtain funds abroad and their desire to prove to American sympathizers that they are "active." The fact is that the marginal groups, using a certain amount of violence, can impair the system's conciliatory function and its attempts to find a compromise.

In conclusion, to what extent do the marginal groups actually hamper the system?

It is legitimate to conclude that they hamper it very little, given their small numbers. In fact, the only three marginal parties represented in the Knesset as a result of the 1981 elections have an altogether limited base of sympathizers and voters. The Rakah Communist Party, the Agudat Israel and the Renaissance (annexationist) Party each won between 2 and 4 percent of the vote, or in other words three to four seats in the Knesset (which has 120). The small Shelli Party, which receives the votes of the Zionist extreme left and which had two seats in the previous Knesset, obtained only 0.45 percent of the votes in 1981, which deprived it of its seats. The two small groups related to the former Black Panthers (Ohalim and Ihoud) together won only 0.1 percent of the votes. The Kach Party on the extreme right,

which has never been represented in the Knesset, once again only gained a total of 0.26 percent of the votes. According to the sociologist Menahem Friedman, all the ultraorthodox "rejectionist" groups together, for which it is a "sin" to participate in the elections, could, if necessary, mobilize up to 40,000 people. But their strength would depend on the issue around which they were mobilizing and on where they were mobilizing. The Neturei Karta live mainly in the orthodox community (Eda Haredit) of Jerusalem. As for Trotskyite circles, situated to the left of the Rakah, their constituency is tiny. Not only do these groups present no obstacle, but we will put forward the hypothesis that they contribute effectively to a strengthening of the system.

### Functional Consequences

#### The Function of "Serving as a Foil"

Emanuel Gutmass speaks of "profound conservatism, frequently without any basis" and of a "general sense of respect for authority" of the Israelis.<sup>40</sup> Now the marginal groups not only oppose this conformity, this conservatism, this ideal of the "just milieu" and of equilibrium, but they even attack certain myths which form the fundamental beliefs of the people. These myths are representations of facts that may be real but are exaggerated by the collective imagination.

The extreme left offends, for instance, because it dares to attack four myths:

--The myth of "tohar-nechek" (literally, the purity in the use of arms by Tsahal, the Israeli Army);

--The myth of Israel as the exemplary egalitarian society where the poor are not too poor and the rich not too rich;

--The myth of Erets-Israel, the intangible property of Israel (you will note that even when the consensus parties agree to the need for territorial concessions, they say that it is a compromise imposed by reality, and not a renunciation of the ideal of a whole Erets-Israel);

--And, finally, the myth of the natural lack of understanding between Jews and Arabs, which is probably one of the most solid beliefs (especially among citizens who originally came from Arab countries, or more than half of the population).

Between 90 and 95 percent of the population believes in these four myths, and the questioning of them can only drive toward the system groups or individuals who would be tempted to draw away from it.

For their part, the extreme right groups offend by their violence and because they attack the myths: of Israel as a democratic country; Israel as the land of the survivors of fascism; Israel as an intellectually advanced and enlightened country (the annexationist circles and the Kach, in fact, resort to the irrational, the obscure, the mysterious and the apocalyptic).

The consensus parties are therefore fond of pointing out the "extremism," the "marginalism," the "sectarianism," and the "irresponsibility" of these groups.

They put particular emphasis on the contradiction between their radicalism and their demands:

--On the axis of the Jewish religious tradition, on one side are the ultra-orthodox of the Agudat Israel and the Neturei Karta, and on the other the Canaanites without any roots;

--On the axis of the territory of the state, on one side the extreme leftists and their desire to "abandon everything," and on the other the annexationist groups and their total lack of "reality."

Thus the marginal groups help give the system its moderate, prudent, and serious image and strengthen its centrality.<sup>41</sup>

#### The "Tribunician" Function

"A political system must succeed in political integration, or in neutralizing the centrifugal forces that cannot be fully integrated at once," wrote Georges Lavau.

The Israeli society is a society with cleavages, highly heterogeneous from the cultural, political, ethnic, and socioeconomic standpoints. A number of groups are aware that they do not participate fully in the community and feel alienated. They include the non-Jewish minorities, the Sephardi from the poorest classes, some circles of poorly integrated immigrants, students, orthodox groups bypassed by modernization, etc.<sup>42</sup> The consensus parties have used various methods to deal with these groups. They have tried to repress them. At times the system tried to reorganize to make these cleavages disappear, but it never succeeded, either because the extreme diversity of the society made the task impossible, or because it did not have the material means to do it. Finally, the system could have allowed these groups to defend themselves against it. As G. Lavau states, this "tribunician function is the functional requirement of a system in a society with cleavages.<sup>43</sup>

The structures of the Israeli system are Jacobin in the highest sense of the word. Although, according to Daniel Elazar, the Jewish political tradition, based on the brit (alliance) is essentially federalist, the State of Israel is the opposite of a federalist system.<sup>44</sup> It has very few tribunician institutions, and when they do exist, they fulfill their function very poorly. The most flagrant example is the Arab minority: how could it vindicate its everyday problems, such as a shortage of jobs for its young professionals, the lack of improvements to its villages or the lack of an infrastructure in Galilee and in the "Triangle?"

The few tribunician institutions offered to the Arabs by the system are notoriously ineffective. The adviser for Arab affairs is a tool in the hands of the government. The dominant parties, while actively seeking Arab votes, did not incorporate members of the minorities in their ranks (with the exception of Mapam). The so-called lists "of the minorities," active at the time of the elections, are only ephemeral appendages of the dominant parties and moreover are in the process of disappearing (in 1981, for the first time, they did not obtain a single member of the Knesset).

Consequently, this "tribunician function" necessarily passes on to the marginal political forces. But far from obstructing the system, these forces work for it:

--They enable the system to remain more or less homogeneous, by "evacuating" to the periphery the groups that are the hardest to integrate;

--They constitute a sort of framework for the discontent, a "valve" that prevents them from taking more dangerous (underground) action. For instance, the liberals who are against banning the Rakah have generally pointed out that if it did not exist, the young Israeli Arabs would be attracted to the Bnaia al-Balad, the Sons of the Village, a guerrilla group. In short, everything considered, the consensus parties prefer the marginal groups to their "functional substitutes," i.e., to the forces that would fulfill their functions if they did not exist;

--Finally, the "spokesman" role of these groups tends over time to make them lose their revolutionary nature. They are increasingly led to "moderate" their troops and to prevent them from taking any rash action.

#### The Function of Serving as a Political Option

In view of their lively criticism of the system, marginal groups should not play any role in this area that would include either the right to propose alternative programs or the ability to "take the place of" the system's authorities. But in Israel we see that the opposite can be true.

As for the programs, besides their platforms or manifestos that frequently are extremist, the marginal groups have at times made suggestions which are acceptable to the system and can be converted into concrete political decisions. The legislative machinery encourages them to use their right to propose legislation and amendments. They try to prove their "raison d'etra." A few recent examples: the Agudat Israel made proposals for conciliation at the time of the very serious conflict of the teachers (even though for the most part it rejects secular education!); the Renaissance Party put forward ideas on the use of the Hebrew language; the Shelli made practical, federalist-type proposals for solving the Middle East conflict.

As for replacing the authorities, this role is harder to conceive, but it exists:

--Although this has never been done, it has frequently been advocated that particularly brilliant personalities belonging to marginal groups, such as Moshe Sneh of the Communist Party or the Shelli's Arieh Eliav, be coopted into the teams of leaders;

--Marginal groups have had to bargain for their participation in the system. For instance, in return for an impressive list of concessions (a list drawn up authoritatively by the Council of Wise Men), the Agudat Israel agreed to give its four votes in the Knesset to Mr Begin. While refusing a ministerial position, this party accepted the chairmanship of the prestigious Finance Committee of the Knesset (a key position for assuring government subsidies to its independent educational network). Without going that far, other marginal parties represented in the Knesset have often voted for bills of the major parties and helped to get them passed.

The marginals are constantly confronted with outside and inside pressures attempting to induce them to leave their marginal status.

Outside pressures include attempts by the consensus parties to win them over. The consensus parties try to attract the least resistant fraction of the marginal groups. For instance, the former Jewish communists have now come back into the Socialist Alignment, part of the Black Panthers has evolved within the system, a fraction of Peace Now has joined a small moderate party, etc.

But there are also internal pressures. The tendency toward moderation appears particularly in the parties represented in the Knesset. Knesset members and leaders who have the most contact with other groups are most interested in coming out of their isolation. The best example is still the Agudat Israel, whose four rabbi Knesset members have frequently adopted compromise positions, quickly censured by the Council of Wise Men (for instance, on abortion). Likewise, in the sixties, the two Jewish communist members, Sneh and Mikunis, were pressured to have the CP play a more active role in the system in the image of the ICP.

The marginal parties can therefore, in a modest measure, contribute to the function of serving as a political option.

A strong ideological intensity, stability over time, a well-defined or even restricted social base, the function of delegitimization and a rejection of the rules of the game, the role of serving as a "foil," and "tribunician" functions and the function of "serving as a political option" all characterize the marginal parties. For an observer of the Israeli political scene, from the time of the British mandate up to the June 1981 elections, these traits and roles of the marginal groups have constantly been apparent.

We must nevertheless ask the following question: What has been the effect of the so-called "upset" (Ha-maapakh), or in other words the Likud's victory in 1977 after dozens of years of Labor Party rule, on the marginal groups? All researchers believe that 1977 deeply changed the political scene in the country, and all the earlier analyses based on the model of the "dominant party" or even on the model of the "de facto one-party system" (Arian) have become obsolete. Did the fact that Israel changed to a bipolar model influence the marginal groups?

Bipolarization strengthened their doctrinal identity. The fact that the Likud and the Alignment actually adopted rather similar social and foreign policies encouraged the marginal groups to assert themselves, to develop their original themes, to demonstrate more effectively what separates them from the major parties and to accentuate their militancy. There has also been a clear diversification of the marginal groups, with the appearance of movements such as Peace Now or Renaissance.

Paradoxically, however, in assessing the roles of the marginal groups after 1977, we notice that they have become increasingly functional with regard to the system. Far from strengthening their "delegitimization" activities, some marginal groups have shown a willingness to cooperate with the system--Agudat Israel and the Bloc of Believers are cases in point. These movements have agreed to contribute political options and to help develop plans. The violence of the extremists has become less apparent, because violence seems to have penetrated all the major parties.

During the 1981 electoral campaign, the Likud and the Alignment used more violence and less moderation than the Communist Party or the Renaissance Party. Finally, the "tribunician" or representation function of peripheral groups and groups alienated from the system has been considerably strengthened during the 4 years the right has been in power.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Bernard Vincent, Presentation of "Les marginaux et les exclus dans l'histoire" [Marginals and Outcasts in History], collective work, Paris, Union generale d'éditions (10/18), 1979. p 10.
2. See Jacques le Goff, "Les marginaux dan l'Occident medieval" [Marginals in the Medieval West], in "Les marginaux et les exclus dans l'histoire," op. cit., pp 19-28.
3. On the nature of Israeli society, see Sammy Smooha, "Israel, Pluralism and Conflict," Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978.
4. We should mention a few reference works on Israeli domestic policy: Alan Arian, "Ideological Change in Israel," Cleveland, Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968; Alan Arian, "The Choosing People, Voting Behaviour in Israel," Cleveland, Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973; Leonard Fein, "Politics in Israel," Boston, Little, Brown and Co, 1967; Oscar Kraines, "Government and Politics in Israel," Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961; Don Peretz, "The Government and Politics of Israel," Boulder, Westview Press, 1979. The election results are discussed after each election in Alan Arian's series- "Elections in Israel," Jerusalem, Academic Press, 1969, 1973, 1977. Most of the detailed articles on Israeli parties are published (in Hebrew) in the Hebrew University review, ETAT, GOUVERNEMENT ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES.
5. The best study of Jewish political forces in mandated Palestine is: Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, "Origins of the Israeli Policy, Palestine Under the Mandate," Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1978.
6. On this cleavage regarding the Histadrut's role, see Louis Guttman, "Whither Israel's Political Parties?", THE JEWISH FRONTIER, 27 December 1961, pp 14-18. Although a left-right cleavage has frequently been denied in Israel, a good account of this subject is found in Eva Etzioni-Halevy's "Political Culture in Israel, Cleavage and Integration Among Israeli Jews," New York, Praeger, 1977.
7. See Yonathan Shapiro, "The Formative Years of the Israeli Labor Party: the Organization of Power 1919-1930," London, Sage Publications, 197-; Yosef Gorni, "L'Union des travailleurs 1919-1930, ses fondements ideologiques et sa pratique" [The Workers' Union 1919-1930, Its Ideological Roots and Its Political Practice], Tel-Aviv University and Hamehouhad Kibbutz, 1973 (in Hebrew).

8. Note the gradual expansion of social democracy in Israel, as it is exemplary: 1919, Merger of the Workers of Zion and the No-Party Workers With the Workers' Union (I); 1930, Merger of the Workers' Union (I) and of the Young Worker With the Erets-Israel Labor Party (Mapai); 1964, Mapai Front--Workers' Union (II); 1968, Merger of the Mapai, the Workers' Union (II) and the List of Israeli Workers With the new Israeli Labor Party; 1969, Coalition between the Israeli Labor Party and the United Workers' Party (Mapam).
9. Alan Arian, "Ideological Change in Israel, op. cit., pp 41-57.
10. Ibid., pp 50-55.
11. See Anton Antonovsky's classic study, "Sociopolitical Attitudes of the Israelis," Amot, 6, 1963, pp 11-22 (in Hebrew).
12. Daniel J. Elazar, "Jewish Religion and Politics in Israel," JERUSALEM LETTER (Jerusalem Center), 33, 12 October 1980, p 5.
13. As Arian observes, the four main differences between the Labor and Likud parties' members are the following: the Likud is more successful with men, with younger people, with more recent immigrants, and especially with immigrants from Arab countries.
14. Otto Kirchheimer makes a similar analysis when he speaks of the "limits" of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, the German Social Democratic Party or the British Labor Party, in his article "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in J. Lapalombra and M. Weiner's "Political Parties and Political Development," Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp 187-188.
15. Alan Arian, "Consensus in Israel," New York, General Learning Press, 1971, p 1. Arian adds: "The dimensions of consensus indicate the outer boundaries beyond which no social group or political party may venture without peril."
16. According to Gutmann, the attachment to democracy and to democratic processes "affects the entire nation, as well as all the political elites." Emanuel E. Gutmann, "Some Observations on Politics and Parties in Israel," INDIA QUARTERLY, 17 (1), January-March 1961, pp 2-3.
17. For the concept of modernization, we have referred to David E. Apter's book, "The Politics of Modernization," Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
18. There are two studies on Israeli extremist groups worth noting: David Schnall, "Radical Dissent in Israel Politics," New York, Praeger, 1979; Ehud Sprinzak, "Extreme Politics in Israel," JERUSALEM QUARTERLY, 5, 1977, pp 33-47.
19. On the development and the options of the Zionist extreme left, see Alain Greilsammer, "Les Communistes Israéliens," Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1978, pp 273-309. The journal that most clearly explains this movement is NEW OUTLOOK.

20. See Deborah Bernstein, "Contradictions and Protest in the Process of Nation-Building: the Black Panthers of Israel 1971-1972," Doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 1976, typed.
21. There is a monograph of "pacifist" movements in Israel in Rael Jean Isaac's "Israel Divided, Ideological Politics in the Jewish State," Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, chapter 4.
22. The attitude of the various ultra-orthodox Israeli groups vis-a-vis the modernization process was the subject of a study by the sociologist Rafael Schneller at the congress of the Israeli Sociology Association, February 1979. Extracts in THE JERUSALEM POST, 28 February 1979, the study to be published in THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY.
23. See Meahem Friedman, "Society and Religion. Non-Zionist Orthodoxy in Erets-Israel from 1918 to 1936," Jerusalem, Ben-Zvi Institute, 1978 (in Hebrew); there is also information on Agudat Israel in Gary S. Schiff's "Tradition and Politics, the Religious Parties of Israel," Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1977.
24. The best study on the whole Erets-Israel movement is found in Rael Jean Isaac's "Israel Divided...," op. cit., chapter 3. A political monograph of the Bloc of Believers (Gush Emunim) has just been published: Zvi Raanan, "Gush Emunim," Tel-Aviv, Sifriat Poalim, 1980 (in Hebrew). As for the Renaissance Party (HaThia), it resulted from a split in the Likud after the agreement with Egypt.
25. Alain Greilsammer, "Les Communistes Israéliens," op. cit.
26. The main themes of the Matspen can be found in Nathan Weinstock's "Le Sionisme contre Israel," Paris, Maspero, 1969; a dissertation was devoted to it: Nira Youval-Davis, "Matspen, l'OSI," Jerusalem, Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, 1977.
27. See Israel Kolatt: "Canaanites and Semitic Action," in Rafael Patai's "Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel," New York, McGraw Hill, 1961, pp 173-1974.
28. On the Neturei Karta sect, you can refer to the works of Menahem Friedman, and particularly to the article, "N'turei Karta," in Rafael Patai's "Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel," op. cit., pp 850-853; also see Ruth Blau, "Les gardiens de la Cite. Histoire d'une guerre sainte" [Guardians of the City. History of a Holy War], Paris, Flammarion, 1978; and Emile Marmorstein, "Heaven at Bay, the Jewish Kulturkampf in the Holy Land," London, Oxford University Press, 1969.
29. The beliefs of the leader of the Kach (formerly the Jewish Defense League) are set forth in Meir Kahana's "Never Again," New York, Pyramid, 1971, and in "The Story of the Jewish Defense League," Chilton, Pyramid, 1975.

30. This stability and this permanence do not mean that the marginal groups always stay the same. Ehud Sprinzak pointed out the multiplication and strengthening of these groups after 1967. Ehud Sprinzak, "Comparative Observations on the Characteristics of Extremist Politics in Israel 1948-1976," Jerusalem, Hebrew University (Eshkol Institute), May 1976, typewritten (in Hebrew).
31. On this subject: Jacob Katz, "Out of the Ghetto. The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation," Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973.
32. This similarity in the attitude toward Palestinians is clear in reading Simha Flapan's "Zionism and the Palestinians," London, Croom Helm, 1979.
33. An Israeli sociologist has defined the Bloc of Believers as a sect. See Janet O'Dea, "Gush Emunim. Racines et ambiguïtés (Perspective de la sociologie des religions)," DISPERSION ET UNITÉ (Jerusalem), 17, 1977, pp 94-106. This analysis was very controversial in Israel. In the same issue see Nathan Rotenstreich's "Conviction religieuse et conduits politiques," pp 116-118; Shulamit Hareven, "Modèle sociologique et réalité," pp 107-115; and Eliezer Goldman, "Interpretation messianique d'événements actuels" [Messianic Interpretation of Current Events], pp 119-120.
34. See for example Moshe M. Czudnowsky, Jacob M. Landau, "The Israeli Communist Party and the Elections for the IVth Knesset," Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965; and Alain Greilsammer, "Les Communistes Israéliens," op. cit., pp 368-384.
35. See M. W. Slann, "Ideology and Ethnicity in Israel. The Communist Parties: the Conflict Between Maki and Rakah," "Studies in Comparative Communism," 7 (4), 1974, pp 359-375.
36. Georges Lavau, "Partis et systèmes politiques: interactions et fonctions," REVUE CANADIENNE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 2 (1), March 1969, pp 36-44.
37. Ehud Sprinzak stressed this function of "delegitimization." See: "Beginnings of the 'Delegitimization Policy in Israel, 1967-1972,'" Jerusalem, Hebrew University, 1973 (in Hebrew).
38. Samuel H. Beer, "Modern British Politics, A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups," London, Faber and Faber, 1965, p 390.
39. It is a shame that studies of this sort have not yet been conducted, because we could decipher and compare the system of signs used by marginal groups in all their various aspects: meanings, connotations, etc. A complete, descriptive lexicography would point out the similarity of the vocabularies.
40. Emanuel E. Gutmann, "Some Observations on Politics and Parties in Israel," op. cit., pp 1-2.
41. Likewise, Bernard Vincent stated in "Les marginaux et les exclus dans l'histoire," op. cit., p 12: "Naturally, marginal groups represent a danger to the society around them because they reject its basic values. At the same

time, however, they render a tremendous service to society, as they remind it of the main themes on which there is a consensus."

42. Seymour M. Lipset has observed that "extremist movements have a great deal in common: they appeal to the discontent, to the 'homeless' from a psychological standpoint, to those who have suffered personal failure, to people isolated socially, in precarious positions economically, and who are relatively un-educated and unsophisticated, to people with an authoritative personality, at all levels of society." "Social Stratification and Right-Wing Extremism," BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 10 December 1959, p 376.
43. Georges Lavau, "Partis et systemes politiques...", op. cit.
44. See Daniel J. Elazar's "Israel's Compound Polity," in Howard R. Penniman's "Israel at the Polls, the Knesset Elections of 1977," Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979, pp 1-38; and "Israel: From Ideological to Territorial Democracy," New York, General Learning Press, 1971.

9805

CSO: 4419/11

FORMER WEST BANK COMMANDER DISCUSSES ARAB VIEWPOINT

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 4 Nov 81 pp 12, 13, 52

[Interview with Brigadier General Benyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, former commander of Judea and Samaria, by Yanon Shenkar; date and place not specified]

[Text] Both from a military and a civilian perspective, the events in Judea and Samaria have been characterized by uncertainty, one could even say that the issue has been surrounded by obscurity. The government's decision to separate the civil administration from the military authority exists on paper. Negotiations continue in the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the Central Command. In the area itself, in the towns of Judea and Samaria, life goes on as before in relative quiet.

For the last 3 and 1/2 years, Brigadier General Benyamin (Fu'ad) Ben-Eli'ezer was the civilian governor and army commander for Judea and Samaria. At the end of last week he left his command--somewhat suddenly--ending not just a chapter in his personal life, but also a period in the history of the military government in Judea and Samaria, where the regime has been active for the last 14 years.

Only after much deliberation did Brigadier General Ben-Eli'ezer agree to grant this special interview to BAMAHANE. He refused in principle to discuss the future of the region which, starting this week, will be partly under the command of Lt Colonel (Reserves) Menahem Millson (as head of the civil administration) and partly under the command of Lt Colonel Yaakov Katz (the military commander). But as is his custom, he did make some clear and penetrating statements about the current situation in Judea and Samaria and about his personal feelings upon terminating his position.

[Question] Brigadier General Ben-Eli'ezer, this week you are ending 3 and 1/2 years of service as commander of Judea and Samaria. Are you sad?

[Answer] No, not at all! I'm leaving with a feeling of full satisfaction. On the one hand, there is the general balance of what's happening here in Judea and Samaria. On the other hand, this marks the end of 27 and 1/2 years of service to the IDF. As one who began his service fighting in the Golani, later training at the officers school, leading the Shaked patrol during the Six-Day War and the war of attrition and as a division commander on the northern border, the climax of my career was the command over Judea and Samaria.

Sometimes I have the feeling that not all present or future leaders in Judea and Samaria will completely understand the strategic value, in defense terms, of this area. They don't fully understand its makeup, how the mechanisms of Arab society

work, what the different factors influencing change are, and what the problematic issues of the area as a whole may be. And then again, what are the defense problems we've already taken care of. Undoubtedly, after 3 and 1/2 years of service in an area such as this, both as district (military) commander and as governor, giving the most possible attention to the entire population, you come away with the feeling of having fulfilled a mission, a national mission, a mission of value. I would even dare to say a moral mission. After 3 and 1/2 years of full and serious activity, there's no reason to leave dissatisfied. What's more, I understand that from a semantic point of view, I will have been the last to hold the title of district commander for Judea and Samaria. From now on, a civilian will head the civil administration and a military commander will handle defense issues, but these will be two separate individuals, each dealing in his own sphere. Therefore, the period I'm ending is also the end of the military regime that has lasted 14 years.

#### No More Violence, No More Sabotage

If you were to ask me: If you were offered this position again today, would you refuse it? I would tell you that knowing the difficulties, problems and challenges of the position, there is no doubt that I would accept, it again! In the army I went from private to unit commander. I rose rank by rank, within the system, step by step as a fighter. But I don't know any senior position at this level in the army that is as complex, as multi-faceted and as demanding as this one. There are also the numerous challenges of the job, top priority challenges at the national level.

[Question] Brigadier General Ben-Eli'ezer, what were the central events which marked your last year as district commander of Judea and Samaria? What are the new trends, if any, that appeared during the course of this year?

[Answer] In the last year and a half, the Arabs learned--under duress--to recognize the fact that the State of Israel and the Israeli government were determined to prevent the PLO from acting freely here and to prevent the continued deterioration of political terrorism and violence in the street.

The Arabs learned to recognize the Israeli government's fairness, in that the government tried to separate isolated instances from the whole, making a more serious effort to treat isolated occurrences as such. In this way, the Arab residents learned that we are completely serious. On the other hand, we are also serious about all the positive trends which developed during the 14 years of the regime, everything related to growth, progress, success and the provision of a pluralistic atmosphere in all that concerns the development and wellbeing of the area. I assume that this trend will continue. However, insofar as everything related to political sabotage and violence, we defined our approach unconditionally. I've said this more than once to the Arab leadership: You want to engage in political activities--please do. But we're talking about positive, constructive political activity. The Government of Israel suggested the autonomy agreement and by so doing invited the residents of the territories to participate in a dialogue, to discuss autonomy.

On the one hand, however, you haven't been able to master your own fate--at least until now. On the other hand, you've become emissaries of extremist movements--in this case the PLO--and you further the process of escalation in words, slogans, demonstrations, and violence--with stones, burnt tires and attacks. We will certainly never accept this kind of political activity. We will put an end to this

kind of activity! We said: Ladies and gentlemen, no more demonstrations, no more violence, no more political sabotage or terrorist acts. That message was received by the Arab people who understood that we would indeed go all the way on this issue. They were wise enough to accept the message very quickly, and from then on the territory has been basically quiet, for the most part.

[Text] In the office of Brigadier General Benyamin Ben-Eli'ezer hang many pictures of past subordinates who fell during Israel's wars. In the last few weeks Fu'ad used his office for essential matters only. Most issues were handled by his deputy, Lt Colonel Ya'akov Katz. Fu'ad himself was often seen in the halls of the Defense Ministry and the IDF General Staff, where he participated in meetings to discuss administrative changes for Judea and Samaria.

In 1936 Fu'ad (his given name) was born in the town of Batzera in Iraq. At the age of 13, he immigrated to Israel alone, after his father decided that given the persecution of Jews in Iraq, at least the eldest son should be saved. Fu'ad was educated mainly on Kibbutz Merhavia, where he was given the Hebrew name Benyamin.

During the Six-Day War Benyamin Ben-Eli'ezer commanded the Shaked Patrol. Later he commanded a unit on the northern border, coordinating between the first officers handling communications with Captain Hadad and the militia in southern Lebanon.

On 3 May 1979 he accepted the command of Judea dn Samaria, 10 minutes after his predecessor Brigadier General David (Jockie) Hagoel, in a televised appearance, accepted the responsibility for the smoke bomb in a Jericho school and resigned.

At the end of last week, on 30 October 1981, Benyamin Ben Eli'ezer ended his role as regional commander of Judea and Samaria. In so doing he marked the end of 14 years of the civil and military regime in the area, a regime wherein the military commander was also the highest civilian officer.

He will be replaced by Lt Colonel (reserves) Professor Menahem Milson, who will head the civil administration.

Brigadier General Benyamin Ben-Eli'ezer's future, married and the father of five children, will be decided later.

[Question] Brigadier General Ben-Eli'ezer, are the Arabs in Judea and Samaria today moderates?

[Answer] In answer to your question I want to repeat one simple statement. Taking the Arab populace as a whole, you cannot, unfortunately, use words like "moderate." Anyone who knows the Arab mentality and society knows that the term "moderate" simply doesn't apply. I prefer to use the term pragmatic. Pragmatism exists for the Arab people, moderation does not because their whole life style and social structure is so different than ours.

[Question] Will the silent majority in Judea and Samaria, which was quiet in the past (perhaps because they feared the PLO and others), begin to speak up now?

[Answer] I'll answer in this way: You have to differentiate between several levels of Arab peoples. First, the overwhelming majority in this area is a majority with little to say. It's a majority interested in survival and better living conditions. But ask me if this majority sides with the PLO and I will say emphatically: No! Definitely not.

There is a minority, most of whom are urban, who in their heart and behaviro, in their world view and in their ideology, side with the PLO's ideology, strategy and techniques. This minority is hard to change. You can try as we did over the last year and a half--and this was one of our most impressive achievements--to nullify that influence. We didn't eliminate it. It still exists in the area. It exists below the surface. We simply silenced it and its activities. Today, it is what they call "under control." But it exists and we must continue to deal with it.

As far as the third topic you raised, I would say that when you speak with people at all social levels in Judea and Samaria, you feel at least one thing: They have learned to accept Israel, her strengths and weaknesses. They have learned to accept and appreciate Israel, to accept and tolerate us. I say this with great confidence.

#### The Majority do not Believe in the PLO's Ideology

Today they know our moral strength, the strength of our values and what our reservations are. They have also learned to recognize the democratic regime in Israel and the meaning of freedom of speech. These are things which, although not applicable to them, they learned to value. I take home with me a very positive view of people in the territories, people who revealed their high esteem toward the State of Israel and the people of Israel--and of course, the Israeli government. However, there are those who think differently, people who think differently than the PLO, its strategies and ideology. I can't say that everyone here is pro-Zionist or pro-Israel, or would want to see Israel in power forever. But the decisive majority does not see the way of the PLO as the path that should be taken here. If this majority believes in peace and a brighter future, it certainly does not believe in the PLO.

But, there is a feeling of fear and distrust. Even a respectable Arab can tell you one thing in your office and another thing when he's out on the street. There was once an Arab resident whom I had decided to assign to a certain position. I saw him first as a servant to his people, his environment and the needs of the population of which he was a leader. The man accepted the position, and then something fantastic happened. He went to Jordan and got permission to accept it. But at the last minute someone suggested that before returning to the territories--and this is a man of strong will and emotions--he should go to see the PLO representative permanently located in Jordan and inform his of such. This representative told him in other words: If you want to take this job, take it. But we will not be responsible for your well-being after you leave that office. The message was clear. The man came back with his tail between his legs and said: With all the respect and esteem I hold for the government, I cannot take this position, because that would mean death.

We learn from this that it doesn't matter what the people in the territories think. What matters is who is pulling the trigger, who's holding the gun and at whom it's pointed. The PLO, I'm very sorry to say, has succeeded to control this situation time and again in the past.

[Question] The IDF's policy in Judea and Samaria was one of consistent restraint. Was this successful?

[Answer] Our policy of restraining all PLO activity was used intensively for a short time. It was fair, selective but consistent and we haven't backed off from it since. It succeeded, in fact very well. We treated the throwing of a stone like an attack, and went all the way with that stone, until we caught the person who threw it. We make it clear that we were not willing to remove anything from the order of the day--not the roadblocks, not the stone and certainly not the grenade. This policy succeeded. I would say that everyone here--Jews of course but also many from the Arab population--is satisfied because we've given them security and this security is for everyone.

#### There are Positive Forces in the Territories

I am convinced and certain of one thing: The State of Israel and its army will continue to fight the PLO and enemy sabotage activities. I have no doubt that on these issues the IDF, which was always in command of the region and did an outstanding of it, will continue to do so equally as well in the future.

[Question] Brigadier General Benyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, at the beginning of your report summarizing the 14th year of the regime you said you hoped that the 15th year (this year) "will be a year of change and achievement." What changes were you looking forward to when you wrote this statement?

[Answer] When I wrote "change and achievement" 4 months ago, I was hoping and dreaming deep inside for changes and achievements in all senses of the words. The central and basic thing I would hope for would be that the Arab populace would wake up once and for all from the distorted dream it has been living in all these years. I call it the dream of "Is Israel Still Here?" This is the central problem and I'm not just talking about Judea and Samaria. I'm not among those who are convinced that the central problem is a Palestinian one, those who feel that if you've resolved the Palestinian problem you've resolved everything. I am among those who believe that the central problem today is coexistence with Israel and the Israel homeland in this place called the Middle East. Therefore I had hoped that the Arabs who have lived and resided among us (in the territories) these last 14 years, would stop and say: Enough! Perhaps we can find another way, another system. Perhaps we should wake up from this dream and begin to understand that struggle, violence and attacks by saboteurs won't get us anywhere. This route has not allowed us to advance one step forward toward what we call peaceful co-existence, a level of peace. At least we--the Arabs and residents within Israel--will be able to stand up once and for all and say: Enough PLO, enough violence, enough sabotage, enough Palestinian ideology. We'll wake up and try to find common grounds for coexistence with the Jewish homeland in Israel.

[Question] In other words, the silent majority will not remain silent?

[Answer] That's exactly what I hope. I can say with absolute certainty that there are potentially enough positive forces in the Judea and Samaria region to bring the people around. Their thinking is quite positive. It's what I call rational thinking. They really understand that through violence no one will actually achieve anything.

One of the tragedies of the region stems from the fact that since 1921 and until the present, no leader has been able to stand up on his own and decide the future of the area. It was always contingent and dependent upon others. I regret, too, that today this phenomenon persists and they are dependent upon the PLO. Therefore,

my dream is that these potential forces will successfully develop other organs and make independent statements with head held high. The second point is that the IDF's strength should be based on the achievement of security in the area. In the past, saboteurs used bases here to reach Jerusalem and the coastal plain. Arms were stockpiled here. Briefings were held here. One of my dreams is that peace shall reign in this territory.

[Question] Brigadier General Gen-Eli'ezer, by definition you are also the last governor of Judea and Samaria. Can you assess your personal contribution to the development of the area and the events of the last few years?

[Answer] I am not just the last governor. In title, I am the last commander and governor of Judea and Samaria. From now on there will be administrative changes. At least the names will sound different. From now on the head of the civil administration will be the civil governor. So, I was not the last in this sense. But I was the last to function both as governor and military commander.

#### The Impact of Values on Work in the Territories

I came to this region with 24 years of experience in active duty. When I arrived I brought with me the values and principles of a Jewish fighter who had experienced very hard times. At least as a child, before I came to Israel, things had been very difficult. The fundamental values I believe in, my world view, my experience as a fighter--these have undoubtedly influenced my work.

[Question] Personally, don't you feel that you were cut off in the process of working toward a goal which you hoped to achieve?

[Answer] Not at all. It's the process. The building of Israel and Israel's strength began 100 years ago, with the beginnings of Zionism, and continued through all the wars. It's an ongoing process. Everyone contributes his share to the chain. My feeling, my appraisal is that I did all I could do. In effect, I returned in kind all that which the IDF, the State and the people had given to me and done for me during the 24 years prior to my arrival here. I leave this position with a wonderful feeling of accomplishment, with the feeling that I was given a mission which I think I fulfilled faithfully. I am leaving in excellent spirits and I will always claim that I was lucky to have served during the critical period marking the beginning of the peace process and talks related to autonomy. These were 3 and 1/2 critical years and we certainly made strides.

All in all, I'm leaving with a lot of friends, both among Jews and Arabs. The feeling is that together we moved the area one more step forward, combined with the security component which includes the IDF.

[Question] Last week you conducted parting tours from your command. You left saying "Good-bye and see you later." Thus, to close our interview there is one question that almost demands to be asked: Fu'ad, what next?

[Answer] One thing is clear, I won't be twiddling my thumbs. I'm not the type. Either I'll continue with the Israel Defense Forces or, as rumor already has it, I'll leave the IDF.

In any event, in anything I do, I will always direct my energies and my strength toward those acute and critical problems which preoccupy the Israeli people and society. I gave 27 and 1/2 of the best years of my life to defend the State of Israel, with pride and great satisfaction. I leave my position with a feeling of satisfaction which comes from having performed well for many years, more than a generation. There is no doubt that I will be directing my efforts and energies into goals which I see as crucial to the State of Israel and its people.

9811  
CSO: 4423/67

## BEDOUIN VILLAGE EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Nov 81 pp 15, 21

[Article by Yoram Hamizrahi: "Frustration in the Shadows of Mount Tabor"]

[Text] "It was 300, maybe 500 years ago that Bedouins from Iraq settled in the Bet She'an Valley. They were killed off by malaria and the two who survived--Subh Al-Shibli and Shibli Al-Shibli--escaped to Mt Tabor where Subh established the Arab Sabayih tribe and Shibli the Shible tribe. The Subahim moved to Jordan and we stayed. We never left." That is how Muhamad 'Abdallah Shibli (38) summarized the history of his small tribe for me.

We sat in his spacious home and listened to his stories and his claims. Colorful Mideastern decorations hung on the walls, plastic flowers, elegant peacocks and a naive drawing of the holy shrine of Kaaba in Mecca. Muhamad, lean and quiet, has also for the last 2 years been called by the title Hajj, which he earned by making a pilgrimage to Mecca. Abdallah's opponents call him "Hajj Modai," after the minister of the Liberal Party of which he is a member. A party placard hangs on the wall of his home.

"I was supposed to have been on the Likud's list for the Knesset," says Abdallah, who seeks to right the administrative inequities which have hurt his village. "We have no local council, no committee. There are thousands of residents with no local administration. How can this be in the State of Israel?" From the adjoining room we hear the cries of little Mustafa, one of 'Abdallah's five children. His young wife Aysha comes into the living room from time to time, serving fragrant guavas, tangerines and later, bitter coffee with almonds.

### Beauty and Wealth

"Abdallah's elegant home and the plant nursery which he owns alongside are located at the highest and northernmost edge of the village, on the eastern slope of Mt Tabor, next to the old path leading up to the monastery. From the spacious terrace we have a view of the village, the mountain and the neighboring village of Tabor. The homes in Kfar Shibli are pleasant, mostly new, competing with each other in size and exterior decorations. Here and there are spots of green, lemon trees or ornamental flower pots. There are many cars and tractors, few animals. "We have no donkeys, only cats and dogs," says Abdallah. Above the rocks of the mountain the turret of the mosque can be seen--white, narrow and new. "A few years ago we

brought an imam from Gaza. Since then the work of God has been with us. Thanks to MK Beni Shalita we received the right of permanent residency." I was surprised by the beauty and apparent wealth of the village, but my embittered host complained; "It's not organized yet, there's no council, no services, and the Ministry of the Interior refuses to help."

Sitting with us, too, is Jamal Muhamad Shibli (37), elegantly dressed. Jamal is a teacher in the local school: "I have a masters degree in education and a second masters in psychological counseling. I'm a graduate of the Kaduri School and of the University of Illinois in the United States," says Jamal. He doesn't believe in politicians: "They promise a lot before the elections." He is distressed by the situation in the village, which has no council and no youth services or any other cultural offerings. He diplomatically sidesteps "loaded" questions on subjects concerning Jewish-Arab relations and the problems of good or bad neighborhoods.

Our host, who seeks to establish a council "or at least a serious committee," enumerates one by one the virtues of this village of less than 2,000 people. "We never raised a hand against the State of Israel. Our people serve in the IDF. Five of our sons fell in Israel's campaigns and others have been permanently handicapped. Many serve in the security forces. How could it be possible that the State would help all the neighboring villages, even helping them to establish councils under Rakah control, but will not help us, the faithful?"

#### A Covenant Between Shibli and the IDF

I have no answer to give him. Another friend joins us--Hasan Shibli (49), an affluent farmer and apparently a seasoned businessman as well. He tells me things I've heard recently in several Bedouin circles and among other minorities in the north: "You are pushing us to dislike you, and then when we hate you, you tell us we're out of line."

Hasan tells about the "Covenant between Shibli, the army and the Jews," recounting an incident from the war for independence which is reminiscent of stories and events from the days of the Indians in the United States. "I was 13 years old when the war reached us here. The Jews were interested in keeping the "Afula-Tiberias road open and we, therefore, struck an agreement with them. Because I knew how to read and write, I drafted the agreement which was signed by the village elders and representatives from Kfar Tabor, as well as Dr Fi'at, the principal of the Kaduri School. The participants declared, among other things, that anyone who was hot-blooded and looking for a fight should get up and leave.

We signed, but today that agreement has no value at all. They took most of our land. Kfar Tabor is against us and even the Kaduri School is not the best of neighbors," says Hasan. We talk about those days which are so close and yet so far, and I hear stories about the time when a Bedouin was a Bedouin.

Outside in the street, old women go by in their traditional black dresses. The young people dress fashionably, in a more "European" style. The school children dress in light blue uniforms, exactly as they do in nearby Afula or in any other Jewish settlement. Hebrew can be heard flowing from all sides and people listen to Israel radio. But my hosts were unrelenting: "We demand a council. There are no services here, therefore no development. We were barely able to establish committees for electricity, water and schools, but there's no money and soon they're going

to stop lighting the streets. The government takes taxes and we benefit very little from it. Should we just give and pay, just like that?"

A little later I'm speaking with some young people strolling around the village, several of whom are wearing IDF uniforms: "In the army we're soldiers, but in the lower Galilee we're Arabs," they tell me. They claim that "The Ministry of the Interior behaves badly toward us despite the fact that many of us voted for the Likud." They demonstrate a current familiarity with the Israeli administration and what is happening in neighboring settlements, especially Kfar Tabor. "Look, just look how rich they have become!" They also claim that "Some of their wealth came from taking our land. Today, anyone who wants to make a living has to lease land from the Jewish moshavim in order to go into agriculture. You call that justice?"

They complain that "there isn't even enough water for limited agriculture, barely enough for anything" and they say that "when the Jews in the valley water the cotton, the water pressure isn't sufficient to reach the upper areas of Shibli." They tell of their daily lives, but avoid talk about internal conflicts within the village. "The old Mukhtar opposes the establishment of a council or committee, but would agree if he understood that there was no choice," they say.

I spoke with the person responsible for the northern district, Israel Kenig, and with several clerks dealing with administration and counseling. It was apparent that the problem in Shibli is of some importance to them. They're not avoiding it but they fear that the village "is not ripe for self-administration." They promised to do something in the near future, however.

#### Sparks of Hatred

Driving on the narrow road climbing to the peak of Tabor I reached the intersection beyond Shibli. Several taxis are parked there and the drivers are drinking coffee and clowning around. Dresses decorated with Arab embroidery and multicolored spoons flutter in the light wind. This is a tourist stop, just beyond the intersection, on the northern slope of the mountain. Kfar Daburiyah, surrounded by other minority villages, is nestled here. It is a magic land, a third Israel almost unknown. Signs of new building are everywhere--unfinished structures, cement mixers, a steam roller. "We're Falahin, not Bedouins!" one local youth declares proudly.

Daburiyah is quite large already, with 4,500 residents living in apparent wealth--asphalt drives, sidewalks, banks, stores, many trucks and pleasant homes, large and well cared for. The head of the local council, Asad 'Aziza (31), received me in the living room of his home. He is a young man who is very conscious of the local government's entanglements. "I'm an economist and I was a district officer dealing with budgetary issues," he explains. Only recently it was suggested that Shibli be annexed to his village. There was also a possibility of annexing the neighboring Bedouin village to Kfar Tabor or another council in the area, but no one wants anything to do with the Bedouins. "I'm ready to accept a Bedouin village near Eilat or other Bedouins at a distance, but not Shibli," says the head of the council as he lists the problems of the neighboring population. "They have a lot of hoodlums, a lot of problems and conflicts. They even have trouble with the law. The government did them harm by recruiting them into the IDF. There they have arms, guns and a lot of self-confidence. We do not now and never did have anything in common with them. Municipal cooperation would not work! There is no way!"

In Asad's home I am also served fresh fruits and coffee. From a window on the north side of the house we can look out at the beautiful landscape of the Jezreel Valley, well-kept fields, pleasant villages, and at a distance, beyond the mountain, the towers of Upper Nazareth and smoke from factories. "They deserve a council," says Asad after brief reflection, "but they won't succeed without outside help. Maybe the key would be to appoint an officer-in-charge."

Asad tells me that Daburiyah has an annual municipal budget of 13 million shekels. "Most of the money comes from the government and a small amount comes from taxes." There are two elementary schools and one high school. "The children from Shibli study here," says Asad. In Asad's village there is an awareness of the importance of management and development. "Our council is not organized on a party basis. It is, rather, divided among the three main families. Even this won't work among the Bedouins of Shibli." Later that evening, I received a call from one of Muhamad Shibli's friends. "You were seen in Daburiyah," he complained, continuing as if he knew what we had spoken about there.

And in the meantime, the clerks at the Ministry of the Interior remain silent. And the leaders of the Likud and the Liberals, "Hajj Modai's" patrons, are also silent, while the strange reality of a pretty Bedouin village, right on the crossroads between a Falahin village and an old Arab Settlement, continues unchanged. It is a village with no council, no committee, no services--a village with soldiers' graves, handicapped veterans, antagonistic neighbors and frustration flourishing in the shadow of Mt Tabor, perhaps the sparks of hatred.

9811  
CSO: 4423/67

CROWN PRINCE SA'D AL-'ABDALLAH INTERVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1312, 25 Dec 81 pp 27-29

[Interview with Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim Qadri Qal'aji: "Kuwait Values Arab Solidarity; the Strength of the Gulf Countries is the Backbone of the Arabs!; After the Fez Conference, Some Political Figures Believed that the Arab World Had Split Into Two Factions: One, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front Countries, and the Other the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council---but is the Cooperation Council Actually a Political Faction?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Talking with Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd 'Abdallah, you realize that he has intense feelings for Arab nationalism and the Arab solidarity and the common Arab destiny are his prime motivation and the object of his greatest interest, along with his interest in Kuwait and the Gulf.

This would not surprise you if you knew him well, for he is the son of 'Abdallah al-Salim, the father and modernizer of Kuwait. Sa'd al-'Abdallah grew up and was educated under his father's influence, acquiring most of his ethics and principles from him. However, more than this, he learned from the former Amir of Kuwait that he was known for--his deep faith in his country and his nation.

Our long conversation in the prime minister's office centered around this idea, and whenever the conversation wandered, the Kuwaiti crown prince would bring it back to the main subject--Arab solidarity, which he supports, calls for and believes is the true strength of the Arabs, without which they would have no place in international society.

Noticing this fervent zeal in Shaykh Sa'd, I said to him during the interview: "Statements by Arab officials are replete with talk of Arab solidarity, yet their actions differ greatly from these statements. Actually, Arab solidarity deteriorates daily. It is constantly subjected to new setbacks causing the Arab nation to suffer great adversity, diverting it from its nationalistic goals and throwing it into a scramble for groupings and alliances. What are the real obstacles that stand in the way of solidarity, and who are the obvious or not-so-obvious ones behind this?"

He then sat up in his chair and said:

"If Arab solidarity is the true strength of the Arabs, it is their enemies who do not want them to attain this strength and who make every effort and resort to any

scheme to poison their relations and perpetuate differences and rifts. Such people can only be foreigners, their agents or their dupes because dividing the Arabs is their way of penetrating the Arab ranks, establishing networks and spreading lies to extend their influence and carry out their plots. When the Arabs are truly united, there will be no way for foreigners to meddle and spread their poison and schemes.

We in Kuwait value Arab solidarity and work for it because we believe that it is the basic step for any pan-Arab effort or strategy to confront the provocations and dangers surrounding us and threatening us from all sides. Therefore, we reject the policies of groupings and alliances. This is one of the firm, known principles of our policy."

I interrupted here to say:

"Of course the positive role that Kuwait is playing to settle Arab differences and to unite Arab policies and goals through Arab brotherhood and our pan-Arab duties is well known and appreciated. Kuwait went to great lengths to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which you personally helped found. I still remember your trip in 1978 to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman to make the dream a reality. However some people think that the Council is a new faction in the Arab world opposed to other factions!"

Shaikh Sa'd looked at me with surprise and answered quietly, and somewhat sadly for the rash opinions and irresponsible, off-hand judgments made by some politicians and commentators.

"The Gulf Cooperation Council is not a faction, because a political or military faction is meant to be against another faction, while we have been trying to unite the hearts of the Arabs and to bring differing viewpoints closer, affirming always that creating political factions in the Arab world is a mistake. Would we answer one mistake with another? The faction divides and tears apart, but we are trying to join forces, unify ranks, eliminate differences and overcome crises through a spirit of Arab nationalism. Should we say, if the Arab Maghrib countries wanted to set up some kind of cooperation, coordination or unity, that they are forming an Arab faction against other Arab factions, or should we welcome this enlightened, pan-Arab step on the way to Arab unanimity or comprehensive Arab unity?

"We in the Gulf are one united people who are also bound by strong ties to all Arabs--special, close ties of marriage, kinship, heritage, tradition and similarities in climate, systems of government, mentality, level of civilization and a common view of our present and of the future for which we strive. Not long ago, tribes moved from one place to another within different Gulf countries. These tribes still have their roots throughout the Gulf area. We deal with each other as we would deal with ourselves, in an area governed by one destiny, which must unite its positions to face this common fate, through the charter of the Arab League, which urges regional cooperation to strengthen the Arab nation. We do not cooperate only in new matters, but have cooperated continuously through ancient and modern history, and it is time to organize, coordinate and channel our efforts for the good of the area and of all Arabs.

"When this people, who are scattered throughout six countries, were starting to build the values of their civilization, it was inevitable that they would meet, cooperate, merge, exchange expertise, profit from their experiences and reach a common strategy in their way of life, principles of growth and in political and security spheres in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency and develop their own strength, confirming what we have always said--that the security and stability of the Gulf are the responsibility of its inhabitants. For this purpose, the Gulf Cooperation Council was established and was welcomed by all true Arabs, who considered it an Arab, not a Gulf, accomplishment because they thought it a bold move toward anchoring development on firm, proven bases and a wise step toward the Arab unity that experience and time had proven could not be realized impulsively, but must be taken step by step. We must try to fix the roots of Arab unity firmly in economic, social and cultural life before this unity takes its constitutional form.

"Imagine, for example, that another Arab or Islamic country submits a project to one of the Gulf states. The project is studied thoroughly by experts and is decided to be impractical, and the Gulf state declines to assist in the project. The first country then submits it to another Gulf state, which accepts it without sufficient study. Or suppose that a certain industry fails in one Gulf country because the natural conditions and economic circumstances were unfavorable and another Gulf country decides to establish this industry without learning from his brother's experience in this field. Suppose that one Gulf country is successfully producing a certain commodity and that another Gulf country comes along to compete with the first country in production of this commodity. Such examples, caused by unpreparedness and unilateral action, cannot happen now because the Cooperation Council will try to oversee, direct, coordinate and ensure that there is planning among the six countries.

"The Gulf Cooperation Council is a shining principle and ambitious step, whether through joint consultation and self sufficiency in facing possible confrontations and dangers, avoiding the conflicts of the great powers and building a promising future, or through the Arab nation's moving toward a greater closeness and brotherhood and helping Arab national interests to overcome regionalism and selfishness. Each day may bring the start of true Arab unanimity or the building of Arab unity on sound, enlightened bases strengthened by perseverance and the avoidance of upsets and setbacks. When the Gulf countries are strong, flourishing and close, so are the Arab countries. These countries have always felt that they are an inseparable part of the great Arab nation in which their happiness and bitterness are reflected and whose prosperity and adversity they feel. The Gulf countries have always been open to their Arab brothers, both in political matters, where they have consistently and eagerly tried to bring viewpoints closer together and eliminate existing differences, and in economic matters, where they have extended the brotherly hand of cooperation to every Arab and Islamic country to help them reach their goals, increase their capabilities and strive together for the common pan-Arab goal. The Arab countries are our Arabism and the Islamic countries are our Islam, and we place our Arab nationalism and our Islamic belief above all else!"

As I left the Kuwaiti crown prince and prime minister, I was convinced that the Gulf Cooperation Council was not founded in a casual, off-hand or artificial manner nor ignoring the obstacles and leaping blindly. Rather, it is an affirmation of historical, geographical and psychological reality, an organizing of this reality

through planning, coordination and direction, and one of the results of continued, quiet, tireless effort, and making the public interest triumph over any regional or personal tendencies. As Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim said, it is an Arab achievement and the strength of the Arabs because pan-Arab action will remain one of its most important and most ambitious goals.

Since I was one of those who grew up in a Mediterranean country with a great dream, the dream of Arab unity, then saw this dream shattered and torn through setbacks, upheavals and selfish actions, through struggles for power and leadership and through nationalistic supremacy and actions, I wondered if the Arab Gulf countries had found a new path to Arab unity, a new way to deal with it and to work for it based on patience, flexibility, openness and brotherhood instead of our way in the Mediterranean countries, which is based on excitability, tumult, one-upmanship and violence over every difference in opinion.

Leaving the building for the open air, I remembered what my brother and colleague Sulayman al-Farazili said: "We used to think that the Arab Gulf was part of the Arab nation but, to our surprise the Arab nation is part of the Gulf."

9882

CSO: 4401/221

CONTROVERSY, PASSAGE OF CITIZENSHIP LAW ANALYZED

Dispute Over Citizenship Law

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 722, 16 Dec 81 p 15

[Article: "The Citizenship Law--Between Rejection and Acceptance"]

[Text] By last Monday the decree-law dealing with citizenship had been brought up to be voted on four times in the National Assembly. Neither those in favor of the law nor those against it had succeeded in obtaining a quorum to either pass or reject it.

It has been noted that the percentage of those for and against the law has been about the same when the vote was taken all four times, and it is possible that it will continue to be the same many more times in the future if and when it is brought up to be voted on. This means that the law will continue to be held in abeyance and that people's minds will continue to be held in abeyance along with it. There can be no rest for the souls of people who cherish the hope to achieve some of their aspirations or people who are beset with anxiety.

Furthermore, observers notice differences in the positions taken by those who are against the law. Some members of the Assembly reject the law since they consider that the process of granting Kuwaiti citizenship to more people will lead to problems in the realms of services, housing, loans, etc. Others are against the law on the premise that the law would not satisfy the aspirations of many people, such as men in the army, policemen, and others, who believe that they deserve to be able to obtain Kuwaiti citizenship. But the position of the government, as well as of those Assembly members who agree with the government, is clear and definite. The thing that really makes us wonder is the fact that some of the Assembly members who have been against the law have sunk to the level of demanding, as a condition for their voting in favor of it, that the law contain an amendment stipulating that Kuwaiti citizenship be granted only to Muslims! Those taking this position are ignoring many of the negative aspects of the law, particularly when applied to women married to non-Kuwaitis and their children. It also promotes discrimination among our citizens, etc.

If some of those rejecting the law have ignored some of its essential negative aspects and have taken a stand which is marginal and often illogical, in view of the fact that [Kuwaiti] nationality is a right acquired by [Kuwaiti] citizens to

whom the conditions apply, regardless of their religion, then their rejection of the law has no meaning and the justification for the apprehension felt by some of the Assembly members is stronger and more logical.

However, as long as there is a clause in the constitution which does not permit the introduction of any amendments to decrees before they are either rejected or ratified, then any deferment of a decree on the pretext of introducing amendments to it is not justifiable because this is in violation of the constitution. Furthermore, such an amendment itself which is brought up for discussion does not justify holding [the decree] in abeyance. Furthermore, the prevailing trend in the Assembly indicates that it is possible to merely get the decree ratified. We do not wish to ask why it is not being ratified and then discussed and amended as is stipulated by the constitution. But we are asking what efforts are being made to get those who are against the decree to constitute a quorum and vote against it in view of the fact that rejecting the decree will provide more opportunity to quickly study it and introduce amendments to it than would be the case if it were ratified since the government would be more interested in discussing amendments to a new decree. In any event, our citizens, as well as those aspiring [to become citizens] and those who are apprehensive [concerning this issue], still feel at a loss concerning their situation. When will this matter finally be decided?

#### Citizenship Law Passed by National Assembly

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 724, 30 Dec 81 p 7

[Article: "The People's Interest--Between a Hands-Off Attitude and Agreement [With the Authorities]!!!"]

[Text] During last week's meeting of the National Assembly the ratification of the citizenship law, which was promulgated by order of the Amir in 1980, was of great significance for the political direction of the Assembly. This law had been submitted during previous meetings and the Assembly had rejected it, demanding that some changes be made in it. This is something which cannot be done since laws which are promulgated by decree of the Amir must be either completely ratified or completely rejected. This is why the Assembly could not write [into the law] the clause, proposed by some Assembly members, stipulating that Kuwaiti citizenship be granted only to Muslims. During the meeting of Tuesday before last the Assembly, by a large majority, voted in favor of the law which was submitted by the government. Then another law was submitted which was the same law issued by the government, but with the addition of the condition that one must be of the Islamic faith in order to acquire Kuwaiti citizenship. It was quickly ratified by the Assembly and then submitted to the executive authorities.

This action taken by the Assembly concerning the citizenship law gives rise to a lot of questions. First of all, we agree that the citizenship law is important concerning the composition of Kuwait's inhabitants. However, even laws cannot be applied objectively and in accordance with Kuwait's interest unless the procedures are sound and are carried out by people of integrity. The crucial thing is basically the application of laws, and not the provisions of laws--which can be circumvented.

We are not at this point interested in going into the details concerning the citizenship law and the situation with regard to Kuwait's population. This is not the subject which we are discussing. The thing that has irritated us is that we were hoping that the Assembly would take action concerning the laws which it has approved. It has never taken any action like the action it took when dealing with the citizenship law.

Let us say that the Assembly took action when dealing with the citizenship law and ratified the amendment during the same meeting, motivated by what was in the interest of Kuwait. At this point we would like to ask: Where was this large number of Assembly members who rejected and voted on the new law, proposed by the government, when dealing with the rent law which they ratified during the initial meetings of the session, even though many Kuwaitis have really been affected by rent increases?

What action did the Assembly take concerning the public service law and the unjust clauses which it contains with respect to the Assembly? Its ratification did not result in any quick action taken to eliminate these clauses.

What action did these Assembly members take concerning Article 30 of the press law? So far no member has requested or promoted the elimination of this article from the law. So far it has remained in effect, approved by the Assembly members, and has not been put to a vote.

The Assembly members have done all of these things, but have not taken any action concerning laws which directly affect the lives of Kuwaiti citizens. They approved them in the form that they were promulgated by the executive authorities when the Assembly was dissolved. But when dealing with a law involving executive considerations and the population situation, some of the members flex their muscles to preserve the Islamic faith. We, in fact, do not know the number of Christians who wish to apply for Kuwaiti citizenship. But judging by how far a number of the Assembly members went in defending this proviso [stipulating that Kuwaiti citizens must be Muslims], in order to preserve their identity and the interest of the Kuwaiti nation, you would think that they numbered in the thousands!

At this point it is clear to us that the action engaged in by the Assembly members is of the demagogic type, but when it comes to laws which [really] concern the interest of the [Kuwaiti] people, all they do is have a hands-off attitude and agree [with the authorities]!!

9468  
CSO: 4404/215

## KPC PLANS TO STEP UP OIL EXPLORATION

London 8 DAYS in English No 2, 16 Jan 82 pp 22, 23

[Article by Graham Benton and John LeRoux]

[Text]

THE KUWAIT Petroleum Company plans a huge increase in overseas exploration spending this year. But contrary to the expectations of many oil industry analysts, it does not aim to become a fully-integrated company to rival the international majors in diversity of operation.

These are two important points to emerge from a recent interview by the Houston-based newsletter, *Petroleum Information International*, with Kuwait's oil minister, Sheikh Ali al Khalifa al Sabah. The sheikh, who is also chairman of KPC, says that the company spent almost \$100m last year acquiring leases in nine countries from Canada to Australia. In 1982 KPC will be looking further afield and the minister used China as an example of a new exploration area in which Kuwait was interested. The extent of new exploration is not yet known. But Abdul Razzaq Hussein, chairman of KPC's overseas exploration division, the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company, said that some of the ventures being considered will make current operations 'look like peanuts'.

Last year one of KPC's most publicised ventures was taking a half share in the Hawaii refiner, Pacific Resources. Along with other Kuwaiti purchases of mainland United States refineries, this raised a flurry of speculation in US oil industry circles that KPC was planning to move into downstream as well as upstream oil activities. But Sheikh Ali al Khalifa told *Petroleum Information International* that he certainly did not intend KPC to become the 'eighth sister' among the international oil majors. The venture with Pacific Resources was 'an extremely exceptional case', he said.

In general, the company's foreign investment strategy is determined by the criterion of profitability. The Pacific Resources venture was chosen because Hawaii is essentially a two-refinery market where the profit margins are good. Ali al Khalifa stated flatly that extreme caution would be used before any further downstream operations were developed.

It should be noted that the small mainland US refineries bought up last year were investments not by KPC but by private Kuwaiti interests. On the other hand, Ali al Khalifa did say that KPC was looking into distribution opportunities in countries outside Kuwait.

He did not entirely rule out KPC involvement in further downstream activities, if these could be shown to complement Kuwait's local industry by providing an outlet for further processing Kuwait's domestically refined products or by offering a market for Kuwaiti petrochemical production.

The oil minister committed KPC to moving 'full steam ahead' with upstream projects. 'Obviously, the most profitable area today is international oil exploration,' he explained. Reserves developed outside Kuwait by KPC would enhance domestic operations by increasing market flexibility, even though these foreign reserves technically would belong to KPC rather than to the Kuwaiti state directly. This may well indicate that foreign reserves will help Kuwait's pricing flexibility too, since any production by KPC outside Kuwait would not be subject to Opec agreements.

Last year's acquisition of the California drilling contractor, Sante Fe International,

slots in neatly with KPC's worldwide exploration strategy. Ali al Khalifa reassured the US company's existing clients that Santa Fe's ability to service their needs would not be restricted.

Shortly before the turn of the year, Santa Fe's senior vice-president, James R. Ukropina, is reported to have written to Energy Secretary James Edwards that Santa Fe's C. F. Braun subsidiary wished to be relieved of its involvement in work at government facilities where plutonium is produced and chemically separated for use in nuclear warheads. He said the decision had been made 'in view of the persistent public mischaracterisation both of that project's sensitivity and of the intentions of Santa Fe and the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation'. *Interview with the Emir of Kuwait's investment and financial adviser Page 44.*

CSO: 4400/122

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

PORT TRAFFIC--Kuwait's ports will have handled a record 6.5 million tons of goods this year, according to Dr Ibrahim Makki, head of the Kuwaiti Port Authority. Making this prediction on the basis of statistics covering the period from January to November 1981, Dr Makki was quoted by ASSOCIATED PRESS as saying the total would overshoot last year's target of 6 million tons. The Gulf state's three ports have been operating at full capacity to cope with cargo ships queuing to discharge Kuwaiti imports and transit goods. The closure of other Gulf ports as a result of the Iran-Iraq war had helped boost the transit trade passing through Kuwaiti ports. Kuwait's principal port is Shuwaikh, five kilometers north of the capital. The ports of Ahmadi and Shuaiba handle exports of crude oil and refined derivatives in addition to imports of capital goods for industrial installations. During the first 11 months of 1981, Shuwaikh handled 99,165 containers compared to 33,549 in 1978, an increase of 300 percent. Dr Makki said the improved performance was due to the expansion of Shuwaikh and other ports, where over two million square metres of shallow water have been deepened to accommodate cargo ships. The overall figure of 6.5 million tons is 31 percent up on the total for 1977, a year of record congestion in Gulf ports, when ships unloaded 4.5 million tons in Kuwait. In 1980, the figure was 5.9 million tons, Dr Makki said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 2, 11 Jan 82 p 9]

BOND ISSUE FIGURES--Eight investment and financial houses in Kuwait made international bond issues amounting to \$1.47 billion in the seven years which ended last December. The issues were made for 64 international borrowers in 18 countries including Japan, France, Sweden, Finland, Spain and Yugoslavia. The Kuwaiti houses that led, co-managed and contributed to the bond issues were the Kuwait International Investment Co, Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Co, Kuwait Investment Co, Arab Financial Consultants Co, Financial Group of Kuwait, the Kuwait Financial Centre, Kuwait International Finance Co and National Bank of Kuwait. The principal borrowers included the Korean Development Bank, the African Development Bank, Banco Nacionale de Credit Rural of Mexico, Finnish Municipalities and the Republic of Indonesia. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 11]

CSO: 4400/122

ISRAEL BLAMED FOR RECENT BOMBINGS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 85, 26 Sep-2 Oct 81 pp 21-22

[Article: "The Bombings In Lebanon Are a 'Preparation' For Inflaming the Situation At the Arab Summit; Who Are the 'Front For the Liberation Of Lebanon From Foreigners'? Has Israel Begun a Secret War Against the Resistance?"]

[Excerpts] Beirut--A few weeks before the convening of the Arab summit conference this November in Morocco, Lebanon is experiencing important and meaningful security and political developments which for the most part concern the future of the South, which since last Ramadan has been under a fragile cease-fire reached after fierce battles between Israel and the Palestinian resistance.

These security developments are an attempt to send a message to the Arab summit conferences--at which the situation in Lebanon is expected to be one of the main topics on the agenda--by an alleged Lebanese faction claiming it is behind them. The explosions that occurred in Shaka--which militarily is under the control of the Arab Deterrent Forces [ADF]--and Sidon, on Thursday a week before last, and those in western Beirut and its southern suburbs on Friday and Sunday, which claimed more than 40 lives and injured dozens, were the work of the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners which claimed responsibility for them. This front has previously carried out several operations against the Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese leftist military presence in Lebanon. It also claimed responsibility in 1968 for an assassination attempt against the United States ambassador at the time, John Gunther Dean.

So far no one in Lebanon has publicly identified himself with this front even though it claimed responsibility for its actions through telephone calls from an unknown person to the Phalangist radio station Voice of Lebanon and the offices of foreign press agencies in Beirut. The unidentified individual, speaking on behalf of the front after the blast which destroyed the building which housed Palestinian headquarters and those of the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces in Sidon, South Lebanon, and which caused 21 deaths and left 96 injured, claimed that the front would hold a news conference at which it would make its identity and its aims known. But this step has not yet been taken, and it is doubtful whether it will take place soon, particularly in view of the current security situation in Lebanon which the Lebanese Government, with resolute Arab support, is endeavoring to convert into real tranquility in anticipation of the creation of a formula for a national agreement accepted by all the parties concerned.

The explosions in western Beirut caused the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese National Movement to take strict security measures. Sources in those organizations said that these measures have helped thwart several attempts at planting bombs which could have been disastrous.

According to sources in the Lebanese National Movement the identity of the front which claimed responsibility for the explosions is partially known to them. The public indictment of the organization which is behind this front awaits further evidence--of which there is already plenty following the arrest of several suspects accused of blowing up an arms depository belonging to a leftist Lebanese organization several months ago.

These sources believe that the purpose behind such operations may be to create the impression that the areas under the control of the ADF are not as tranquil as they should be, and that it is therefore necessary to devise alternative security plans--in which there is more extensive and comprehensive Lebanese participation--to settle the crisis.

The sources believe that the front whose goal is to "liberate Lebanon from foreigners" timed its actions in Shaka, Beirut and Beirut's southern suburbs with the Sidon operation, and that this last operation was not carried out by this so-called front.

#### The Secret Israeli War

Lebanese sources therefore support a belief among circles in the Palestinian resistance that the Sidon operation was the work of none other than Israel.

An official Palestinian source told AL-MAJALLAH that the Sidon operation, which occurred an hour before a meeting of the joint leadership of the joint forces in the south--which Abu Jihad is accustomed to chair when he is in Lebanon--and which used about 300 kilograms of the powerful explosive TNT, was part of the secret Israeli war against the PLO. The source said that Israel used the name of an alleged Lebanese faction in the operation in order not to be accused to having broken the cease-fire agreement which is still nominally in effect. He pointed out that several days prior to the explosion the forces of Sa'd Haddad fired eight rockets at Tyre, causing severe damage.

Abu Jihad told AL-MAJALLAH in a private conversation 2 months ago that he expects Israel to temporarily replace large-scale military operations with specific operations aimed against Palestinian leaders and installations.

The Palestinian source links the Sidon operation to all the political and military developments in Israel. On one hand we have seen large-scale Israeli troop concentrations in the settlements along the border, while Israeli military leaders, particularly Chief of Staff Rifael Eytan, claim that the Palestinians have violated the cease-fire agreement 18 times since last July, and that they have brought thousands of tons of arms and ammunition into the South and that they are training and carrying out large-scale mobilization activities in the South.

While the military have been making statements and allegations, the Israeli press, in anticipation of Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin's recent visit to the United States, had been saying that Begin would discuss the situation in South Lebanon with President Ronald Reagan "in view of the violation of the cease-fire by the Palestinians."

Palestinian leaders believe that an Israeli military plan against South Lebanon was studied during the meeting between Begin and Reagan in Washington recently. The chairman of the executive council of the PLO, Yasir 'Arafat, made this announcement during the opening session of the World Congress for Solidarity With the Palestinian People, which was held in Beirut on the 10th and 11th of this month. 'Arafat said that he had information that Israel was preparing a large-scale military action against the Palestinian resistance in the South, and that Begin had brought a military plan to Washington relating to this.

Observers in Beirut point out that the agreement on strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States, which was reached during Begin's visit to Washington, includes a clause which says that the agreement is directed "against foreign intervention and terrorism in all its manifestations." These observers link this with Reagan's announcement upon taking office that the United States was interested in eliminating terrorism from three sources: the Soviet Union, Cuba and the PLO.

9123  
CSO: 4404/48

ASSISTANCE FROM FRANCE SAID TO BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 275, 3 Oct 81 p 43

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil: "Long-Term Credits From France and Lebanese Laxity"]

[Text] The long-term financial credits Lebanon expects to receive from France are quite substantial, both with regard to the rate of interest in comparison with long-term credits being offered or which can be expected from Arab and European countries, and with regard to the actual amounts.

While it is true that these long-term credits are for financing purchases of various French products, it is also true that they are quite large, and will be used for a variety of purposes and in several sectors.

The first topic concerns the signing of a new financial protocol for financing contracts for development and construction projects won by French companies after the previous financial protocol, which amounted to Fr 410 million, was fully implemented.

When, in the course of the negotiations with the chairman of the Committee For Development and Construction, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, who conducted the negotiations, the French began to insist that the Lebanese present projects that were clearly defined and close to implementation, the Lebanese negotiator succeeded in convincing the French in principle to raise the amount of the new protocol and to allow it to continue for several years so that Lebanon could make appropriate use of it without any time constraints. The Lebanese negotiator also succeeded in making the French receptive to giving priority to granting financing on easy terms for public utilities projects included in the "Construction Project," the financial burden of which is borne by the public sector.

On the matter of the second topic, which pertains to long-term credits for army purchases of equipment and materiel, the Lebanese negotiator succeeded in convincing the French to raise from Fr 100 million to Fr 600 million--a Fr 500 million increase--the amount of long-term credits offered to Lebanon for the purchase of French weapons. In addition, Fr 150 million--30 percent of the Fr 500 million figure--is to be paid in cash, gradually, between the time an order for the purchase of specific arms is placed and the time delivery begins. The amount of longterm credits offered for this purpose is Fr 750 million.

One of the factors of success in this positive atmosphere, with the results which were achieved and which will still be achieved, is, according to official sources, the Lebanese negotiator who entered the negotiations with full freedom of action on behalf of the state and the government. He acted as an excellent negotiator, overcoming existing obstacles and preconceptions, and showed the French that this small nation deserves all the long-term credits--as well as grants--it may get, because it is able to pay it back double in the future. What difference does it make if it is paid back directly, or if the repayment is deferred through payment for goods France wishes to sell? After all, Lebanon is one of France's markets.

In fact, on this point there are certain other reasons for the success.

France's long-term credits to Lebanon are not an example of indulgence on the part of France. The Lebanese negotiator himself did not seek any forbearance, even though he worked to strengthen understanding of his need for them and his ability to repay them. Rather, France's long-term credits to Lebanon for financing civilian and military purchases is in keeping with France's own interests in several aspects.

1. First, it is well-known that Lebanon's public debt is not large, either in the size of the Lebanese budget, or with regard to Lebanese national income and gross national product. This means that the Lebanese economy which is currently suffering as a result of the war and the current situation, can, by its own strength monetarily, financially and economically, repay this debt on schedule. What difference does it make whether its own resources are augmented by funds expected to be provided by the Arab countries which have begun to send gradual assistance? Or if there has been some delay, which does not reflect bad intentions so much as it is a reflection of operational routines and the demands of circumstances?

2. Secondly, the increased French long-term credits to Lebanon are in accord with an established general policy of the new French government, publicly affirmed by President Francois Mitterrand and Minister of Cooperation and Development Jean-Pierre Cot, that any assistance given by an industrial nation to the economy of a developing nation is actually self-assistance to the economy of the industrial nation. Thus, the more long-term credits given to Lebanon and other countries, the more exports the advanced country can make for these long-term credits, and the more active its economy becomes while unemployment decreases, even if the payment for these exports is deferred. Or does Lebanon, which is still paying back all its debts, to the sister Arab countries and to the entire world, not deserve to obtain some of what other nations, which have been saved or are being saved from near bankruptcy--such as Poland and Zaire, to say nothing of Romania, and all the poor countries of the world--are receiving?

3. The third reason for France's extensive grant for long-term credits to Lebanon can be found in the answer to this question, particularly when there is an excellent negotiator available to do it. Lebanon, which in principle deserves all the rights that others have, also deserves something more, particularly from France which apparently is still aware of how necessary Lebanon's continued existence and strength is for the preservation of the region, and how necessary the preservation of Lebanon is in helping France directly and indirectly to obtain what it desires from the region.

These three aspects, in which the reasons for the increased French long-term credits to Lebanon can be discerned, serve also to make clear the reasons why other nations, such as Italy and Great Britain (and perhaps soon others), are taking steps to initiate protocols similar to the French-Lebanese protocols, through our excellent negotiator who did not let the opportunity with France slip away, a fact which will strengthen his position in negotiations with the Italians and the British.

It remains for Lebanon and the Lebanese people to absorb the examples and lessons of these long-term credits, and to become less careless with their country and themselves.

9123  
CSO: 4404/48

STAYING OUT OF TROUBLE

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 2, 20 Jan 82 pp 1-4

[Text]

Since last March's aborted coup attempt by a group of dissident Mauritanian officers, the eviction of a **Libyan**-leaning civilian government in April and the exclusion from mainstream politics in July of an ambitious **pro-Iraqi** faction, political life in Nouakchott has been remarkably serene. As we have concluded in the past, these interludes of relative tranquility are usually the proverbial calms preceding a new series of political sandstorms. The atmosphere in the capital is thus jittery, with even the changing of a military commander's post serving as the pretext for uncontrollable rumours on "radio trottoir" about foiled coup endeavours. Indeed, during the parade at the end of November celebrating the Islamic republic's 21st anniversary, exceptional security measures were deployed around the tribune, where President **Mohammed Khouna Ould Heydalla** was flanked by ex-presidents **Ould Saleck** and **Ould Louly**. Tracts had mysteriously circulated in Nouakchott predicting that Heydalla would meet the same fate as the late president Anwar Sadat. The analogy between **Egypt** and Mauritania is clearly shortsighted, for whatever the shortcomings and contradictions of the ruling *Comité Militaire du Salut National* (CMSN), it does still possess substantial support and sympathy now that it has extracted the country from the disastrous Western Sahara conflict, promulgated basic reforms, such as the abolition of slavery, and put the economy back on its wobbly feet.

Heydalla's regime has not really capitalised on its potential political support. It has sought above all to reinforce the armed forces (partly with **Algerian**-supplied **Soviet**-made weapons and **Algerian** military advisers) as a safeguard against possible efforts by King **Hassan** to destabilise the Heydalla regime. Thus, in spite of the political merry-go-round in government circles since former president **Ould Daddah** was toppled in July 1978 no clear political line or ideological orientation has clearly emerged. Heydalla is known to be an honest, capable and

religious individual, but his political culture is circumscribed. He is loath to meet diplomats or journalists, fearing to make gaffes. During the reception, for example, at the presidential palace in honour of independence day, he timidly stood at the palace entrance shaking hands, and then quickly withdrew into a back room with a group of notables, where only the **Chinese** ambassador dared enter. His number two, prime minister **Maaouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya** is of the same mould: respected, apparently above corruption and hard working. He seems to lack political ambition, and appears content to serve faithfully Heydalla. If differences between the two men exist, they are kept quiet. Taya, whose health is fragile, would probably withdraw if his relations with the president turned sour. We understand that leading army officers tend to respect and be loyal to him rather than Heydalla: they include Lt-Col **Yall Abdoulaye**, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Commander **Gabriel Cimper**, minister of the interior, Capt. **Sidina Ould Sidya**, Capt. **Sid Ahmed Lakhel**, Commander **Athié Hamat**, head of the *Suréité Nationale*, and Lt-Col. **Mohammed Mahmoud Ould El Hossein**, the CMSN's influential permanent secretary.

While nobody puts into question the honesty of the president and the premier, the same cannot be said for some members, their respective entourages, leading military officers and several ministers. Investigation behind the presidential palace in a new quarter known as "Ilot A", yields several surprises. In an area which was a sand dune just a year ago, magnificent villas are springing up. The proprietorship of the villas (few secrets exist in Nouakchott) makes up a "Who's Who" of the civilian-military élite, with the military apparently in the lead.

A contentious subject is the activity of the President's brother, who is linked to important businessmen. He has amassed substantial wealth in a short period. The brother has been given the

sobriquet of "Billy" Heydalla, in memory of sundry doings of former American President Carter's younger brother. Other grandes known to be wealthy are minister of fishing, Lt-Col Silman Soumaré, Captain Moulaye Hachem, in charge of distributing foreign food aid, Lt-Col Mohammed Mahmoud Ould Deh, minister of industry and commerce and Yahya Ould Menkouss, minister of labour. The parastatals have also provided opportunities for power. For instance, **Abdel Kader Ould Ahmed** played a central role in practically handing over to the business community the state foodstuff distribution company, *Sominex*, and now wields influence from his new post as director of the state insurance firm, *Smar*. The new leadership of the trade union movement, *Union Mauritanienne du Travail* (UMT) owes its election to Ahmed's *Smar* delegates, a debt which undoubtedly will be cashed in later on.

Mauritanian potentates also attempted to foster links with ex-US representative to the United Nations, **Andrew Young**. The PM's cousin, **Sid Ahmed Ould Taya**, became friends with Young while Mauritania's UN ambassador, thanks to the half-Mauritania half-Algerian international businessman, **Mohammed Najhli**, who operates out of Paris, New York and Nairobi. Ex-foreign minister, the naval commander **Dahane Ould Mahmoud** was in turn introduced to Young and later invited him to Mauritania during one of his business safaris to **Nigeria**. Talk of Young being hired as a "consultant" to improve Mauritanian's international image never bore fruit. In any case, the wealth accumulated by the cream of Mauritanian society has reached such a point that numerous grandes are purchasing splendid flats in Las Palmas and La Défense quarter in Paris. *Air Mauritanie*'s flights to the **Canarian** capital are booked weeks in advance by pleasure-seeking Mauritarians.

The other side of the coin is the increasing impoverishment of the vast majority of the population. Nouakchott's population has jumped from around 100,000 in 1970 to over 300,000 today. Sociological studies on the capital's inhabitants reveals a severe state of malnutrition. There are less than 30,000 salaried jobs in the capital, and 80% earn less than 8,000 ouguiyas (about US\$ 175) a month. With this, a family of eight can afford one meal a day and a meagre breakfast. The vast majority of displaced nomads, ex-slaves (known as Harratines) and uprooted farmers live in poverty. Nouakchott has one of the highest rates of child mortality in Africa. Such destitution gives rise to urban crime, religious fanaticism and ethnic friction.

The religious leaders, known as marabouts, have seen their influence climb. the marabout of the Friday pray, **Bouddah Ould Bouseyri**, has his sermon broadcast over *Radio Mauritanie*. A rural phenomenon is **Mohammed Lamine Ould Sidina**, of the Aougef region, who has cut out a veritable fief. Heydalla's marabout, **Ely Cheikh**, has become a major figure in the northern region encompassing Atar

and Zouerte, where the workers at the state iron mines, SNIM, readily consult him, as did premier Taya last autumn when he toured the area. The conservative Arab Gulf states finance the *Fundamentalist Islamic Association* lead by **Mohammed Moktar Gaggeh**. An Iranian type ayatollah movement, however, is to be practically ruled out in Mauritania. Firstly, Mauritanian Islam is in the mainstream of Arab religion. Secondly, black marabouts would look askance at a messianic-type crusade spearheaded by Arab Moorish marabouts.

On the political front, Heydalla must face the ongoing infighting between the principal civilian political currents and their allies in the armed forces and abroad. Over the past two years the main competition has been between a pro-Iraqi Baathist group and a group favourable to Polisario, Algeria and Libya. Heydalla has been juggling political personnel — successful politics in Nouakchott is to preserve not more than 250 individuals — in order to find an acceptable, and workable, modus vivendi. A civilian government headed by **Sid Ahmed Bneijara** was dismissed last spring for letting itself be too closely wooed by Libyan President **Moammar Gadaffi**.

This was followed during the summer by the cutting down to size of pro-Iraqis, notably over-ambitious foreign minister **Dahane Ould Mahmoud** and presidential adviser **Mohammed Ould Breidelley**. Dahane went into disgrace when he surpassed his prerogatives by prematurely reestablishing diplomatic relations with **Morocco**. Breidelley, a member of the Baathist international bureau, is known for his constant behind-the-scenes manoeuvring. Now, we hear government changes are again in the pipeline, with the pro-Polisario-Algerian-Libyan faction probably due to make its return to positions of influence. This grouping encompasses:

1. Le Mouvement du 10 Juillet behind ex-premier **Ahmed Bneijara**, and including other civilian ministers such as **Mohammed Ould Zamel**, at mines and energy, and **Mahjoub Ould Boye**, at housing and water resources.
2. "Progressive" army officers like Lt-Col **Moulaye Ould Boukreiss**, deputy commander in chief of the army, who smiles at Polisario successes.
3. Le Mouvement National Démocratique (MND), the left-wing movement with the longest political tradition, which still remains semi-clandestine. It has shed most of its pro-Chinese rhetoric, concentrating on forging unity between the two wings of Mauritanian society, the Moors and the black Africans. **Traore Ladji** is a leading representative of the black community in the MND. Its role in any left-wing government would be crucial, given the number of credits it has in junior but influential government positions.
4. Arab nationalists of the Nasserite tradition, who oppose the Iraqi Baathists by pushing for eventual unity with Polisario-controlled *République Arabe Sahraouie Démocratique* (RASD). **Hassan Ould Saleh**, director of the *Agence Mauritanien de Presse* (AMP), plays a pivotal role in this group.
5. El Hor (Free Man), which is a group of activist ex-slaves known as Harratines. It is composed principally of intellectuals and soldiers, and can count on discreet assistance from the MND. We feel that this movement will certainly play a major role in the future of Mauritanian political life, all the more so as its influence among Harratines in the shanty towns is rising. Principal members of this organisation are **Boubacar Ould Messoud**, a senior civil servant, Capt. **Breiks Ould M'Barek**, recently named commander of the region of Nouakchott, and the deputy director of the trade union movement, who goes by

the name of Bodgel. We understand that several El Hor members seem to be sympathetic to Iraq.

The above forces carried off a substantial victory in October when they engineered the ousting of the old leadership of the union movement, UMT. After a long battle, **Malainine Robert**, an Ould Daddah appointee, was removed as secretary-general, and his deputy, known by the sobriquet of Tshombé, was also eased out. Both refused to leave the UMT offices, until the threats of physical intervention became too strong. Their faction was supported by:—

1. Members of the dissolved party of the Daddad regime, *le Parti du Peuple Mauritanien* (PPM).
2. The *Kadahine de Marie-Thérèse*, the faction of the MND which split in 1975 due in part to the intervention of the president's French-born wife, **Marie-Thérèse Ould Daddah**. In this group is **Haibetna Ould Sidi Halba**, director of the university project, and **Isselma Ould Abdel Kader**.
3. The Moslem integrationists close to **Mohammed Moktar Gaggeh**.
4. Black nationalists of the Soninké and Toucouleur ethnic groups, who dream of setting up a black-dominated state in the southern part of the country.

It was only the decision of *Smar* director Ahmed which tipped the balance against the above coalition of forces. But because of Ahmed's questionable background, the UMT might loose some of its potential force. In fact, most diplomats who were present at the independence day parade were impressed by the militant slogans deployed by union members. They remain the only organised group in the country besides the armed forces.

The armed forces have not as yet decided to set up their own political party as a means of eventually easing the country back to civilian rule. But they are establishing an embryo of an organisation which, if necessary, can be called upon in the future to assume such a role. Known as the "structure for education of the masses", it already has three members: **Aliou Bâ**, in charge of economic questions; Dr. **Ahmed Salem Ould Zein**, responsible for Islamic morality, and **Mouloud Ould Sidi Abdalla**, in charge of organisation. The CMSN is searching out a director for this executive committee. The successful candidate will be an "ideologue with ideas", we are told.

The failure of the March 16 coup was a serious blow to the Moroccan-backed opposition forces in the so-called *Alliance pour une Mauritanie Démocratique* (AMD). Most of its leaders were expelled from Senegal by President **Abdou Diouf**, and since the election of President **François Mitterrand**, they have been requested to cease all political activity in France. Their principal base remains Morocco, while conservative Arab regimes in the Gulf provide limited funds. We understand that ex-president Ould Daddah has been thoroughly discouraged by manoeuvres within AMD and has abandoned an active role. He now lives in Tunisia. The tactical brains behind AMD operations is **Mustapha Ould Abeidara**rahmane who operates out of Paris and has excellent contacts with journalists at a well-known French-language weekly on African affairs, even leading them to make several significant errors, both

appreciative and factual, in their reporting on Mauritania. Other AMD barons abroad include paymaster **Mohammed Ould Jiddou** (who we understand is seriously ill), **Ismael Mouloud**, former ambassador to Egypt, businessman **Haba Ould Mohammed Vah**, whose goods were recently sold in auction in Nouakchott, and ex-diplomat **Mohammed Maloukif**. Within the country, AMD still has sympathisers in the administration, the army and the business community. Head of the employers organisation, **Sidi Abbas**, is thought to be one, but he publicly plays the game of the Heydalla regime in order to assure his substantial economic holdings.

Leading CMSN members still fear that Morocco will use the AMD to undermine its power. Rarely, however, has the regional and international diplomatic scene been as favourable for Heydalla. The demise of Presidents **Léopold Senghor** and **Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** has reduced the sphere of complicity which the AMD could expect, and Polisario's recent military victories have forced Morocco to withdraw its two garrisons nearest to the Mauritanian frontier. Moroccan claims that Mauritania served as the staging ground for the attack in October on Guelta Zemmour by Polisario forces are totally discounted by western diplomats in Nouakchott, several of whom recently toured the northern region. Moreover, military commanders appointed to the northern part of the country are not known for their pro-Polisario attitude. (For example: Capt. **Cheikh Sid Ahmed Babamine** in Nouadhibou and Capt. **Salem Ould Memou** in Zouerate). On the diplomatic front, however, Mauritanian interests are often badly served by the choice of its ambassadors: if the ambassador in Paris, **Abdel Kader Camara**, tends to reflect the official view, another leading ambassador boasts that the Heydalla government is an Arab racist regime backed by Polisario.

The Heydalla government has also been shored up by better economic conditions, especially the rise in the value of the US dollar, the currency in which most of its exports are denominated, and the excellent performance of the re-organised fishing sector. We understand that South Africa is involved via a Dutch-based company, *Inter-Pêche*. Iron ore exports represent about 80% of total exports. The slight decline in exported ore, to around 8.4m tonnes in 1981, was more than compensated for by the jump in the value of the dollar. The ouguiya, which is pegged to a dollar-dominated basket of currencies, has appreciated in the last year by about 15% against the CFA franc and the French franc.

Longer-term economic worries involve the drying up of Arab petrodollar aid. We understand that budgetary aid, mostly of Arab origin, dropped from 4.5bn ouguiyas in 1980 to a slim 1.4bn in 1981. (In November, premier Ould Taya is thought to have returned with a cheque from Algeria for US\$ 10m in budgetary assistance)

During the next six months, the Heydalla regime will face a host of tricky internal questions. We expect that the broom will sweep many corrupt civil ser-

vants into early retirement. Likewise, a serious effort will be undertaken to hammer out legislation for the promised agrarian reform. A cabinet reshuffle is also in the pipeline. Heydalla feels that a more coherent team is necessary to tackle regional politics, which he expects to worsen before improving. Mauritanian diplomats do not reckon that King Hassan intends to go through with the referendum in the Western Sahara, and are worried by the prospect of increased American aid to Hassan ●

CSO: 4500/100

COMMODITIES PRICE INCREASE PERSISTS IN MOROCCO

[Editorial Report] Casablanca AL BAYANE (daily organ of the Moroccan Party of Progress and Socialism), in French 8-22 January 1982 carries on pages 1-3 successive articles criticizing the price increase in various basic commodities, e.g., meat, chicken, eggs, medicines and construction items: "Those who needed to buy meat or chicken on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday, and they were many, have had the unpleasant surprise of having to pay higher prices or to abstain from buying." The 12 January 1982 issue reported that the 1982 finance law increased taxes on products and services 15 percent to 17 percent which were subsequently passed by the various affected companies to the consumers. The 14 January 1982 issue added that: "Contrary to official declarations, prices continue their steady and inhumane climb plunging the average family into a daily scramble for the bare necessities." Finally, the 22 January 1982 issue emphasized the wide range of the price increase: "Dear readers beware! Do not telephone your friends to tell them about the new increase in prices...because reliable sources asserted that phone call rates have also been increased."

CSO: 4519/112

OMAN

FIVE-YEAR PLAN ACCOMPLISHMENTS CITED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 246, 7 Nov 81 pp 65, 67

[Article: "Social Development Conference in Muscat to Evaluate Five-Year Plan Experiment; Omani Five-Year Plan Ends This Year; Its Accomplishments Include 2,200 Houses for People With Low Income and 13,561 Cases of Social Aid"]

[Text] A general social development conference will be held in the Sultanate of Oman on 1 December 1980 to evaluate the experiment of the local community development programs carried out in a number of the sultanate's provinces since 1976.

The conference will discuss the possibility of transforming this experiment into a national plan covering 1,500 local communities in all parts of the sultanate.

A number of experts and researchers working in the field of local community development and representatives of the specialized UN organizations will take part in the conference.

Negotiations are currently underway between the Omani Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and these organizations to participate in financing the comprehensive development plan seeking to develop the local communities in the wake of the proven success of the experimental plan carried out in only three provinces, namely: Nazwa, al-Rustaq and Abra.

The international interest in the plan reflects the conviction among the international organizations of the soundness of the project's goals, of its careful planning, of its precise implementation and of the results produced by its implementation.

The philosophy of the plan to develop the local communities stems from Oman's social policy which believes in the right of every citizen in the cities, and the countryside to enjoy the benefits of social development.

The social development program, as defined by the first conference for the development of local communities which was held in Muscat in December 1974, has been based on creating the elements of economic and social progress for local communities, on the participation of individuals and groups and on making use of their capabilities and resources and of the human and material resources available

in the local community in a manner compatible with the social conditions of the Omani society, with its cultural and historical reality and with its spiritual values.

The plan seeks to test the best and most suitable means for developing the local Omani communities, as well as the means of cooperation between the various ministries in implementing their policies, offering their services and providing the Omani manpower needed to undertake development of the local communities throughout Oman. The plan also seeks to bolster the various ministries concerned with development, both by enabling them to train their skilled social development workers and by preparing the citizens to respond to their services, in addition to supporting the technical agencies engaged in social affairs with researchers and specialists trained to work in this sphere.

The work to implement the plan started in early 1976 with the creation of a department for the development of local communities. A number of international and regional organizations, which have received aid and assistance from the UN West Asia Economic Committee, from the UNDP, from UNICEF and from the Arab Education, Culture and Science Organization, have participated in the plan.

In 1976, the plan started in three experimental villages in Nazwa Province inhabited by 1,433 people. By 1979, the plan's work covered the provinces of Nazwa and Abra, including in its services 16 villages inhabited by 3,910 people.

With the start of 1980, the plan was expanded to include a new work area, namely al-Wudyan area in al-Rustaq, thus covering with its services 50 population centers in Wadi al-Sahtan and Wadi Bani Ghafir.

The plan has exerted efforts to spread awareness among the citizens to make use of the existing government services and to enlighten them as to the role of each service agency and its importance to them, thus raising considerably the number of citizens making use of these services and bringing about new services. The plan has also exerted efforts to change the pattern of individualistic personal thinking among the citizens into the pattern of thinking of the public interest through the formation of work committees in each village, through strengthening the ties between the social work teams, the citizens and the existing government agencies and through the completion of numerous projects and works in the local communities.

In this regard, cooperation has been established with the Ministry of Education and 16 illiteracy-eradication schools centers have been opened in the villages covered by the plan, three Koran-memorization schools have been built and the existing schools have been expanded and improved.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the plan workers have carried out concerted disease-control campaigns, such as malaria and trachoma control campaigns and campaigns to spray insecticides, to control rodents, to sterilize drinking water wells, to build clean drinking water projects and to educate the citizens regarding the importance of vaccination against diseases. Moreover, seven healthcare centers have been opened to offer simple preventive and curative health services.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources, it has been possible to develop guidance [model] farms for the farmers, to organize campaigns for pest control, to educate the farmers as to the importance of cultivating vegetables and new crops and to encourage them to establish agricultural cooperatives and market their production.

Women leaderships have participated in the work carried out in the villages covered by the plan and women have been trained on home economics and on holding fairs to display and market their products so as to encourage women's work. Trips have also been organized for the exchange of experience among the villages covered by the plan. Ceaseless campaigns have also been conducted to educate women as to the importance of home cleanliness, of vaccination, of treating diseases scientifically, of controlling epidemics and of enabling women to gain skills that bring them income, such as embroidery. This is in addition to developing rural housing and to teaching women how to diversify the Omani family's food.

To realize the goals of social development in the sultanate, the state agencies have implemented a well-studied plan seeking to develop the citizen, to aid and assist him, to train him, to enhance his skills and to give him the means so that he may perform his role in building and development. The state has also issued a social security law stipulating that financial aid be advanced in the form of monthly payments to needy families and individuals, such as orphans, widows, divorced women and old people. The law has also defined the conditions for the dispensation of this aid so as to guarantee the right of a needy family to an honorable life.

The number of cases benefiting from this social security reached by the beginning of November 1980 a total of 13,561 cases to whom 2,815,916 Omani riyals have been paid in comparison to 131 cases in 1973 to whom a total sum of 13,561 riyals [as published] were paid.

For this purpose, the state has set up a number of centers in the major cities of Oman to provide care for disabled and old people. The state has also focused its efforts on the projects and programs that seek to provide infant and maternal care, keeping in mind the role of the Omani woman as a mother, a housewife and a worker.

The first 5-year plan, which will end by the end of this year, has built 2,200 houses at a total cost of nearly 15 million Omani riyals. These houses have been distributed to people with limited income. The state is also eager to provide vocational training in order to utilize the human resources and to provide them with work opportunities and is eager to propose legislation capable of providing labor care and of organizing the relations of workers with business owners on the basis of solidarity and cooperation in order to realize the public interest.

494  
OSO: 4404/149

## BRIEFS

WATER INJECTION PROJECT--Qatar is launching a \$20 million pilot project for powered water injection at an onshore oilfield to test the method's suitability in enhancing recovery of oil by increasing reservoir pressure, OPEC's news agency reported last week from Doha. The OPECNA report quoted an official as saying that the project, which is due to be completed by 1983, would be used to test whether actual results corresponded by projections. If they did, the official said, powered water injection would be extended to other Qatari oilfields, both onshore and offshore. The object of the test was to maximise production at a lower cost and to maximise oilfield safety. The new technique was used between 1976 and 1980 in a limestone structure with encouraging results. At present, Qatar uses dump-flooding to increase reservoir pressure in oil zones. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 2, 11 Jan 82 p 11]

FOREIGN INVESTMENT--Qatar is studying ways of directing foreign investment into productive industries in the state, the monthly ASWAQ AL-KHALEEJ reported in its latest issue. The magazine quoted Ali Hassan al-Khalaf, Director of Economic Affairs at the Qatari Ministry of Economy and Trade as saying that recent restrictions on foreign capital were intended to prevent unfair competition and to channel funds from foreign investors into areas of the economy which were beyond the reach of local investors. There was still room in Qatar for foreign investment, he stressed, adding that Qatar appreciated the role played by foreign investment in oil, petrochemicals and Qatar's iron and steel industry. "But foreign investment does not give priority to the interests of the host country and does not take into account the training of Qatari personnel, a burden which rests on the state," Mr Khalaf said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 2, 11 Jan 82 p 12]

CSO: 4400/122

COUNTRY'S FOPEIGN POLICY EXAMINED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 2, 11 Jan 82 p 2

[Text]

New patterns are appearing in the New year in the Middle East's political kaleidoscope. Just how significant these will turn out to be in the long run could well depend on how accurately the rest of the world interprets the signals coming from Saudi Arabia and, perhaps even more important, how well Saudi Arabia's rulers read the replies from other Arab governments to Riyadh's initiatives.

A good deal of ink and newsprint has been expended in recent days on just what Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry Prince Saud el-Faisal meant in an interview with the *New York Times* when he indicated that the Arabs were prepared to "accept" Israel if occupied Arab territory was surrendered. Did this mean recognition, as some Western analysts believed? Two official statements from Riyadh managed to muddy the issue. For the nonce, it scarcely matters because Israel's Prime Minister Menahem Begin is in no mood to give an inch of territory except in Sinai.

What does matter is that Riyadh is signalling that those who forecast that the Saudis would retreat into brooding silence after the fiasco at the Arab Summit at Fez must think again. Saudi Arabian diplomacy is alive and in much better health than could have been expected, thanks in large measure to Mr Begin's virtual annexation of the Golan Heights. The technique used by Prince Saud is a time-honoured one in the Middle East for launching trial balloons: while the subsequent charges that his words were misinterpreted will not endear him to Western correspondents, the ambiguity that has thus been created could serve Saudi purposes very well.

Indeed, ambiguity could well be the *sine qua non* for any moves to untangle the log jam in inter-Arab relations left by the Fez meeting. This is because public and private perceptions of Arab leaders are not the same when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict and because

some of these leaders have become the prisoners of the rhetoric of their public utterances.

This newsletter's analysis of Saudi Arabia's strategy points squarely to the Kingdom's relations with the US as the key element in future developments. Riyadh's links with Washington are unique in the Arab world and President Reagan must do his utmost to preserve them or risk having an open door to the Arabs slammed in his face. At the same time, the Saudis have gained little real advantage from their ties with the US because of the strength there of pro-Israeli opinion. This, we believe, is what the Saudis want to change. It is that opinion, in our view, that the Saudis are seeking to weaken and, in doing so, they are counting on help from Mr Begin to wean Middle America from unthinking backing for "galant little Israel."

If the Israelis can be shown to be irresponsible and endangering important American interests, the fat will truly be in the fire both in the US and in Israel, where preserving Israel's own unique relationship with the Americans is seen as a vital necessity. "What the Israelis fear most," a seasoned European observer told this newsletter recently, "is to have the Americans cease to view them as a strategic asset, the one ally they can count on in the Middle East." But this is precisely what Mr Begin has been helping to erode. And because Mr Reagan is responsive mainly to domestic political pressures, the coming mid-term Congressional elections in the US are an opportunity for the Saudis to rack up significant bonus points for the Arabs within a relatively short time.

**Projecting a moderate image**

But the principal obstacles to Saudi efforts along these lines are other Arabs. What the Saudis have been

trying to do is to project an image of Arab moderation and of Arab willingness to make peace with an Israel determined under Mr Begin's guidance to spurn all overtures. Hence the eight-point peace plan proposed by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd which the hard-liners shot down at Fez, only to have the Saudis breathe new life into it in recent weeks. And while this may seem puzzling in view of the fact that it was done while the Arabs were still absorbing the shock of Mr Begin's moves on the Golan Heights, what the Saudis have apparently been banking on is the way that Israeli actions were helping to bring the Arabs together.

Syria's President Hafez al-Assad is understood to be the latest convert to the Saudi policy. But Syria's position is an especially difficult one. The Golan is Syrian territory and no Syrian leader can be seen taking such actions by Israel lying down. The UN Security Council debate on the Golan was still continuing as this newsletter went to press and there were reports of intensive diplomatic efforts to frame a resolution acceptable to Syria, which had demanded sanctions against Israel, and which would not at the same time place an American veto.

A veto would most certainly be a serious setback for Riyadh at this juncture because the Saudis would be forced to cool off their relations with Washington and the hand of the hard-liners in the Arab camp would be strengthened immeasurably. And that would not be a happy prospect for those who prefer results to rhetoric.

CSO: 4400/121

SAUDI ARABIA

ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AID PROMISED TO PAKISTAN

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 10

[Text]

Saudi Arabia will help Pakistan develop its energy resources, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani announced recently after a six-day visit to Pakistan. He indicated that joint ventures for oil exploration were already under consideration. Sheikh Yamani said that his country was "very concerned" about the difficulties Pakistan was encountering in finding finance for oil exploration. Pakistani officials have indicated that the country needs foreign aid to develop 10 known oil-bearing structures, and that Kuwait has already expressed an interest in joint ventures aimed at that end.

Sheikh Yamani also was reported as saying that he was sure Saudi Arabia would look favourably on any Pakistani requests for collaboration in developing hydroelectric and thermal power.

In a related development, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) has urged its members to invest their financial assets in oil exploration in the Arab world and in other developing countries. In its monthly *Bulletin*, OAPEC called for the free exchange of information and technical know-how between its members and for coordinated efforts at oil exploration beyond OAPEC countries' borders, indicating that the

vast financial assets of certain producing countries could contribute greatly to exploration world-wide.

Another result of Sheikh Yamani's visit was an agreement to sell Pakistan light crude oil only, at Pakistan's request. Pakistan imports 90 per cent of its crude oil needs of up to 100,000 b/d, and is particularly dependent on products refined from light crudes such as kerosene and diesel oil.

Yet a further indication of the strengthening ties between the two countries came last week with an announcement that the Kingdom has promised Islamabad \$500 million to help pay for arms worth over \$2 billion which Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq plans to buy over the next six years. Around \$300 million of this pledge will be available in the next few months to pay for 6 US-made F-16 fighter aircraft scheduled to be delivered to Pakistan as part of a \$3.2 billion American arms and aid package.

It is not known yet whether the Saudi aid will be in the form of a loan at favourable rates or an outright grant. Some observers see the aid promise as a gesture of thanks to President Zia for his pledge to intervene militarily should there arise a threat to the Saudi ruling family.

CSO: 4400/121

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

LOAN TO BANGLADESH--Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide Bangladesh with a loan of \$86 million to help finance the construction of a urea fertiliser plant in the port city of Chittagong. The agreement came following a visit to Dacca by a delegation from the Saudi Fund for Development. Total costs of the fertiliser plant, which is expected to be commissioned by the end of 1985, are estimated at \$470 million. Other sources providing financing for the plant include the Asian Development Bank, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, the International Development Agency, the Islamic Development Bank, the Canadian International Development Agency and Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. The fertiliser plant will produce 1,000 tonnes of ammonia and 1,500 tonnes of urea per day. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 12]

JAPANESE DESALINATION COOPERATION--Saudi Arabia and Japan signed an agreement last week to set up two water desalination research and training centres in the Kingdom at a cost of \$37 million. The agreement, reported by the SAUDI PRESS AGENCY, calls for the exchange of information on desalination technology and the founding of a desalination technology institute. Nine workshops will be established to train 300 technicians a year in the operation and maintenance of desalination units. Saudi Arabia will contribute \$27 million to the programme, and Japan will cover the remaining \$10 million. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 8]

EUROPEAN CONTRACTING ADVANTAGE--Saudi Arabia has accepted recommendations by British experts that will favour European contractors supplying equipment for the Kingdom's electric power grid over the next two decades, according to a report last week from London. The report said British Electricity International, the overseas subsidiary of Britain's nationalised Central Electricity Generating Board, has persuaded the Saudi authorities to reject advice of American consultant Charles Main on two key aspects of the master plan he had prepared for the country's 5,000 mile-power grid. The plan called for use of gas turbines to generate power at voltages of either 220 or 500 kilovolts and would have given American manufacturers a head start in bidding to supply equipment. The report said that the Saudis were moving away from reliance on gas turbines and towards the idea of building big thermal steam plants on both the Gulf and Red Sea coasts which would be cooled by sea water. BEI believes this would save Saudi Arabia 70 million barrels of oil a year. At the same time, according to the report, Saudi Arabia is expected to adopt 380 kilovolts as the standard for generating throughout the grid. This is close to the 400 kilovolts standard advocated by Europeans. BEI has a team of 90 experts in Riyadh, where they are advising the Saudis on an \$80 million power system. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 pp 7, 8]

TRADE TIES WITH TAIWAN--An agreement to improve shipping conditions between Taiwan and Saudi Arabia and to promote commerce between the two countries was reached last week in Riyadh, during a visit by Taiwanese Economy Minister Chao-fao-Tung to the Saudi capital where he held talks with Saudi Commerce Minister Suleiman Abdulaziz al-Salim. Mr Chao was leading a 20-man economic and trade team to attend meetings of a joint Saudi-Taiwanese economic commission. Annual trade turnover between the two countries is \$2 billion, and in 1980 Saudi Arabia sold Taiwan crude oil valued at \$1.7 billion. Taiwanese exports to the Kingdom in 1980 were worth \$850 million. Other issues discussed during the meetings include Taiwanese requests for a \$100 million loan to finance a telecommunications project and for Taiwanese commercial banks to be allowed to serve as guarantors for Taiwanese construction companies engaged in the Kingdom's developing projects. Questions concerned with ways of upgrading the quality of Taiwanese goods exported to Saudi Arabia and dealing with trade disputes were also addressed. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 7]

CSO: 4400/121

DAMS TO BE BUILT ON AL-'ASI, AL-SARUT RIVERS

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 26 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "Two Dams on al-'Asi and al-Sarut Rivers With Storage Capacity of 293 Million Cubic Meters; Final Studies, Blueprints, and Plans for Implementation (of Project) To Be Completed Next Month"]

[Text] Damascus--Studies have been begun on a project to build dams on al-'Asi and al-Sarut River with the aim of retaining the water exceeding the storage capacity of the dams already built on the part of the river between al-Rastan and Mihradah dams and to exploit the stored water in irrigating the fertile lands located in the river basin. The preparatory phase studies have been completed and sites have been chosen for the following two dams:

1. Kuraymish Dam on al-'Asi River, with a height of 60 meters, a length of 970 meters and a storage capacity of 275 million cubic meters, in addition to a seasonal electricity generation plant with a capacity of 4,800 kilowatts and an annual production of 37 million kilowatts.
2. A dam at the site of Rabiyat al-Shaykh 'Ali on al-Sarut River to retain the annual flood waters flowing from al-Sarut River to al-Ghab plain. This dam will have a length of 320 meters, a height of 22.5 meters and a storage capacity of 18 million cubic meters.

As for the final phase concerning the final studies, blueprints and the schedule for implementation of the two aforementioned dams, the Public Major Projects Establishment has decided to begin the blueprints after completing the studies connected with the emergency conditions on al-'Asi River with the purpose of determining the peak of the flooding at the sites of the existing and proposed dams and after completing the study on the spread of flood waves in case one of the dams collapses and the impact of such waves on the towns, villages and farmlands located behind that dam. This is why lengthy negotiations have been conducted with a consulting firm on the technical, legal and financial conditions that must be taken into consideration while the required study is being completed.

The contract concluded for this study includes:

1. The preparatory hydrological study which covers al-'Asi River basin from the Lebanese borders to, and including, Mihradah Dam. This study seeks to determine the river's water resources and the current and future [water] needs.

1. A study to plan the water resources with the aim of meeting the needs for drinking water and water for industrial purposes at set points, to control al-'Asi River basin floods from Quttaynah plain to the lower part of Mihradah and to reduce the minimum limit of water loss (by enabling the water to flow to Mihradah Dam and by insuring the proper exploitation of this dam's water). Moreover, a study will be conducted on flood waves in certain cases at the sites of the existing and proposed dams.

The aforementioned studies have already begun and are expected to be completed next month.

8494

CSO: 4404/132

NEW DAM, IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "Increase of 180 Million Cubic Meters in Water Stored in Surface Dams; Irrigation of 13,792 Hectares of New Land and Drilling 100 Wells in Semi-Desert Area; Allocation of 670 Million Pounds in Five-Year Plan for Ministry of Public Works"]

[Text] It has been decided that the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources will implement a number of development projects in the sphere of irrigation and water resources during the fifth (current) 5-year plan with the aim of increasing the volume of water stored by small and medium-size dams by 180 million cubic meters.

This has been asserted by the minister of public works and water resources in the course of answering a question by an AL-BA'TH reporter on the projects scheduled to be carried out by his ministry in the next 5 years. The minister has added that the projects also seek to irrigate 13,792 hectares of new farmland.

The minister has also pointed out that a number of new irrigation and drainage projects will be implemented to make use of spring water during the winter and to realize a tangible increase in agricultural production. It is expected that the Upper al-Yarmuk project will irrigate 1,200 hectares and al-Nasiriyah project will irrigate 2,000 additional hectares.

The plan has devoted strong attention to the Syrian semi-desert and has approved the drilling and equipping of 100 water wells in the semi-desert to develop new grazing areas and to supply water to nomadic bedouins and their livestock.

The appropriations allocated for the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources during the 5-year plan have amounted to 670 million Syrian pounds. A sum of 311 million pounds has been allocated for the purchase of heavy equipment and vehicles for the water projects, for completion of the drilling and equipping of the semi-desert wells, for completing construction of the vocational training center in Damascus, for completing construction of the dams and irrigation and drainage networks, for conducting studies on control of public water pollution, for the Upper al-Yarmuk irrigation and drainage project and for al-Nasiriyah irrigation and drainage projects. These projects have been designated as basic projects.

A sum of 359 million has been allocated for new projects which include repair and maintenance of the government irrigation networks, implementing the Upper al-Yarmuk irrigation project and al-Nasiriyah irrigation project, constructing new dams and developing the vocational training centers in Damascus and Aleppo.

Priority in the implementation of projects has been given to completing projects already started by the ministry so that these projects may be put into operation in the shortest time possible. Therefore, the annual plan for 1982-82 has been confined entirely to completing the primary phase projects.

8494

CSO: 4404/132

## ELECTRICITY TO BE GENERATED FROM WATERFALLS

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "Efforts to Produce 1.75 Billion Kilowatt-Hours of Electricity From Waterfalls"]

[Text] The Ministry of Electricity is exerting efforts to generate more electricity from the waterfalls which have not been yet exploited in our country.

The assistant minister of electricity has pointed out that the waterfalls that can be utilized in our country in the future are capable of supplying 1.75 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. These waterfalls will be created for us by the Yusuf Pasha Dam on the Euphrates River which is capable of generating nearly one billion kilowatt-hours, by the regulatory dam which will also be built on the Euphrates Dam and which will have a capacity of 250 million kilowatt-hours and by al-Khabur River dam which can generate nearly 20 million kilowatt hours. The dams which may be built on other rivers and on coastal stream courses can generate 460 million kilowatt-hours. 'Afrin Dam can generate nearly 20 million kilowatt-hours.

The dams are also extremely important at the agricultural level. It is well-known that the yield of irrigated lands is at least fourfold the yield of rain-irrigated lands. It is obvious that these dams can supply primarily large volumes of water for irrigation.

However, the process of generating electricity from these dams is extremely important and is a vital requirement at the present time, especially in the wake of the rise in the price of oil derivatives. This price increase is expected to escalate in the future with the decline of the oil reserves, thus making the production of electricity from plants operated by heavy oil and fuel oil extremely costly.

In this regard, we must note that our country is considered a pioneer among the Third World countries in relying on waterfalls for the generation of electricity. The hydro-electric plant on the great Euphrates River, with its 8 turbines which have a capacity of 800 megawatts, was able to supply 94 percent of the country's electricity needs in 1974. The electricity generated by the Euphrates Dam has been able to turn a profit equal to the costs of the dam within a short period of its being put into operation.

CONSTRUCTION OF SYRIAN SECTION OF HEJAZ RAILROAD TO BEGIN SHORTLY

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 23 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "Construction of Hejaz Railroad Between Damascus and Jordanian Borders to Begin in 3 Months"]

[Text] The question of constructing the Hejaz railroad between Damascus and the Jordanian borders was discussed at the meeting held on the 20th of this month under the chairmanship of the minister of transport and in the presence of the assistant minister of transport, the director general of the Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment, the director general of the Syrian railroads and the director of the transport and communications section of the State Planning Authority.

The assistant director general of the Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment has pointed out in an interview with an AL-BA'TH reporter that the minister of transport stressed the importance of this project and of implementing it as soon as possible.

The following decisions were taken at the said meeting:

1. The Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment specifically will be responsible for construction of the Hejaz railroad between Damascus and the Jordanian borders in accordance with the specifications agreed upon by the governments of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia so that this section may be linked in the future with the other sections of the railroad located within Jordan and Saudi Arabia (the specifications referred to call for the railroad to have a width of 143.5 centimeters and to accommodate a speed of 140 kilometers [per hour] for passenger trains and 100 kilometers for freight trains, with the possibility of passenger train speed being increased to 200 kilometers in the future).

2. In view of the fact that the Hejaz railroad is of an international nature, the said project is considered an international project and the special laws applying to the Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment, especially the unified agreement concluded between Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and ratified legally by each state, shall apply to it.

3. It has also been decided to continue to observe the instructions of his excellency the deputy prime minister calling for the Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment to take charge of constructing the said railroad.

4. Continue allocation of the full appropriations needed to implement the said project in the fifth 5-year plan and in the budgets of the coming years (1982-85).

5. The Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment has been asked to prepare a preliminary memorandum containing the reasons dictating the construction of a railroad linking al-Suwayda' Governorate with the country's railroad network.

On the other hand, the assistant director general of the Hejaz Railroad Public Establishment has pointed out that the length of the aforementioned railroad between Damascus and the Jordanian borders is 114 kilometers and is expected to cost 360 million Syrian pounds.

The executive studies pertaining to this railroad are expected to be started in the next few weeks. It will take 14 months to complete these studies after which the comprehensive implementation of this big project will start. However, this doesn't preclude initiation of the efforts to secure the raw materials and to start (the works covered by the preliminary studies). The railroad between Damascus and the Jordanian borders is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1985 at the most.

5494

CSO: 4404/132

## BRIEFS

ALEPO INVESTMENT BUDGETS--The Governor of Aleppo has announced that the two 1982 draft investment budgets of the departments of the local government and of the Aleppo Municipality have been approved in preparation for their final ratification. The figures of the investment budget for the local government departments have amounted to 369,596,000 pounds, of which 150 million Syrian pounds have been allocated for the projects to construct school buildings, 132 million for drinking water projects, 38.5 million for road projects, 2.3 million for irrigation and water resources projects, one million pounds for culture, 29.5 million for health projects and 16.5 million pounds for social affairs and labor projects. The governor has added that the total sum of the Aleppo Municipality investment budget for next year amounts to 511,535,000 Syrian pounds, of which 10.5 million have been allocated for the construction of a number of sewers with a total length of 40 kilometers. The city will give priority to the construction of these sewers. It is estimated that the number of citizens benefiting from them will exceed 34,000 citizens. The draft budget also calls for the construction of 670 housing units (in two installments). This is in addition to implementing the project for the three roads scheduled to be constructed in the city of Aleppo in accordance with decree No 40. [Text] [Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 22 Oct 81 p 3] 8494

COTTON SEED PRODUCTION--Next season's production plan of the Public Seed Production Establishment in Aleppo calls for the production of 24,000 tons of cotton seed of the Aleppo/40 variety and other varieties, 33,000 tons of various types of wheat, 10,000 tons of potato seeds, 1,500 tons of barley seeds, 200 tons of millet seeds and 25 tons of Cypriot bean seeds. The establishment's director general has asserted that the cotton seed volume will meet the country's needs, with a 20 percent surplus. As for wheat seeds, the plan drawn up until the end of 1985 insures the replacement of 32 percent of the annual wheat seed needs instead of the current plan, which ends this year, that insures replacement of only 32 percent of the country's needs of improved wheat seeds. As for barley, millet, potatoes and Cypriot beans, the quantities set by the plan are enough to meet the country's needs. The produced quantities will be increased in light of the distribution capabilities. [Text] [Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 26 Oct 81 p 3] 8494

CSO: 4404/132

DIALOGUE INTERVIEWS MAHMOUD MESSAADI

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 376, 16 Nov 81 pp 14-18

[Interview with Mahmoud Messaadi, president of the Chamber of Deputies, on the occasion of his election as president on 9 November, by Raja El Almi and Hammada; date and place not specified]

[Text] The new Chamber of Deputies, which resulted from the early elections of 1 November 1981, began its period in office last Monday [9 November] by electing its president, Mahmoud Messaadi, his two vice presidents--Mrs Fathia Mzali and Abdelaziz Beltaief--as well as its various committees. A thinker and an author of great talent, whose works are among the most original and closely reasoned in the Arab world, Mahmoud Messaadi is also a man of action who has had to act to translate his commitments into concrete form, at the political and trade union levels. The author of "Al Sud" ["The South"] and "Le Barrage" ["The Dam"] has never felt "pulled in two directions" in devoting himself at the same time to writing and to political action. As a former member, for 4 years, of the Executive Council of UNESCO and winner in 1978 of the Bourguiba Prize for the encouragement of literary endeavor, the new president of the Chamber of Deputies concerns himself in particular, in the interview which follows with an intense analysis of research and the extent of the consensus brought out by solid, pertinent, and responsible debate in the framework of participation in the Chamber of Deputies and in the consolidation of the democratic process under way in Tunisia.

[Question] You have just been elected president of the Chamber of Deputies. And the name of Mahmoud Messaadi is far from being unknown to Tunisians who see in him a writer, a thinker, a man of culture, a trade union member, and a politician. In the course of your life and at this proud moment in the life of the nation, would you introduce us to the president of the Chamber of Deputies in his present situation?

[Answer] I have always advocated a sense of responsibility among men. I mean men in the fullest sense of the term, men with a capital "M." A total responsibility, in which there can be no distinction made between the responsibility of the intellectual, the man of action, the patriot, or even that of the politician or finally that of a man of culture.

For me, all that is one entity, in this sense that there are only the various aspects or manifestations of the development and exercise of this integrated responsibility. In the same way these are the practical means of exercising this responsibility which initially make one appear to be a writer, an intellectual, either first as a statesman or political leader or as the leader of a cell or a president of the Chamber of Deputies.

For the man who has this integrated and total conception of responsibility, there is hardly any difference. Only the forms are different.

Thus, I have always had the feeling of serving my country, in the same way, whether I was a simple professor, a simple activist within the Destour Party, the president of the Federation of Educational Trade Unions, the deputy secretary general of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], or still when I took my modest part in the final struggle for national liberation in the years from 1952 to 1956.

I have always had the feeling of acting according to this sum of intimate beliefs, developed at the age when I prepared and defined my responsibility as a man, which implied, among other things, this fundamental commitment toward the society to which I belong.

Crucial problems were raised for me at the very moment when I was considering what should be my responsibility as a man, in the form of a dilemma: how to achieve and ensure my human identity in the most authentic sense of the term? Should this be done by deepening my reflection on relationships developed in my mission as a man, or should it be developed by deepening my action, my effort, going into the deepest resources of a human being, considering while being and, faced with this fact, to conceive the responsibility of a man within the limits of the development of individuality.

Consequently, by agreeing to exist--I would not say outside--but neither inside the sense of relationships, roots, and social integration. That is a major problem which gives rise, which creates egotistical men who can be very great minds, who can even be geniuses, but these are geniuses in the sense of individual originality, personal in character. Literature and philosophy provide many and undeniable examples of this.

Or still--and this is the second element of the dilemma--is it a fact that the full unfolding of humanity in a human being, even on the individual level, should be conceived first of all as participation in the life of others?

In other words, can one be more fully a man in the sense of the most committed, the most demanding humanity by going into the depths of existence or is it a fact that there is no greater honor, no more beautiful development, no fuller humanity to be unfolded--I would not say this in the horizontal sense--than with and in others?

We then stop feeling alone, the limits of the individual are lost, and we have the feeling that we can only exist in this participation in the lives of others.

It is on these foundations that I have built, developed, defined, and assumed my responsibility as a human being.

All of the works which I have written are witness to this. This is also true of my life. I have done this without ever having the feeling of living two or three different lives, or of turning back or changing. I retain, as president of the Chamber of Deputies--for this considerable honor has fallen to me at the end of a career which, thank God, will be continued as long as God gives me the strength--a feeling which is exactly like that I had on the first day, when I became involved in political action. This is what seems to me the most important thing in this integrated development of a sense of responsibility which normally places me in my different missions, in my different duties, without my having the feeling that I am changing my life.

[Question] You have participated in all of the elected Chambers of Deputies. You have thus seen from within, the development of this most important institution of Tunisia. Could you speak to us of the history of this Chamber and describe to us its present situation, that is, at a crucial stage of national life, on the eve of the implementation of an ambitious development plan and in the straight line of the democratic process in which the country is engaged.

[Answer] I have had the honor, in effect, of participating in this assembly which is now called the Chamber of Deputies, from 1959 to the present, without any gaps.

Following the achievement of independence, a republican system was established on the institutional foundations defined in the Constitution, in the framework of a state of development, a stage of sociological evolution, which have progressed gradually from the time of independence to today. This republican system has therefore been established in a country, a society whose character is perfectly well-known.

I have personally lived through this since, in 1958, in accordance with this mission given me by President Bourguiba and following his directives, the republican regime undertook the transformation of the human being in this country. This has been done by organizing, thanks to the progressive development of education and thanks to its spread throughout the country according to a 10-year plan, the accession of every Tunisian man, of every Tunisian citizen, to full responsibility as an element in a society within which a new destiny has been turned over to him by the republican regime.

To evaluate the path we have followed, we must return to the starting point, to the basic considerations and fundamental constraints which then characterized Tunisia.

What we needed then was not only to transform the Tunisians by education into human beings as agents of their own economic and social development, but we first had to provide the country with the cadres we needed. Tunisia acceded to independence having not even 5 percent of the cadres necessary to assume state responsibilities, we were preoccupied by this question, and we had to train them quickly. It is this task which was undertaken in the space of a 10-year plan which looked from the beginning like a more ambitious, bold plan but which was--thank God!--achieved and has fully produced fruits.

This undertaking, which thus pertained to the concern with providing the state with the cadres which it needed urgently to sustain it, had another purpose. It

was that of permitting Tunisians to reach a level of training, education, or instruction such as to give them means of gradually assuming responsibility, not just the daily activity of the engineer or the government official, but also of thinking about their future and the future of their society. To think about it and to assume his responsibilities.

Beyond the training of cadres there was the matter of the training of the citizens who would one day, in the framework of this regime, be called on to replace the generation which, before independence, had thought a little about the people. We must say that the Tunisian people had the immense good fortune of finding in its first group of leaders--at the head of whom President Bourguiba has stood from the 1930's to the present--those who thought out for themselves their own role in turn and who went on to say so. Our people were illiterate. On the whole, they were people who had been kept absolutely outside, excluded from, placed on the margins of the country. Totally. Perhaps now people can't imagine what this situation was.

Now the citizen--even if illiterate--is in direct contact with life, because there is radio, television, the newspapers, because he participates in the life of his country. The situation in Tunisia before independence would be very simply defined as follows: The whole population was kept outside the framework of life and was not even involved in its own future. It was kept in total ignorance. Nothing was done to make the people understand anything, because it was considered dangerous to make the people aware of the slightest problem and, above all, of the problems which their own destiny involved. It was therefore necessary, and this is what President Bourguiba did, beginning with his policy of direct contact, to begin the educational effort aimed at making the Tunisian citizens aware of the responsibility which they must assume personally in order to change their own conditions. That is what permitted Tunisians to become aware at the same time of their identity and of their rights. It required all of the courage, perseverance and imagination of President Bourguiba to succeed in transforming this inert mass of people, drawing out their capacities which permitted Tunisia to accede to its independence.

What was done, thanks to this first group of leaders, thanks to this genial man who thought and explained so much, has been continued under other forms since independence. For the party, this education which he gave it and which tended to awake patriotic feelings so that Tunisians would become agents of their own independence, has been transformed into education and civic training. This is what has made it possible for this regime to send to the National Assembly the best of the children of this people, of this country, and those who could make their contribution to the formulation of policy in the executive branch of the government, thanks to the training which they have had. For the most part the first group of leaders did not have university degrees, but they brought to the National Assembly the help of their training in civics, as activists party members perfectly well understanding the designs and political views of the country.

Based on the situation which I have just described and analyzed, it can be said that the successive legislative bodies worked in the direction of bringing elements which had come out of the people, whatever their situation, whatever their intellectual level, whatever their state of awareness and their ability to assume the responsibilities related to the future of the state.

We can say now that we have the possibility--thanks to the progress achieved in terms of the policy tirelessly followed--of ensuring the participation, in election after election, in Chamber of Deputies after Chamber of Deputies, of a people more and more capable of assuming responsibility for the problems and complexes which pertain to their own development.

The people's aptitude is in this direction, ever greater, more and more total, thanks to the very progress achieved by the country.

What you were saying--and I would not make a distinction between the present Chamber and its predecessors--places the last elections in a context which correctly illustrates this continuous progress in terms of the development of awareness, of raising the level of responsibility, in which this process of assuming responsibility has taken place. In the first years of independence we had simpler problems. Now we have more delicate responsibilities. For example, we have those related to a multiparty system. Let us say it clearly, a thing which was absolutely unthinkable a few years ago. The multiparty system, with what that presupposes in terms of development of the sense of political and national responsibilities.

That question is always posed in temms of life or death for a nation, for if, behind this effort there is no assurance that there are men capable of rising to the level of their enormous responsibility for the future of the nation, if we are not talking about men of this temper, there would be great risks in allowing a multiparty system to be established which, given the state of the world, could be exploited and end in something like a catastrophe.

In other words, let us say it frankly and simply, there are times when the interests of the nation demand that safeguards be established, that we remain prudent while working in the direction of greater freedom, while favoring the increased participation of the people. Thus, it was necessary to judge the degree of maturity, the political sense, and the sense of nationhood of the masses of the people. Not only the elite, because behind the elite there are the voters. And if the mass of the voters do not choose the best, a choice which guarantees the future of the nation, there are risks in allowing the practices of a multiparty system to become firmly set in the direction of what ended by destroying certain republics, even among the advanced countries. It is only necessary to recall the striking example of the final period, the decadence of the Third Republic in France, which ended by crumbling because of the errors resulting from the evolution of the party system. We therefore had to move toward the installation of a more and more liberal, republican regime which permitted a growing participation of the voters, to the extent that they became more and more able to make the best possible choices.

We can say that what characterized the period we are presently going through is precisely the fact that the party, with President Bourguiba at its head, has accepted or noted a state of evolution among the people which has allowed us to think that we could call on the voters to participate more fully in political choices, which implies the mutliparty system. This undertaking consisted in saying to all of the people: We think that you are presently capable of making your choice without our being required to take precautions or establish safeguards other than a certain number of normal conditions (no allegiance to foreign countries, respect for the Constitution and the legitimacy of the president, etc.).

The voters responded to that, and this is an important achievement, by demonstrating their ability to make the best choice. On the one hand they found themselves faced with a clearly defined policy, perfectly clear programs, a logic which had been applied to action, which knew how to remain faithful to itself over a period of 25 years, and which intended to continue with the same purposes, with the same intentions, with the same means, while developing its efficiency. On the other hand the voters also were presented with an ideology imported from abroad, or an attempt to resume a policy whose disastrous effects in the 1960's were known to everyone, or a program tending to present a political doctrine, that of the Destourian Socialist Party, on the basis of socialism and democracy, which the party has always applied, not on the basis of a program--since they have not succeeded in developing a program--but an assortment of criticism and disparagement.

The people therefore made their choice where they had certain elements and precise commitments to deal with. I can testify to this, since I was at the head of the party list in Cap Bon. We went to the people.

We engaged in a dialogue with them, and I can tell you that the people did not go to vote simply on the basis of the love or the gratitude they feel for President Bourguiba. They went to vote with their eyes wide open, fully aware of what they were doing. They gave their support to a policy which they approved. A policy was presented to the voters and was approved by them, not only on the basis of fidelity to the party, of what it did for them in the past. Rather, it was on the basis of their saying that they agreed, that they understood that the party would continue this policy. This is a commitment. We were only elected on the basis of the commitment which we made to the people, who asked us what we were doing. The people made their choice.

This is a perfectly well reasoned and clear choice. It is a political and not only a patriotic choice. It was the expression by a people of confidence in the patriotic men who served them. Perhaps the people were not yet capable of assuming the role of judge of their policies and of demanding that they account for their action. Now, the people have done this. They have asked for a rendering of accounts, and this has been given them. These were choices made by an adult people who judged, not at the level of gratitude to the president and the men who work with him, but on the basis of judging our party in terms of its program, its actions in the past, and its proposals for the future. For the people are permitted to be ungrateful. And I assure you that if we had presented to the Tunisian people a program which they did not approve of, they would not have voted in our favor. Thus, this concerns a conscious and responsible vote.

[Question] What will be the role of this multiparty chamber in which all the seats are held by candidates of the "National Front," in the consolidation of the democratic process?

[Answer] First of all, I distrust predictions. I will only express points of view which can be nothing more than hypotheses. The establishment of the National Front in fact is only a reaffirmation of what has characterized the nationalist movement, taking into account the evolution of events which has led to an examination of conscience on the part of the parties making up the National Front. Each of these partners is aware of its political responsibility. Within each

organization making up the National front a kind of sense of political responsibility has emerged, and thus the feeling that they are no longer simply responsible for a particular sector, but also that they have a political responsibility at the level of the definition of the elements to include in the development plans. This political responsibility should be reflected in the activity of the Chamber of Deputies. Each of the organizations which make up the national front has a better understanding of the problems in their respective sectors. And it is their particular capacity which puts them in a position to provide the best contribution to the better definition of the policy to be established within the general framework of things.

The National front is made up of more and more specialized elements, more and more capable of going deeply into our problems. It is in this sense that we can speak of a more responsible Chamber. In this Chamber there is neither a majority nor a minority. There is a Chamber which is not monolithic but which is a single body and which is diversified at the same time. There is a unity of choice, of vision, of will in a variety of capacities, of deep understanding of different areas. On the whole, there is a union of wills which nothing separates in terms of the objectives, the general will and political tendency, but which are distinguished by the specific details of their capacities. Democracy in Tunisia is illustrated by the process of consensus. Let me, in this connection, say that those who say they are against unanimous expressions of views do not understand anything about what is presently happening in Tunisia. More and more--as in international institutions--consensus is replacing formal votes. Let us discuss this at different levels.

First, at the level of the committees, and then with the executive branch a dialogue is undertaken, in the course of which convictions are established between those who are "for" or "against" a given course of action. A determining balance is arrived at by placing these on the scale. The balance winds up by coming down on one side, but that does not mean in any way that there is nothing on the other side. However, when the balance inclines to one side, without a formal vote, we have emerged with a consensus. In these circumstances it is mere formality to speak of a vote. The essential aspect is to discuss, to put into the balance all the arguments as necessary in favor of this or that thesis. Once this responsible effort at reflection and argumentation is undertaken, once the best decision is reached, what counts the most is the process which emerges. Moreover, I am astonished that people speak of a unanimous vote. These were not unanimous votes. They took place without formal opposition, that is, accepted by consensus. The question is to know how decisions are made. Are they made by a process of argument in the framework of reaching a consensus, of discussions. If things happen in this way, that is democracy and that is also an example of pluralism. We do not represent an opinion multiplied by 10 or by 100. Within the national front we are a group of organizations, each making its contribution in the framework of consensus.

[Question] In the next 5 years will people talk of a real "Messaadi style" in building over the new Chamber of Deputies?

[Answer] Personally, I don't much believe in a personal impact on the institutions of the state. There can be a personal contribution to progress, to the improvement of a given situation. I have seen this assembly function, but I do not know

it from the inside, at the wheels in motion level or of its manner of functioning. However, I am persuaded that improvements could be made. The machine will continue, for the moment, to function at its usual pace, the more so as we must very soon begin the examination of the 1982 budget. Considering my experience in certain national institutions and my experience in the Chamber of Deputies, the latter's function will certainly require evolving in terms of the more and more complex role which it will have to play. My experience in international organizations leads me at present to ask myself in what way we can introduce what is called the method of "working groups" which undertake "in depth studies." If standing pat is dangerous, hasty reforms are even more so.

[Question] With this new responsibility as presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies, does this mean that Messaadi the intellectual and writer will still find enough time to continue to write for ECRIRE?

[Answer] Whatever my work and however little leisure time I have, the process of reflection does not stop. What is lacking in the latter case is the time for technical implementation, the formulation of what is the product of thought. I have a large number of notes which I have not found time to put in finished form. Therefore, they remain in draft because I have not found it possible, in my mind and in my conscience, to decide definitely that I have served my country enough and what I could isolate myself in my ivory tower to bring out a book one day.

5170  
CSO: 4519/59

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

RA'S AL-KHAYMAH RULER DISCUSSES GCC, BORDER ISSUES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 240, 1 Dec 81 p 27

[Interview with the Ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah by 'Ali Hashim: "Change in UAE Constitution Possible"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Shaykh Saqr Ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, the Ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah and member of the Supreme Council of the UAE government, declared that his Emirate, and the UAE itself, was holding on to the island of Abu Musa, which previously had been occupied by Iran, during the shah's reign in 1971.

The Shaykh emphasized that Abu Musa was an Arab island which, throughout history, has belonged to Ra's al-Khaymah for hundreds of years, and whose population was and still is Arab.

I met with Shaykh Saqr in his old office in the al-Ma'murah section of Ra's al-Khaymah. In the meeting he stressed that establishing the government of the UAE was a huge accomplishment. Regarding the government's experience, through the past 10 years, he said that it was a success, and that the proof was the accomplishments that it had achieved. "People thought that the federation structure would not last, but it has been proved that it is solidly anchored and will not become shaky. No one can break it apart, because it is stronger than he who tries.

The Constitution In Practise

With regard to keeping the constitution "temporary" for the past 10 years, and postponing work on it for another 5 years, he said: "There are no temporary or permanent constitutions in the world. Even in Great Britain, there is no written constitution. Regimes change, as well as constitutions, but what does not change is the direction to society and its development in it and with it. Our constitution is the Koran. We apply what is compatible with the Shar'iah."

[Question] Do you as ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah and a member of the Supreme Council believe that a change of some sort might occur in the government's structure, after work on the temporary constitution was extended, the extension of the presidency of Shaykh Zayid, and the need for the present government's resignation decreed?

[Answer] Change might occur if the head of the government and his deputy want it. They are constitutionally authorized to do that. We left that matter in the hands of the president and his deputy. If they deem the public interest occasions

a change, then they must decide. Change is possible, and this is natural and normal, and occurs in every nation in the world. Even though one does not expect constitutional change as such, these things are subject to circumstances and developments, and could occur even in ordinary days. If those concerned see a need to make a governmental modification, so be it.

#### Gulf Cooperation Council

[Question] What about the GCC? Is it in the region's best interests?

[Answer] Yes it is in the region's interests. We hope that it will succeed and becomes firmly established. The region, through its states and emirates, decided to unite politically and socially. Measures were adopted to implement that. The kings and heads of state took the steps required to achieve the aspirations of the people of the region. Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayan played a large part in establishing the council.

[Question] What about Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Sau'd's plan and what happened at the Fez summit?

[Answer] Saudi Arabia studies every step and every word, and then studies the aspects of all that. The Saudis studied the Middle East problem and submitted their plan. It is up to the opponents to be good enough to prove their point. Previously, the Saudis have only submitted wise views, most especially Prince Fahd, who has far-reaching aspirations. I don't doubt for a minute that ultimately it will be all right. Carrying out Fahd's plan is a journey that must be taken. If we reject it, then let us find an alternative. If we are incapable of presenting an alternative, or present an absurd alternative, then this means paralysis. We must now accept solutions that are internationally possible and acceptable.

#### The Border With Oman

[Question] What has happened to the border dispute with the Sultanate of Oman?

[Answer] All of us know that brothers differ at times. However, guiding wisdom always ends the differences. The issue with Oman has been finally settled. The guiding wisdom enabled us, along with our Omani brothers, to overcome the so-called border issue. We must acknowledge that the UAE vice president and prime minister, the ruler of Dubai, Shaykh Rashed Ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, played a large part in reaching the final solution.

[Question] What about oil in the Emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah?

[Answer] Drilling has been done, and we obtained oil, and it was burned off for a month. It was then determined that its presence was insufficient for commercial exploitation. Now, new drillings are underway. We have learned from past mistakes and experience. We hope for the best.

0001  
ISI: 44-4/184

ABU DHABI SURPLUS EXPECTED TO FALL

London 8 DAYS in English No 2, 16 Jan 82 p 37

[Article by Graham Benton]

[Text]

**ABU DHABI'S** cash surplus is shrinking fast under the impact of falling worldwide oil prices and depressed demand. A surplus of only \$1bn this year is foreseen by Abdul Malik al Hamar, the UAE central bank's governor — a fall from the richer days of 1980 when it was \$5bn. He estimates that last year's surplus may have decreased to \$2.3bn.

What is left after commitments in 1982 will go substantially into dollar and yen investments. Interest in the dollar marks a partial reversion to the safety of the US currency after the recent diversification into other currencies. Yen investments, on the other hand, have attracted Abu Dhabi in the past but are still considered rather controversial. At the heart of the emirate's dilemma is the choice between the best return on investment and the safest haven for the shrinking cash surplus.

Abu Dhabi's annual surplus is made up of the oil export revenues left after payments to the federal and local government, aid grants to foreign governments (as well as the Abu Dhabi fund for Arab Economic Development and other pan-Arab and international aid institutions), and the payments made to the privy purse of the UAE president, Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi. This latter is reckoned to constitute about four per cent of Abu Dhabi's oil revenues.

The central bank's al Hamar estimates

that income from existing foreign investment will more than double next year, to around \$1bn. Investment of the surplus is largely the responsibility of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (Adia), which is currently thought to be handling about \$12bn. Diversification into West German and Japanese securities in the late 1970s reportedly reduced the dollar component of Adia's portfolio to around 45 per cent: the interest shown in dollar investments by Abu Dhabi investment officials in 1982 thus marks a shift of emphasis back to old investing grounds.

According to al Hamar, the dollar is enticing because of the new free banking zones created for international banks in New York. He was recently reported as saying that the new offshore banking system 'may lock deposits of \$120bn to \$130bn into the US area, which will definitely strengthen the dollar' (even though Arab banks have shown little interest in the new zone).

In the past, Abu Dhabi's US investments have centred on stocks in utilities, banks, oil, and chemical and forest product stocks. But Adia was chiefly known in the late 1970s for extensive buying into airline shares, including such industry heavyweights as TWA, Eastern, Braniff and United.

Given the poor performance of US air-

lines of late — especially Braniff, which has been close to bankruptcy — this may not have been a wise choice. But a spokesman for Morgan Guaranty Trust, which bought the stocks for Adia, once commented that, since the stocks were undervalued when Adia bought them, 'they ought to get quite a ride for their money'.

At all events, Adia is not interested in high-risk investment. The US has always been favoured, since it provides political stability and regulated markets. Adia officials say it operates 'essentially as a pension fund for indigenous nationals of Abu Dhabi, with investment tending toward minimum market and credit risk.'

Investment strategy for 1982 is based on the assessment that foreign exchange developments will move away from interest differentials, and back to such economic fundamentals as inflation rates and current account balances. They believe that the dollar will benefit from the diversification of the US economy, its liquidity and capacity to absorb capital, and its political security.

Like the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, however, UAE investment officials continue to find Japan particularly alluring. They have been slightly nervous of investing in yen funds, partly because the outlook for the Japanese economy has been clouded by American and European resentment of Japanese trade policies.

CSO: 4400/122

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

DUBAI ALUMINUM PROJECTIONS--The Dubai Aluminium Company (DUBAL) has indicated that it feels it is "in the best possible position to take advantage of the metal price recovery now predicted for the second half of the year." Commenting on the company's 1981 annual report, DUBAL's Deputy Chief Executive Bill Willetts said: "We can look back on a year when performance exceeded expectations." He added that increased production and efficiency enable the company to look forward to a good year in 1982. All but 4,000 tonnes of DUBAL's 1981 production of 106,000 tonnes of high purity aluminium was sold before December, and 37,000 tonnes of 1982 production has already been sold. The past year saw the company steadily increasing its production reaching its full capacity of 135,000 tonnes in early October and raising it to 140,000 tonnes per year by the end of December. The production increase has been complemented by the institution of a cost-saving scheme which has reduced the controllable manufacturing cost of metal to below that of many leading American smelters. In addition to producing aluminium, DUBAL supplies the Dubai Water Department with desalinated water by using heat from the smelter that would otherwise be wasted. Last year the company provided the Emirate with an average of over 10 million gallons of water a day, nearly half of daily consumption needs. Tests have shown that this figure could be increased to 25 million gallons per day. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 3, 18 Jan 82 p 8]

CSO: 4400/122

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

Feb 22, 1982